ISLA Journal of International & Comparative Law by ISLA Journal of International & Comparative Law

ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER
INTERNATIONAL PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK EDITION
Volume 12 Spring 2006 Number 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Litigating the Holocaust in U.S. Courts:
Perspectives on the Process And its Aftermath
International Law Weekend Panel on Litigating
the Holocaust in U.S. Courts .................... Monica Dugot 389
Advancing the Effectiveness of International Law:
Is U.N. Reform Necessary?
Enhancing Accountability at the International
Level: The Tension Between International
Organization and Member State Responsibility
and the Underlying Issues at Stake ................. Ralph Wilde 395
The Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements:
Strengthening Compliance with International Commercial
Agreements and Ex-Ante Dispute Resolution Clauses?
After the Hague: Some Thoughts on the Impact
of Canadian Law of the Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements ......... H. Scott Fairley and John Archibald 417
The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Clauses ................................ Andrea Schulz 433
Applying Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law in the
Extraterritorial War Against Terrorism: Too Little, Too Much,
or Just Right?
Application of Human Rights Treaties
Extraterritorially to Detention of Combatants
and Security Internees: Fuzzy Thinking All
Around? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael Dennis 459
Filling the Void: Providing a Framework for
the Legal Regulation of the Military Component
of the War on Terror Through Application of
Basic Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict ...... Geoffrey Corn 481
International Law and the Humanities
International Law and the Humanities: Does
Love of Literature Promote International
Law? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Daniel Kornstein 491
International Arbitrators: Civil Servants?
Sub Rosa Advocates? Men of Affairs?
The Role of International Arbitrators ............... Susan Franck 499
What is War?
What is War? Terrorism as War after 9/11 ........... Jane Dalton 523
When is a War Not a War? The Myth of
the Global War on Terror ................ Mary Ellen O'Connell 535
"War" in the American Legal System .............. Detlev Vagts 541
U.N. Reform and the International Court of Justice
U.N. Reform and the International Court of
Justice: Introductory Statement ......... Amb. Andrew Jacovides 547
Is International Law a Threat to Democracy?
Is International Law a Threat to Democracy:
Framing the Question ......................... Andrew Strauss 555
On the Uneasy Relation Between International
Law and Democracy ............................ Carol Gould 559
War and Freedom of Expression
Political Conflict and Freedom of Expression
in Venezuela .......................... Amb. Alvarez Herrera 565
Hate Speech Under the American Convention
on Human Rights ............................ Eduardo Bertoni 569
Federal States and International Law
Connecticut and International Law ........ Houston Putnam Lowry 575
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Unique Issues of Compliance
Compliance Assessment and Compliance
Enforcement: The Challenge of Nuclear
Noncompliance ............................ Christopher Ford 583
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Unique Issues
of Compliance ............................ Gustavo Zlauvinen 593
Command Responsibility: Prosecuting Military Commanders and
Civilian Ministers for Violations of the Laws of War
The Importance of Customary International
Law During Armed Conflict ...................... Jordan Paust 601
INTERNATIONAL LAW WEEKEND PANEL ON
LITIGATING THE HOLOCAUST IN U.S. COURTS
Monica Dugot Esq.*
I joined Christie's a little over a year ago as Director of Restitution,
coordinating Christie's restitution issues globally. Restitution is a complex mix
of ethical, legal, and commercial concerns and raises ongoing challenges for an
auction house, both in terms of policy and practice. Before I share a few
thoughts on our approach to these issues, I'd like to begin by giving you some
background on what I was doing before joining Christie's, make a few remarks
about Holocaust-era art claims in general and finally give a brief history of
Nazi-era art looting to put all of this in context.
Most recently and for seven years, I was Deputy Director of the New York
State Banking Department's Holocaust Claims Processing Office, where I
assisted owners and heirs in seeking to recover art collections that were lost or
looted during the Nazi-era. The aim was to assist claimants in resolving art
claims, in a fair and non-litigious manner, through an open exchange of
information and cooperation. As an office within a state bank regulatory
agency, the office was and continues to be an especially valuable advocate for
claimants whose objects have been found in public or financial institutions, for
claimants with well-documented claims, and for claimants seeking to recover
paintings not necessarily of high monetary value.
Resolving these claims was facilitated to some degree by an expansion of
the legal framework in the last decade, through diplomatic initiatives, class
action lawsuits, new laws, and guidelines which include the 1998 Washington
Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art.
Given that each art claim involves a specific and identifiable object, art
claims have been resolved on a case-by-case basis. Because looted art has been
carved out of every Holocaust asset settlement to date, art claims have not been
funneled into a large process or commission. This differs substantially from the
more "wholesale approach" on the bank and insurance fronts where Holocaust-
era litigation resulted in the establishment of settlement funds, claims
processes, and tribunals set up to resolve claims.
Art claims are very fact-specific. The ability to find a resolution or to even
pursue a claim often depends on a myriad of factors including: in what country
* Monica Dugot, Esq. is a Senior Vice President and Director of Restitution at Christie's. This
article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at
the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
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or state the object is found or in which countries the object changed hands,
whether the painting is located in a public institution or in private hands, the
monetary value of the object, how much the current holder actually paid for the
painting, whether the current holder is a good faith purchaser and whether the
heirs are all in agreement as to a particular course of action.
Nazi-era art cases can be difficult to resolve because, as these works may
have been traded multiple times since the end of WWIL, passed through many
individuals, through several nations, many might have ended up in the hands of
good faith purchasers who had no knowledge that the work they acquired ten
years ago or more, from a reputable gallery, might have a tainted provenance
and may be stolen property. As a result, one often ends up with two victims:
the original owner and the unknowing purchaser.
Depending upon the claim, litigation might be the only way to reclaim
Nazi looted property but as is evident from the handful of lawsuits filed in the
United States involving WWII looted-art, litigation is not the most productive
avenue for reaching fair and appropriate solutions to these types of cases. The
emotional and financial costs associated with litigation are high. The legal
costs can easily end up being a sizable percentage of the actual value of the
work. Indeed, the legal costs can easily exceed the value of the work. The
Nazis looted across the board and many of the paintings they seized were not
limited to the museum quality seizures for the Fuhrermuseum that Hitler was
planning to build in Linz, Austria but rather, objects whose value was largely
sentimental. Finally, litigation results in resolutions that are unpredictable,
often cash-driven and anything but amicable.
Not surprisingly, to date, most WWII looted art cases have resulted in
settlement. To provide a bit of background on this, as is now known, vast
amounts of art were looted or displaced during the Nazi-era. Much of that art
was not restituted to its true owners. The looting of art by the Nazis before and
during WWII was not a mere incident of the German war effort, but was an
official Nazi policy. The Nazis systematically stole millions of pieces of art,
cultural artifacts and other objects from museums and private collections in
Europe. Those works and many collections were scattered across Europe, often
far from their countries of origin. Between 1933 and 1945, art was displaced
in a number of different ways which included forced sales, Aryanisations,
Degenerate Art de-accessioned by German museums, seizures by the Gestapo,
and theft by Russian and American soldiers. In the years immediately
following the end of World War II, art was also displaced by the Communists'
extensive nationalization of private art collections.
After the war, consistent with Allied policy, collecting points were set up
and looted objects generally were returned to the country of origin in cases
where that could reasonably be determined. These nations were then to make
restitution to victims under systems established in each country. However,
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thousands of looted objects remain in government hands. In addition,
thousands of looted works remain unaccounted for, but often surface in the
hands of dealers, auction houses and museums around the world. As has
become clear, many of the stolen pieces have ultimately ended up in private
collections and governments here and in Europe. Despite increased attention
to Holocaust-related gaps in provenance and so-called "red flag names," once
having entered the market, Nazi-looted art continues to be passed on, often
inadvertently.
More and more information concerning the ownership of these pieces has
emerged and continues to surface regularly. In addition to the opening up of
governmental archival records in many parts of Europe, there are a number of
databases that are and continue to become available. Books continue to be
published on the subject as well, many documenting pre-War collections and
supplying much-needed information to families who wish to pursue these
claims, as well as to current holders and dealers who are also faced with these
issues. Not surprisingly, as additional information continues to become
available, and given the greater access to information, the number of Nazi-era
claims is increasing.
Moreover, these displaced works are likely to surface more frequently in
the next few years as collections are passed on from one generation to the next.
As children and grandchildren inherit these objects, some will end up selling
them, in all likelihood largely unaware of the complete provenance and
therefore totally unaware of a possible restitution problem.
As with others in the art world, Christie's is aware of the importance of
being proactive with regards to these issues-from a moral, commercial as well
as legal standpoint. It has become clear that WWII spoliation issues are with
the art world for the long term. We are well aware that a number of these
objects will surface when offered up for sale. As intermediaries in the art
world, we have a responsibility to properly research property consigned to us
and to document the provenance of an object as accurately as possible so that
a purchaser can be confident that they are receiving clear title to the work.
From a commercial standpoint, given the art market's increased awareness
of these issues, it is unlikely that potential buyers at auction will bid on works
if they are not convinced that the work comes with a clear provenance. As one
example, the American Association of Museums guidelines now require that
museums take all reasonable steps to resolve the Nazi-era provenance status of
objects before acquiring them for their collections. One must also keep in mind
that provenance research is not only important with regards to questions of title,
but also important in terms of authenticity issues; and what we call a "good
provenance" can impact the value of an object.
A few brief comments on Christie's response to Holocaust-era looted art
issues-Our aim is to ensure that sales are handled as responsibly as possible
2006]
392 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:389
and that we do not inadvertently sell looted or spoliated objects. In order to
achieve this, we make certain that internally there is a high level of awareness
with regards to these issues and we work on ensuring that that awareness is
incorporated into Christie's day-to-day business and culture. If there is a
possible restitution problem with an object consigned to us, the goal is to
identify the problem early so that there is sufficient time to resolve the problem.
To the extent that Christie's can act as a neutral intermediary, helping to
seek a resolution that is fair to both parties, we do so. Where issues arise, we
strive to act as an "honest broker" amongst the parties. Presently, there is no
viable dispute resolution mechanism to resolve claims that arise as an
alternative to avoiding lengthy judicial proceedings. To be sure, Christie's role
is not to adjudicate these claims but where we discover a problem and find
ourselves in a situation where we can encourage a dialogue between consignor
and claimant, assisting the parties in reaching a settlement is a service we can
provide. Where the original owner is a private individual, a dialogue often
results in restitution, some monetary compensation or the sale going forward.
Where the original owner is a Government or museum, a deal often results in
the object being returned.
Although we ask our sellers to warrant that they have good title to the
property, as well as warrant that the property is free from third party claims, this
alone is no longer sufficient because of the complexities of these issues. Most
often, sellers legitimately believe that the work in their possession is free and
clear of claims. Christie's generally sells as agent rather than as principal. This
means that we are not the owners of the property that we sell and often have or
start off with incomplete provenance information when an object is consigned
to us.
What is often most critical to resolving Holocaust era art cases is access
to provenance information-once the facts are known, there is a greater chance
of reaching a solution. Although the perception is that auction houses have
access to all provenance information, it is worth pointing out that in the course
of researching objects consigned to us, we too run into roadblocks in trying to
obtain relevant documentation quickly. On occasion, key information simply
no longer exists. This is a problem for most wrestling with these issues, trying
to solve claims. Where Christie's can be helpful to third parties such as heirs
or museums in their research, we endeavor to do so. Similarly, given the
difficulties of this research work, we are grateful for the cooperation and
assistance of archivists, experts and others in this field.
Christie's completes various steps to ensure that objects are being offered
with as accurate and complete a provenance as possible. As I mentioned,
company-wide awareness of restitution issues is a critical step and involves
ongoing education and training of Christie's staff globally. In addition to what
we ask of the consignor which I described earlier, proper due diligence includes
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physically examining the object for marks and labels on the reverse of the
picture, researching the provenance of the object itself with the assistance of in-
house resources and tools, looking out for key gaps in provenance, as well as
checking lots against the published lists for art that was looted from individuals
and museums in all relevant countries.
As a final leg in our process, our catalogues are sent to the Art Loss
Register for checking. Complimentary catalogues are sent to claimant
representatives such as the Holocaust Claims Processing Office and others in
the field so that they can review our sales and make certain there are no matches
in our catalogues with objects they may be pursuing.
It is clear that the work that needs to be done is laborious and extremely
time-consuming but given where things stand at the moment, for instance the
lack of one single repository of archival information or central global database
which would greatly facilitate and expedite provenance research, these are the
steps we complete in order to ensure that we are not offering a lot we know or
suspect may have been spoliated and where they might be a dispute as to
ownership. Given the constant flow of paintings that pass through our doors
(Christie's offers around 200,000 objects a year), as well as the significant time
pressure under which we work as compared to, for instance, a museum with a
relatively unchanging collection, the task is a challenging one.
As a final thought, I should say that Christie's would support ideas and
initiatives that would facilitate the handling and resolution of some of the
Holocaust-era looted art issues I've talked about this morning, for instance
organizing all key information into a cost-neutral easily accessible centralized
repository or possibly supporting a more uniform set of laws governing the
adjudication of these issues, in a way that fairly balances the interests of all
parties. Although, as I've described, progress has been made with regards to
access to information, it is in everyone's interests that more be done, whether
it be working towards centralizing relevant data or digitizing often hard to
obtain archival data.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1945, international organizations have come to play a major role in
international and national affairs. All states (apart from the Vatican City) are
members of the United Nations and subject to the binding resolutions of the
Security Council, such as the series of resolutions imposing a broad range of
obligations relating to activities prescribed as 'terrorist';' many states are
subject to the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, from the WTO
dispute settlement process to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.2
Since 1945 international organizations have often been involved in the arena of
military action, whether in providing legal authority, such as the Iraq war in
199 1, or conducting operations on the ground, from all-out military campaigns
such as the NATO bombing of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
in 1999,4 to peace operations such as the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia
and Eritrea (UNMEE) stationed at the Ethiopia-Eritrea border.5
For those states that become the target for concerted international inter-
vention, the power wielded by international organizations can be acute,
especially in circumstances where international organizations assert administra-
tive prerogatives over territory.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, has
been subject to a UN-authorized regime of military occupation by NATO (from
1995 to 2004 through SFOR, formerly IFOR)7 and then the European Union
(through the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), since December
1. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333 U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19,2000); S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1390 U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1617 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
2. See generally PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
(1999).
3. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
4. See the information contained in the Legality of Use of Force cases before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Mar. 9,2006).
5. On the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), see
http://www.un.orglDeptsldpko/missions/unmee (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
6. On the range of projects involving the administration of territory by international organizations
since the beginning of the League of Nations, see e.g., R. Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond:
the Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 Am. J. INT'LL. 583 (2001) [hereinafter Wilde 2001 ].
7. See S.C. Res. 1031 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (Dec. 15, 1995) (discussing the establishment of
a multinational implementation force (IFOR)); S.C. Res. 1088 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (Dec. 12, 1996)
(discussing authorization of the establishment of a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as legal successor
to IFOR); see also the NATO IFOR and SFOR websites: http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm (last visited Nov.
5, 2005) and http://www.nato.int/sfor (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
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2, 2004)' and partial administration by a range of different international
structures, from the sui generis international organization called the Office of
the High Representative, which asserts the power to dismiss elected officials
and impose laws,9 to foreign nationals appointed by international organizations
sitting as members public bodies, such as the three members of the
Constitutional Court appointed by the President of the European Court of
Human Rights,'° and an OSCE-run electoral system, which operated from 1996
to 2004.11
More recently, international organizations in general, and the United
Nations in particular, have been placed under greater critical scrutiny, as
reflected in the UN reports on the failure to prevent the 1993 genocide in
Rwanda 2 and the July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica,"3 the outcry that followed
evidence of involvement of UN peacekeepers in trafficking and forced
prostitution 14 and the misuse of funds and corruption relating to the Oil for
8. See S.C. Res. 1575, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1575 (Nov. 22, 2004). See also the EUFOR website,
http://www.euforbih.org/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
9. On OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, e.g., Wilde, supra note 6, at 584 n.4 & 8,585 n.10,
594-96, 599-601, sources cited therein and accompanying text
10. On the international appointments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, e.g., Wilde, supra note 6,
at 584 n.9 sources cited therein and accompanying text, 597, 599.
11. On the OSCE's role in operating the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, e.g.,
Wilde, supra note 6, text accompanying note 91 and sources cited therein. On the first entirely locally-rn
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina since Dayton, see, e.g., Bosnia's Nationalists Lead Poll, BRITISH
BROADCASTING CORPORATION (BBC), Oct. 3, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/
3709340.stm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
12. See Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994
genocide in Rwanda, contained in the Letter dated Dec. 15, 1999 from the United Nations Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999).
13. See United Nations Secretary-General, Report pursuant to GeneralAssembly Resolution 53/35,
The fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,2006). In its 2004 judgment, the Trial Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia convicted Radislav Krstic, at the time of
the massacre the Chief of Staff and, subsequently, the Commander of the Drina Corps, a formation of the
Bosnian Serb Army whose zone of responsibility covered the Srebrenica area, of genocide, thereby providing
the first judicial determination that the Srebrenica massacre constituted genocide. See Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, 353, 688 (Aug. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialCl/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
14. See, e.g., United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, Report of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services on the investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa,
U.N. Doc. A/57/465 (Oct. 11, 2002); United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, Investigation by
the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. A/59/661 (Jan. 5,2005);
Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General, A
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Food Programme in Iraq which ran from 1996 to 2003." This more critical
climate has extended to the ever-expanding activities of the Security Council;
for example, in its report of 2004, the expert UN High-level Panel raised
concerns with the "terrorist list" which is used by the Council's so-called 1267
Committee to denominate the individuals and organizations in relation to whom
member states are obliged to take certain actions (e.g. freezing assets) under
some of the aforementioned terrorism resolutions.16 According to the High-level
Panel:
The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list
maintained by the Council and the absence of review or appeal for
those listed raises serious accountability issues and possibly violate
fundamental human rights norms and conventions.17
comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, U.N. Doc. A1591710 (Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the S-G's Special Advisor]; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HOPES BETRAYED: TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS TO POST-CONFLICT BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA FOR FORCED PROSTITUTION (Nov. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/bosnia/Bosnia1l02.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
15. The Oil-for-Food Programme was established by S.C. Res. 986 (1995), UN Doc. S/RES/986
(Apr. 14, 1995); the implementation of the programme started in December 1996, after the signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on 20 May 1996
(U.N. Doc. S11996/356 (May 20, 1996)). On the phasing down and termination of the Programme, see S.C.
Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,2003). See also U.N. OFFICEOFTHE IRAQ PROGRAM-OIL-FOR-
FOOD, http://www.un.orgIDeptsloip/index.html (last visited Nov, 5,2005). The allegations of mismanagement
and corruption in the context of the Oil-for-Food Programme have been recently confirmed by the
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Report on the
Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://www.iic-
offp.org/MgmtReport.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). See also Press Release, Secretary-General's
statement to the Security Council on receipt of the Independent Inquiry Committee (UC) report on Oil-for-
Food, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1657 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
16. The obligations so imposed on Member states include freezing the assets of listed individuals
or groups, preventing the entry into or the transit through their territories of listed individuals, and preventing
the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment to the individuals or groups
included on the list. See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333 U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1390 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16,2002); S.C. Res. 1455 U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1617
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). The implementation of these obligations is supervised by the so-
called '1267 Committee'. On the Committee, see UNrrED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE
ESTABLISHED PURSUANTTO RESOLUTION 1267, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267Template.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
17. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, 152, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2,2004) [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
See also Case T-315/01 Kadi v. Council and Commission, European Court of First Instance, Sept. 21, 2005.
In the academy, this shift towards a more critical approach is reflected the
decision of the International Law Association (ILA) to create an international
research Committee on the "Accountability of International Organizations,"
which completed its work in 2004.18
UN reform measures and proposals relating to accountability, including
those agreed at the Summit of the General Assembly in 2005, essentially
concern internal administrative measures, for example strengthening internal
oversight mechanisms including the Office of Internal Oversight Services
(OIOS), 19 creating a new Oversight Committee to co-ordinate internal
accountability mechanisms,2" introducing a new internal Office of Ethics, 2! and
strengthening staff codes of conduct and disciplinary measures.22 This internal,
administrative approach is reflected in the High-level Panel's prescription for
addressing the aforementioned accountability concerns it raised in relation to
the terrorist list maintained by the Security Council's 1267 Committee:
23
The A1-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a
process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions
claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists.24
18. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON THE
AccOuNTABumrY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2004) [hereinafter ILA 10 Accountability Report]
and Resolution No. 1/2004, both available at http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layoutcommittee.htm (last visited
Mar. 22,2006) (follow the 'Accountability of International Organizations' link). For further academic debate
on the accountability of international organizations, see the academic sources cited infra in notes 26 and 59.
19. On mandate, composition and functioning see United Nations Office of Internal Oversight
Services (OIOS) website, http://www.un.org/depts/oios (last visited Mar. 22, 2006); see also G.A. Res.
48/218B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218B (July 29, 1994); G.A. Res. 54/244, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/244 (Dec. 23,
1999); G.A. Res. 59/272, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/272 (Dec. 23, 2004). The 2005 World Summit Outcome
(recommended, inter alia, that "[tihe expertise, capacity and resources of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services in respect of audit and investigations... be significantly strengthened as a matter of urgency.") See
G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 164(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/l (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit
Outcome].
20. See generally the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, Measures to strengthen
accountability at the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/60/312, i 24-28 (Aug. 30,2005) [hereinafter S-G Report
on accountability]; 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 19, 164 (c).
21. See generally S-G Report on accountability, supra note 20, 140; see also 2005 World Summit
Outcome, supra note 19, 1 161 (d).
22. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 59/287,1 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/287 (Apr. 13,2005); UNITED NATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
IN 20-23 (2004); Report of the S-G's Special Advisor, supra note 14, [ 68-71.
23. On the Committee, see supra note 16.
24. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 17, 152.
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The only external, judicial measure being contemplated relates to
individual not UN responsibility, concerning the greater use of criminal
jurisdiction, with waivers of immunity if necessary, to enable the prosecution
of peacekeepers.25
The possibilities of using international and national structures to bring the
UN and other international organizations to account for their actions are limited
when compared to such possibilities existing with respect to states.26 In the
absence of effective legal remedies against international organizations directly,
attempts continue to be made to sue the member states, from the Tin Council
litigation of the 1980s27 to the cases brought to the International Court of Justice
25. See, e.g., Report of the S-G's Special Advisor, supra, note 14, M 78-90; S-G Report on
accountability, supra note 20, 1 49.
26. On the issue of remedies against international organizations see, e.g., KAREL WELLENS,
REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2002); James Crawford, The Charter of the United
Nations as a Constitution, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3, 12-15 (Hazel Fox
ed., 1997); Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Apr. 26); Difference Relating to Immunity
from Process of a Special Rapporteur, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 29) (hereinafter Special Rapporteur Case);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-L Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, in 14-22 (Oct. 2, 1995); ILA 10 Accountability Report, supra note 18, § 4. On the supervision
of the Security Council by the International Court of Justice see Questions of Interpretation and Application
of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K., Libya v.
U.S.A.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K., Libya v. U.S.A.),
Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 9 (Feb. 27); and the following commentary: T. Franck, The "Powers of
Appreciation ": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1992); V. Gowliand-
Debbas, The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light
of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643 (1994); B. Graefrath, Leave to the Court what belongs to the
Court: The Libyan Case, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 184 (1993); C. Tomuschat, The Lockerbie Case before the
International Court of Justice, 48 REvIEw OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 38 (1992); D.
Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control
ofDecisions ofthe Political Organs ofthe United Nations?, 46 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 309 (1997). On remedies
in the context of international territorial administration, see, e.g., R. Wilde, Accountability and International
Actors in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, 7 ILSAJ. INT'L&COMP. L455 (2001); R. Wilde, The complex role
of the legal adviser when international organizations administer territory, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 95TH ANNUAL MEETING 251 (2001); Case U9/00 (Constitutional
Court ofBosnia;20951;20951 and Herzegovina) (Nov. 3,2000) (evaluating the Law;20963;20963 on State
Border Service;20967;20967), available at www.hrc.ba (last visited Mar. 22,2006). On the law applicable
to international organizations, see the sources cited infra note 59 and accompanying text.
27. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Department of Trade and Industry and related appeals, Re
International Tin Council; Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v International Tin Council; Maclaine Watson & Co
Ltd v. International Tin Council (No 2) [198813 All ER 257 (Court of Appeal) (hereinafterTin Council cases
(CA)); [1990] 2 AC 418, [1989] 3 All ER 523, 81 I.L.R. 670 (1989) (House of Lords) (hereinafter 'Tin
Council cases (HL)). For commentary, see, e.g., C. Warbrick and 1. Cheyne, The International Tin Council,
36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 931 (1987); 1. Cheyne, The International Tin Council, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417
(1989); 1. Cheyne, International Tin Council (3), 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 945 (1990).
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and the European Court of Human Rights concerning the 1999 NATO bombing
campaign. 28 However, the view of most international lawyers, affirmed in the
Tin Council cases and endorsed by the Institut de droit international, is that
member states of an international organization do not incur legal liability for the
acts of the organization act by virtue of their membership of it.29 However,
some accept that member state responsibility might be in order if effective
remedies against international organizations are lacking.3"
This piece revisits the long-standing member-state-responsibility issue to
consider how advocates of the current legal position on it, and those who
countenance the possibility of recourse to member state responsibility,
understand the relationship between the two key policy issues at stake: the
effective functioning of international organizations, on the one hand, and the
promotion of accountability, on the other. I will suggest that both approaches
fail to accord due weight to the need for greater support generally by states for
enhanced scrutiny of international public policy.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXCLUSIVE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITY
The traditional approach to the law of international organizations conceals
the tension between international organization and individual state
responsibility, by conceiving responsibility for the acts of the organization (if
a distinct legal person, as with the United Nations) exclusively in terms of the
organization itself, not also the individual member states.
In international law, many important international organizations including
the UN enjoy distinct legal personality, separate from the legal personalities of
their member states.3' In other words, legally, they are more than the sum of
their (state) parts. A corollary to this idea is that the distinct legal person is
responsible for the organization's acts.32 In consequence, when member states
28. See the eight similar cases on Legality of Use of Force brought by Serbia and Montenegro
against the states involved in the military campaign, cited in supra note 4). See also Bankovi6 v. Belgium
and 16 Other Contracting States, Eur. Ct. H.R., Admissibility decision, Dec. 12,2001, reprintedin4l I.L.M.
517 (2002).
29. See discussion and sources cited infra, Part 2.
30. See discussion and sources cited infra, Part 4(c).
31. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, at 179 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries].
32. See Reparation for Injuries, supra note 31; Special Rapporteur case, supra note 26, at 66.
The United Nations International Law Commission (IL) is currently considering the topic of responsibility
of international organizations. For the Reports of the Special Rapporteur, Professor Giorgio Gaja, see First
Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, UN doc. AICN.4/532 (2003); Second Report on
Responsibility of International Organizations, UN doc. A/CN.4/541 (2004) Third Report on Responsibility
of International Organizations, UN doc. A/CN.4/553 (2005)). For consideration of the matter by the ILC, see
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perform certain acts as part of the structure of the international
organization-for example voting in the UN Security Council-as a matter of
law these acts are not state acts at all, but rather form part of the process of the
organization, for which the organization is responsible. Similarly, when states
act on behalf of the organization, and in the organization's name, as a matter of
law these are acts of the organization.
This situation might be denigrated as a "legal fiction" when compared with
the idea of state responsibility, but of course the concept of the state, and the
idea that state representatives engage the legal responsibility when they perform
acts in an official capacity, also involves imputing legal personality to an
abstract entity rather than a real person." Most international lawyers accept the
concept of legal personality and the correlative notion of distinct legal
responsibility on the part of international organizations; disagreement exists,
however, on the question of whether in addition to international organization
responsibility, member states are also liable for the acts of the organization-in
a secondary or concurrent manner-by virtue of their membership.
A minority of academic commentators have suggested that there is a
general rule of international law providing for such member state responsibility.
Such suggestions have been made in two main ways. In the first place,
commentators highlight the absence in international law of specific norms
providing for limited liability on the part of international organizations, a
position at odds with the treatment of corporations by many municipal legal
systems. It is argued that in the absence of such norms, member states are
secondarily responsible.34 This argument is challengeable on the grounds that
the absence of positive rules providing for limited liability is matched by the
absence of such rules providing for secondary liability. Even if, then, there is
a lacuna in the law, it is not by itself capable of leading to a conclusion of
either secondary or limited liability.35 Moreover, whether in this respect the
position of corporations in municipal law is analogous to the position of
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-seventh session (May 3 to June 3 and
July 11 to Aug. 5, 2005), UN doc. A/60/10 (May 2, 2005), Chapter V.
33. Certain 'official' acts can also give rise to individual criminal responsibility in international law.
See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003).
34. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS, NTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw 780 (2nd ed. 1980) and the
discussion in Rosalyn Higgins, Report on the Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-fulfillment
by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties 66 (1995) ANNUAIRE DE L'INsTrrUT
DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL, vol. I, 252 (hereinafter Higgins 1995], at 266-7; see also IGNAZ SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 119-20 (1987) [hereinafter Seidl-
Hohenveldern].
35. See Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 270, 286.
international organizations in international law is not to be assumed, as this
argument seems to suggest.
36
In the second place, it has been suggested that the presence of limited
liability clauses in the constitutions of some international organizations37
implies that for those constitutions without such clauses, as in the case of the
UN Charter, member states would be liable for the acts of the relevant
organizations. Thus the clauses modify a general rule of international law
providing for member state liability. However, such clauses could merely
reflect uncertainty about the state of international law, and/or be motivated by
a desire to warn third parties about where liability would lie.38 In the absence
of a detailed examination of the travaux preparatoires of all the organizations
with such clauses, and a consideration of the overlap of membership of such
organizations with other organizations constituted without exclusion clauses,
the significance of such clauses in terms of identifying a general rule of
secondary liability is unclear.39
These two arguments have traditionally formed the exclusive basis for
considering the possibility of secondary or concurrent state liability,' ° and their
weakness has led most commentators and judicial authorities to hold with a
general proposition of non-liability.4' This majority view, endorsed by the
Institut de droit international following the report of then Professor Rosalyn
Higgins, is that there is no general principle of international law whereby the
member states of the organization involved incur legal liability in consequence
of the acts of international organizations by virtue of their membership of such
organizations."2 Such liability can only subsist if the constituent instruments of
36. See id. at 267, 287.
37. For such exclusions, see the discussion in Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 271-72 and Sir
Ralph Gibson in the Tin Council cases (CA), supra note 27, [1988] 3 All ER 257, at 354.
38. Tin Council Cases (CA), supra note 27, [1988] 3 All ER 257, 354-55; Higgins 1995, supra
note 34, at 267, 271-73.
39. Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 273.
40. An argument has also been made that certain international organizations enjoy legal personality
that is only 'subjective,' viz. opposable only to member states, and not 'objective,' viz. opposable to non-
member states; because of this, member states are responsible for the acts of the organization as far as non-
member states are concerned. See the discussion in id. at 274-76.
41. See Tin Council cases (HL), supra note 27, 81 LL.R. 670 (1989), at 679--81 (Lord Templeman);
710-15 (Lord Oliver).
42. See Tin Council Cases (CA) and Tin Council Cases (HL), supra note 27. See generally Higgins
1995, supra note 34; INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION, THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR
MEMBER STATES OF THE NON-FULFILMENT BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS
TOWARD THIRD PARTIES (1995) available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig-chon 1993.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Institut Resolution].
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the international organizations explicitly provide for it, something which, as
mentioned, the UN Charter does not do in the case of the UN.43
Is this a politically supportable position?
1II. THE COMPETING POLITICAL ISSUES AT STAKE AND THE BALANCE
STRUCK BETWEEN THEM IN THE RATIONALE FOR THE LEGAL POSITION
When the Institut de droit international drew its conclusion as to the
absence of a general rule of member state responsibility, it did so having taken
into account the two main competing political issues as stake, which it
described thus: "the tensions existing between the importance of the
independent responsibility of international organizations on the one hand, and
the need to protect third parties dealing with such international organizations,
on the other hand".'
These competing principles might be understood in terms of the effective
operation of international organizations, on the one hand, and accountability,
on the other. How have these principles and the effect on them of member state
responsibility been understood in international legal discourse? How was an
outcome excluding such responsibility reached on the basis that it
accommodated both principles?
A. Policy Issue 1: The Operation of International Organizations
The first key political issue at stake concerns, in the words of then
Professor Higgins, "the efficient and independent functioning of international
organizations."45
The Institut describes the principle thus: "support for the credibility and
independent functioning of international organizations and for the establish-
ment of new international organizations."46
Member state responsibility as traditionally understood is seen as
undermining this principle. Professor Higgins points out that:
... if members know that they are potentially liable for contractual
damages or tortious harm caused by the acts of an international
organization, they will necessarily intervene in virtually all decision-
making by international organizations. It is hard to see how the degree
43. See Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 5; Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 273-74; see
also ROSALYN HIGGINs, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT47 (Clarendon
Press 1994).
44. Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at pmbl. (emphasis in original).
45. Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 288.
46. Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 8.
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of monitoring and intervention required would be compatible with the
continuing status of the organization as truly independent, not only
from the host state, but from its membership.47
Here, then, we see a potential problem caused by conceiving member state
responsibility for the acts of international organizations: paralysis within
existing organizations, with consensus required for every decision, and states
reluctant to create and support new international organizations in the future out
of a fear of running the risk of liability for future acts they may not be able to
control. Such responsibility necessarily contradicts the nature of those
international organizations conceived in a manner whereby all member states
are not necessarily able to control all the acts of the organization, for example
when decisions are taken by the Security Council.
B. Policy Issue 2: Accountability
The functional effectiveness principle is only one half of the picture,
however. On the other hand, we have what might be regarded as the account-
ability principle. In the first place, as Professor Higgins states, third parties
should be protected: "from undue exposure to loss and damage, not of their
own cause, in relationships with [international] ... organizations."48
Here the focus is on those affected by the actions of international organiza-
tions, who should be provided with legal redress when such actions lead them
to suffer harm or some other loss. This victim-orientated approach leads to the
related violator-orientated approach of avoiding impunity, promoting the notion
that, in the words of Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern: "a state cannot escape its
responsibility under international law by entrusting to another legal person
[e.g., an international organization] the fulfillment of its international obliga-
tions."49
Professor Brownlie argues that "a State cannot by delegation [e.g., to an
international organization] ... avoid responsibility for breaches of its duties
under international law.... This approach of public international law is not ad
hoc but stems directly from the normal concepts of accountability and
effectiveness."5
47. Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 288.
48. Id.
49. Seidl-Hohenveldem, supra note 34, at 121, quoted in Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 269.
50. I. Brownlie, State Responsibility: the Problem of Delegation, in VOLKERRECHT ZWISCHEN
NORMATIVEN ANSPRUCH UND POLITISCHER REALITAT. FEsTCHRIFT FUR KARL ZEMANEK, zuM 65
GEBURTSTAG 300-01 (Konrad Ginther et al. eds., 1994), quoted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, REPORT OF THE SEVENTIETH
CONFERENCE HELD IN NEW DELHI, 2-6 APRIL 2002 (2002), available at http://www.ila-
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Similarly, in two cases before the European Court of Human Rights, the
Court stated that:
where States establish international organizations . . . there may be
implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It would be
incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention,
however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their
responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity
covered by such attribution.5
In one of the English cases concerning the collapse of the International Tin
Council (ITC), an international organization, and the possibility of obtaining
remedies from member states of the organization, Lord Justice Nourse stated
that "international law would surely presume that states which were willing to
join together in such an enterprise [creating an international organization]
would intend that they should bear the burdens together no less than the
benefits. 52
These twin principles-that third parties affected by the acts of
international organizations should be given redress, and that states should not
be able to evade legal responsibility by transferring competences to inter-
national organizations-would clearly be supported if member states were
made legally responsible for the acts of organizations of which they are a
member.
C. Maintaining Lack of Member State Responsibility and Enhancing the
Accountability of International Organizations
How are the two policy issues outlined above accommodated by the
traditional position excluding member state responsibility? Certainly such a
position promotes the first policy objective of ensuring the effective functioning
of international organizations or, rather, fails to undermine this objective,
accepting, of course, the assumption that member state responsibility would
hq.org/html/main listofcomm.accountability.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter ILA Report] text
accompanying note 65.
51. Beer & Reagan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, Judgment of Feb. 18, 1999, 57 (1999),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Mar. 22, 2006). Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, App.
No. 26083/94, Judgment of Feb. 18, 1999, 67 (1999), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng. This
principle was invoked (by way of application, mutatis mutandis, to the creation of treaty obligations, in T.I.
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98 (2000), Admissibility Decision, Mar. 7, 2000, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
52. Tin Council cases (CA), supra note 27, [1988] 3 All ER 257, at 333 (Nourse LJ).
indeed have such an undermining effect were it to be introduced. Thus the
Institut de droit international resolved that
[I]mportant considerations of policy, including support for the
credibility and independent functioning of international organizations
and for the establishment of new international organizations, militate
against the development of a general and comprehensive rule of
liability of member States to third parties for the obligations of
international organizations.5 3
However, those supporting this position do not do so by disregarding the
accountability principle; they do not conclude that the effective functioning of
international organizations trumps the need to ensure accountability. Rather,
they seek to promote accountability through alternative means: greater
safeguards for third parties operating in relation to international organizations
directly. Professor Higgins argues that "a variety of protective measures should
properly be taken-whether insurance, or the demand of specific ad hoc
guarantees from members, or other measures. . . and the Institut concludes
that:
Important considerations of policy entitle third parties to know, so
that they may freely choose their course of action, whether, in relation
to any particular transaction or to dealings generally with an
international organization, the financial liabilities that may ensue are
those of the organization alone or also of the members jointly or
subsidiarily. Accordingly, an international organization should
specify the position regarding liability
1) in its Rules and contracts;
2) in communications made to the third party prior to the
event or transaction leading to liability; or
3) in response to any specific request by any third party for
information on the matter."5
This approach was formulated in the backdrop of the series of cases before
the English courts arising out of the collapse of the ITC mentioned above.
These cases concerned contracts freely entered into by private contractors with
the ITC. Such a "safeguarding" approach is inappropriate, however, in circum-
stances where third parties have not chosen the transaction in question-for
example when individuals are subject to the control of international
53. Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 8.
54. Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 288.
55. Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 9.
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organizations in field operations authorized by Security Council resolutions
passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or, more broadly, where the UN
fails to act to prevent human rights atrocities, as in Srebrenica and Rwanda.56
In the case of the conduct of territorial administration by the UN, individuals
are placed under the control of international organizations regardless of whether
they have accepted such control in the light of the remedies available to them."7
Whereas in transactions that are freely entered into, adequate remedies for
third parties would not necessarily be required-the key requirement being
transparency as to the nature of remedies, so that an informed decision can be
made-for transactions that are imposed, adequate remedies are arguably
necessary. In the case of a failure to protect, being "on notice" of a lack of
responsibility is beside the point; the idea here is that there should be a
responsibility to take effective action.58
The underlying rationale for the lack of member state responsibility in
relation to the acts of international organizations has to be understood, then, in
terms of a separate area of international law concerning the responsibility of
international organizations and the provision of remedies against these actors
directly. When the two are taken together, both policy objectives are seemingly
supported: the functioning of international organizations is not compromised,
nor is securing accountability and redress.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SETrLEMENT
A. Lack of Remedies Against International Organizations
The adequacy of the current legal arrangement in securing both effective
international organizations and proper levels of accountability presupposes an
adequate regime of responsibility, applicable law and remedies against
international organizations. However, as far as the law is concerned, whether
and to what extent international organizations are subject to national and
international law is relatively unclear;59 moreover, no standing international
56. On 'responsibility to protect,' see High-Level Panel Report, supra note 17. See also REPORT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/conuiission-report.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2006)
[hereinafter ICISS Report].
57. On international territorial administration, see, e.g., Wilde 2001, supra note 6.
58. On this point see High-Level Panel Report, supra note 17, l 199-203; see also ICISS Report,
supra note 56, in particular at 69 ff.
59. On the question of applicable law to international organizations, see generally MOSHE HIRSCH,
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLEs
(1995); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NEILS BLOKKER INTERNATIONAL INSTITLTIONAL LAW (3rd ed., 1990), §§
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court or tribunal enjoys jurisdiction to hear complaints brought directly against
international organizations, and such complaints are usually barred on the
domestic level due to the enjoyment of privileges and immunities.' Even if,
then, it is beyond question that international organizations are capable of being
legally responsible for their acts by virtue of their possession of international
legal personality,6' what law applies to them, and what judicial body exists to
apply this law directly in cases where it is alleged that the law has been
breached, remains uncertain.
For example, individuals complaining of a breach of their civil and
political rights by a member state of the Council of Europe would be able to
invoke the state's obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR) (provided the alleged breach took place within the state's 'j urisdiction'
for the purposes of the Convention), and if they were denied an effective legal
remedy against that state in domestic courts, would be entitled to bring a case
to the European Court of Human Rights.62 Such individuals complaining of a
1572-1582; Crawford 1997, supra note 26; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1998 (not yet in force),
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/trbtstat.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006); Interpretation of the
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, at 90 (Dec.
20); Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided
by SFOR and Others, 46 (Oct. 18, 2000); ILA 10 Accountability Report, supra note 18, pt. II, §§ 1-4 and
sources cited therein. On applicable law to peace/field operations in particular, see. e.g., Legal Opinions of
the Secretariat of the United Nations, Question of the possible accession of intergovernmental organizations
to the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims, 1972 U.N. JuRtD.Y.B. 153; United Nations
Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of international humanitarian law, U.N. Doc.
ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999); D. W. BOwETr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY 484-516
(1964); D. Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and
Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406 (2000); U. Palwankar, Applicability
of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
THE RED CROSS (1993) 227; Y. Sandoz, The Application of Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the
United Nations Organization, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (1978) 274; D. Schindler, United
Nations Forces and International Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANrrARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRtNCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 521 (Christophe Swinarski ed.,
1984); R. Wilde, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How UNHCR Governance of 'Development'
Refugee Camps Should Be Subject to International Human Rights Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 107
(1998).
60. See sources cited supra note 26.
61. See sources cited supra note 32.
62. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome,
art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222: "The Court may receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right". For the criteria for
admissibility of individual applications, see generally id. art. 25.
Wilde
410 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:395
breach of their civil and political rights by the UN-for example in Kosovo,
where the UN is the governmental authority-such a breach is not regulated by
the European Convention, domestic remedies are largely absent because of the
enjoyment of legal immunities by the UN and its officials, and there is no
standing before the European Court of Human Rights to bring cases directly
against the UN as opposed to an ECHR contracting state. An Ombudsman can
hear complaints against the UN but its decisions are purely recommendatory
and it has no powers of enforcement.63
It follows that, in general, the legal bar against remedies against the
member states of international organizations flowing from the lack of liability
on the part of member states is matched by the lack of remedies available
against such organizations as a matter of fact. Although, then, states act
through international organizations in a broad range of affairs, the remedies
obtainable against them or the organizations involved for breaches of
international law are severely limited.
It is no doubt in consequence of this general problem that Lord Justice
Griffiths remarked in one of the Tin Council cases that the appellants, who were
barred from suing the individual member states of the Council and had no
remedy against the organization itself, "have suffered a grave injustice. '
Those endorsing the general view of a lack of member state responsibility
in this broader context have focused their attention on seeking to improve
mechanisms for securing the accountability of international organizations. The
aforementioned International Law Association study, for example, concluded
in 2004 that this regime should be enhanced.65
Underlying this approach is perhaps a certain faith that such enhancements
are a likely possibility in the medium term; even if, then, the accountability
principle will not be secured by retaining a lack of member state responsibility,
this is a price worth paying because it ensures the continued functioning of
international organizations and will be relatively short-lived.
Is this faith in the prospects for greater overall, externally-enforced UN
accountability well-placed, however? One approach to this question is to
consider what motivates states to support international organizations, and the
potential effect this motivational structure can have on the position taken by
them as to the question of international organization accountability.
63. The Ombudsperson was established by the Special Representative of the Secretary General in
Kosovo in June 2000. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN Kosovo, UNMIK REGULATION 2000/38, June
30, 2000, as amended by UNMIK REGULATION 2003/8, Apr. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/regualtion2000_38.htm (last visited Mar. 9,2006). See sources cited
supra note 26 (discussing accountability issues in the context of international territorial administration).
64. Tin Council cases (HL), supra note 27, 81 LLR. 670 (1989), 683-4.
65. See LA Report, supra note 50.
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B. The Prospects for Greater International Organization Accountability
Clearly one motivation for state support of international organizations is
the ability to transfer the pursuit of certain policies to the international level.
Moreover, one reason why this can be attractive is that states are no longer
individually responsible for the promotion of the policy-it is the international
organization, not them, that is responsible. So, for example, before the 2003
war against Iraq the idea was put forward by the US and its allies that the UN
had failed to disarm Iraq through peaceable means, and that this failure by the
global organization-rather than its individual member states-therefore
justified unilateral military action by certain states who were, by definition, not
responsible for the failure. This idea by itself would not militate against the idea
of greater remedies against international organizations.
However, it might even be said that this process of displacement from
states to international organizations is also appealing to states because of the
comparative lack of accountability that exists vis t vis international organiza-
tions when compared to states. In the context of an international organization
accountability deficit, displacement means that the state is not made responsible
for the policy and the entity that is responsible is not subject to an effective
accountability mechanism. Thus the policy can be promoted without much
scrutiny. This is of course an effective means of realizing a particular
policy-transfer it onto another actor in relation to whom no effective
mechanism for review exists. Because of this, states may well have an interest
in keeping international organizations unaccountable.
It is therefore necessary to consider the important role international
organizations can play in enabling states to promote policies in an
unaccountable fashion. The relatively unaccountable nature of international
organizations may be a key structural feature as far as their importance to states
is concerned, not something that has come about by accident or, alternatively,
solely because of the way states and international organizations are sometimes
understood as normative opposites, with international organizations seen, unlike
states, as somehow intrinsically humanitarian, selfless and even-handed, and
not therefore requiring the kinds of accountability mechanisms that would be
in order in the case of states.
The traditional settlement, seeking to enhance the accountability of
international organizations rather than opting for member state responsibility,
so that both the functioning of such organizations and the existence of effective
accountability structures operate, is exposed as problematic because it ignores
the possibility that states may wish to block greater international organization
accountability as a companion to the lack of member state responsibility. If
such greater accountability were to come about, then, states might actually seek
Wilde
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withdraw their support for international organizations. Conceiving member
state responsibility is not the only policy prescription jeopardizing the first
policy objective of ensuring state support for international organizations, then;
promoting greater international organization responsibility might also have this
effect.
Attempts to resolve the problem of impunity by focusing exclusive
attention on greater international organization responsibility may therefore be
misguided, in that their prescriptions may be blocked by states objecting to the
underlying policies they promote through international organizations being
made subject to greater scrutiny. It may, then, actually be much more difficult
to reconcile the effective functioning of international organizations with a
greater enhancement of accountability.
C. Revisiting the Settlement and Introducing a Contingent Factor
An alternative approach, accommodating the risk of a failure to enhance
structures of accountability in relation to international organizations, is to make
the continuance of the traditional settlement denying member state respon-
sibility contingent on improvements in such structures. If improvement is not
forthcoming, then the introduction of member state responsibility can be
considered. Such an approach can be seen in a series of cases brought to the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights concerning the question of
state responsibility relating to the acts of international organizations under the
European Convention of Human Rights, two of which were mentioned earlier.
In one such case, M, the European Commission of Human Rights stated that if
the transfer of state powers to an international organization necessarily
excluded the state's
[R]esponsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise of
the transferred powers.., the guarantees of the Convention could
wantonly be limited or excluded and thus be deprived of their
peremptory character. The object and purpose of the Convention as
an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires
that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its
safeguards practical and effective .... Therefore the transfer of
powers to an international organisation is not incompatible with the
Convention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights
will receive an equivalent protection.'
66. M. and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 13258/87,64 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 138, 145 (1990).
What is perhaps implicit in this dictum-that if there is no equivalent
protection of human rights within the organization, then the transfer of
competences to the organization would engage state responsibility-is made
explicit in the later Matthews case, where the European Court of Human Rights
stated that "[t]he Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to
international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be
'secured.' Member States' responsibility therefore continues even after such
a transfer.,
67
The possibility of falling back on member state responsibility is also left
open by the Institut, which asserted a "failure to take any of' the aforemen-
tioned actions it prescribed to safeguard the rights of third parties "should be
taken as a relevant factor in considering the liability of the States members. 68
This suggests, then, that in the traditional settlement the scenario of non
member-state responsibility coupled with greater third party safeguards-and,
one would add, a strict regime of accountability for those activities of inter-
national organizations where the issue of consent by third parties is
inapplicable-is posited as an ideal, in that it safeguards both the principle of
the smooth operation of international organizations and the principle of
accountability. If, however, this ideal is not possible because an effective
accountability regime for, and third party safeguards in relation to, international
organizations is lacking, then an imperfect alternative should be adopted,
whereby the latter principle is promoted through means detrimental to the
realization of the former principle.
D. The Limits of the Contingency Model
According to the assumption that member state responsibility undermines
the effective functioning of international organizations, clearly the contingency
model assumes that this price will have to be paid to secure accountability if the
ideal model of international organization accountability is not forthcoming. It
might be said, however, that the negative aspects of this imperfect solution are
not too great, because in the medium to long term greater accountability
mechanisms operating in relation to international organizations will be
forthcoming, something that perhaps might be hastened by the introduction of
a regime of responsibility operating against member states. Thus the
detrimental effect on the working of international organizations will be short
lived. This echoes the earlier assumption made in relation to the conventional
view rejecting member state responsibility.
67. Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 1 32 (1999).
68. Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 9.
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Given what has been said already about the potential benefits for states of
a lack of international organization responsibility, however, is it really possible
to be confident in assuming the short-lived nature of the contingency model?
The strategy of pushing for member state responsibility might not actually
motivate states to support greater international organization accountability so
as to stave off attempts to make states directly liable, because more funda-
mentally states may not wish any effective accountability mechanisms to
operate.
To be sure, as an alternative to direct state responsibility greater inter-
national organization accountability would mean that states could preserve the
displacement of responsibility onto international organizations, but the much
greater accountability that would then operate would mean that the policies that
have been displaced would be subjected to greater scrutiny, something which
states may not wish to have happen. Instead of leading to a greater push for
international organization accountability, then, the member state accountability
model might actually precipitate a challenge by states to the existing
mechanisms that enforce their own responsibility directly, for example inter-
national human rights bodies.
The contingency model, then, may not be a short-term remedy, and as such
may come at a higher price in terms of undermining the effective functioning
of international organizations than has usually been understood. The nature of
dilemma faced by those seeking to promote such effective functioning and
accountability is perhaps, therefore, different: not whether the push for
immediately enhancing accountability justifies a short period during which the
work of international organizations may suffer, but rather how a more long-term
perceived conflict between accountability, on the one hand, and the effective
functioning of international organizations, on the other, is to be understood.
V. CONCLUSION
Attempts to rectify the inconsequential nature of international organization
liability as far as substantive legal outcomes are concerned-pushing for greater
international organization accountability, and possibly falling back on member
state responsibility as a stop-gap before such improvements are made-will
both make the concept of multilateral liability more costly for states. The
international organization accountability model, although retaining the displace-
ment of policy from states to international organizations, would still mean that
substantive policy outcomes--or lack of outcomes in the case of a failure to
prevent atrocities-are subject to much greater scrutiny than at present. The
future prospects of such a model depend in large part on the willingness of
states to accept such policies being subject to this enhanced form of scrutiny,
something which cannot be assumed.
Equally, the prospects of the member state responsibility stop-gap model
depend on states' willingness to accept this greater policy scrutiny and its
operation through mechanisms operating in relation to them directly. It also
risks undermining the effective functioning of international organizations
insofar as member state responsibility is understood to have such an effect.
Moreover, it may not lead to greater state support for enhanced international
organization accountability as an alternative to direct state responsibility if
states are reluctant to see any enhanced policy scrutiny. In such circumstances,
states might opt for a diminution in the mechanisms that operate against them
directly.
Any transformation of the current accountability deficit in relation to the
acts of international organizations depends not only on international organiza-
tions themselves accepting greater scrutiny; it is also necessary to acknowledge
what is at stake for member states in such a process, and way in which the
current settlement enables states to pursue policies with the broader context of
a relatively attenuated environment of scrutiny. In seeking to understand the
prospects for such a transformation, therefore, one has to take account of the
willingness on the part of member states to have the international policy they
promote through international organizations subject to a greater regime of
accountability than is the case at present.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (HCCCA), signed
by member states of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in June
2005, is an important step in harmonizing national conflicts of law rules that
sometime strain to manage the burgeoning traffic in transnational litigation
generated by global commerce. This development is particularly important for
Canada, a nation dependent on the benefits of international business and trade
and particularly so given the recent sui generis evolution of Canadian conflict
of laws rules against which the HCCCA may provide a welcome panacea.
Nevertheless, given the narrow focus and application of the HCCCA to
* H. Scott Fairley is a Partner at Theall Group LLP; A.B., 1974; LL.B., 1977 (Queen's
University); LL.M., 1979 (N.Y.U); S.J.D., 1987 (Harvard); Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Hague
Conference of Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (1997-2005); Member of the Working Group on Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, Uniform Law Conference of Canada (1998-2004).
** John Archibald is an Associate atTheall Group LLP; B.A., 1998 (McGill); LL.B., 2001 (UNB);
LL.M., 2002 (Harvard). This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2005.
1. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=98 (last visited Mar. 6,2006) [hereinafter, the
"HCCCA"]. A documentary history of the Choice of Court Convention Project is available on the Hague
Conference website. Hague Conference on Private International Law Home Page,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=text.display&tid=l (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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"exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial
matters," essentially a designation by private contracting parties of the court(s)
of one Contracting State to the HCCCA,2 much of the status quo in the national
law of Contracting States will remain undisturbed. Whether the HCCCA
ultimately gains broad acceptance and when it will come into force are also
open questions that only an indeterminate amount of time will answer.
Our purpose here is to give a succinct account of the applicable status quo
in Canada with respect to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
and the likely impact of the HCCCA thereon, assuming the Convention does
come into force and Canada follows through in ratifying it. We also focus on
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act,3 a model law for possible subsequent adoption by all Canadian
jurisdictions, the development of which paralleled Canadian participation in the
Hague project and which was conceived as a domestic legislative response to
many of the same issues addressed by the HCCCA.
IH. THE STATUS Quo
Prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's seminal ruling in Morguard
Investments v. De Savoye,4 Canadian courts rigorously adhered to the English
common-law approach to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
This approach allowed that, unless the Canadian defendant had voluntarily
attorned to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, or was otherwise deemed to be
found within that jurisdiction in certain circumstances,5 the foreign proceeding
2. Id. art. 3.
3. Uniform Law Conference of Canada (hereinafter ULCC) Home Page,
http:I/www.ulcc.ca/en/home/ (last visited Mar. 6,2006); see also Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1 &sub= 1 e5 (last visited Mar. 6,2006) [hereinafter
Uniform Act].
4. Morguard Investments, Ltd. v. DeSavoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
5. See Emanuel v. Symon, [ 190811 K.B. 302, 309 (Eng. C.A. ).
In actions in personam there are five cases in which the Courts of this country will
enforce a foreign judgment:
I) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment
has been obtained;
2) Where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began;
3) Where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum in
which he is afterwards sued;
4) Where he has voluntarily appeared;
5) And where he has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the
judgment was obtained.
Id.; see also Vaughan Black, Enforcement of Judgments and Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada,
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could be safely ignored. The foreign plaintiff would be required to sue on its
judgment, against which a full defense on the merits could then be waged at
home. New Brunswick's Foreign Judgments Act6 and Saskatchewan's Foreign
Judgments Act7 effectively codify the pre-Morguard rules, only recognizing a
foreign court's jurisdiction where the defendant is, at the time of the
commencement of the action, ordinarily resident in the foreign country, or
where the defendant voluntarily attorns, or has expressly or impliedly agreed
to submit, to the foreign jurisdiction.
Somewhat surprisingly in retrospect, given that Lord Justice Buckley's
decision in Emanuel v. Symon focused specifically on foreign judgments,
Canadian courts, before Morguard, applied the English approach co-equally to
the enforcement of rulings from one province to another within the federation.
Thus, in either case, recognition and enforcement required a new action and
potentially a new trial. Legislatures in all Canadian provinces, except Quebec,
attempted to address the enforcement issue as between sister provinces with
reciprocal enforcement of judgments legislation! Some provinces' reciprocal
enforcement legislation went further, listing a number of foreign jurisdictions
as "reciprocating states" where complementary legislation has been adopted in
cooperating foreign jurisdictions. For example, British Columbia enacted the
Court Order Enforcement Act (COEA), 9 which allows ajudgment creditor from
a reciprocating state-including a number of foreign countries-to apply to the
Supreme Court of British Columbia to have the judgment registered as a
judgment of that court.' Nevertheless, under the COEA, the out-of-province
9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 547. (1989) (commenting critically on the pre-Morguard approach of
Canadian courts).
6. New Brunswick Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. c. F-19 (1973).
7. Saskatchewan Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.S. c. F-18 (1978).
8. See Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.O. c. R-5 (1990); Reciprocal Enforcement
of Judgments Act, R.S.A. c. R-6 (2000); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.S. c. R-3.1(1996);
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, C.C.S.M. c. J20 (2005); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Act, R.S.Y. c. 189 (2002); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.W.T. c.R-1(1988) as duplicated
for Nunavut Act, S.C. c. 28 (1993); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.S. c. 388 (1989);
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.P.E.I. c. R-6 (1988); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Act, R.S.N.L. c. R-4 (1990); Court Order Enforcement Act, R.S.B.C. c. 78 (1996) (hereinafter, the "COEA"];
but see also Civil Code of Quebec, C.C.Q. Art. 3155 (2005); Quebec treats all judgments originating from
outside the province, whether they originate from another province or another country, as foreign judgments,
and its judgments receive the same treatment in the other provinces.
9. See COEA, supra note 8.
10. Id. § 29. The reciprocating states are all provinces and territories of Canada except Quebec,
most of the states of Australia, certain Pacific islands, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Austrian
Republic, the United Kingdom (pursuant to Schedule 4 to the Act), and, in the U.S.A., the following States:
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or foreign judgment, as the case may be, will not be registered if the defendant
was neither carrying on business nor ordinarily resident in the otherjurisdiction
and did not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit to the other jurisdiction.1'
Thus, the COEA does not address those cases in which a plaintiff has a
judgment from another Canadian province or foreign country that clearly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, but the defendant was not a
resident of that province or foreign country and did not attorn. Therefore, while
this reciprocating legislation streamlines the process of recognition and
enforcement, substantively it still fails to take plaintiffs much beyond the rigid,
conservative confines of Emanuel v. Symon. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Canada rendered its groundbreaking decision in Morguard, a British Columbia
case, within the context of the substantive shortcomings of the COEA.
Morguard eschewed the traditional English formula in relation to the inter-
provincial context, importing the American constitutional concept of "full faith
and credit"'" as between co-ordinate jurisdictions within national boundaries,
and posited a new formula. The enforcing court would recognize and enforce
the judgment of the originating court, precluding any further defense on the
merits, provided: the adjudicating court had properly exercised jurisdiction
under its own rules; and the enforcing court could satisfy itself that there was
"a real and substantial connection" between the adjudicating jurisdiction and
determinative features of the lis or the defendant as a party.'3
Further, the Morguard court, in prophetic unanimous reasons in obiter
authored by Justice LaForest, suggested that the same approach might apply to
foreign judgments of comparably civilized jurisdictions. Justice LaForest
premised his reasons on the notion of "international comity" which he
described as:
the recognition [that] one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
Washington, Alaska, California, Oregon, Colorado, and Idaho.
11. Id. § 29(6)(b).
12. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
13. Morguard, supra note 4, at 1103-1109; for discussion, see H. Scott Fairley. Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments by Canadian Courts: A New Age of Uncertainty, 2 CAN. INT'L LAW. 1, 2 (1996)
[hereinafter, A New Age of Uncertainty]; Joost Blom, Reform of Private International :Law by Judges:
Canada as a Case Study, in REFORM AND DEvELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH 31-49 (James Fawcett ed., 2002).
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of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws.14
Justice LaForest resurrected this nineteenth-century notion, borrowed from
American jurisprudence, in light of late twentieth-century realities placed on a
trade-dependent country:
Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people across state
lines has now become imperative. Under the circumstances, our
approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
would appear ripe for reappraisal. Certainly, other countries, notably
the United States and members of the European Community, have
adopted more generous rules for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments to the general advantage of litigants. 5
The LaForest opinion added that "[u]nder these circumstances, our
approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would
appear ripe for a reappraisal." Lower courts across Canada enthusiastically
took up this invitation to a dramatically liberalized approach and their endorse-
ments entailed sometimes harsh consequences for Canadian defendants. t6 The
retrospective application of the new rule caught many defendants who had
decided, pre-Morguard, not to defend themselves against foreign law suits. 7
It also caught those defendants whose exposure to damages awards-notably
from U. S. civil juries-were far in excess of anything a Canadian court would
have awarded had the defendants been sued in a Canadian jurisdiction at first
instance.' 8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose not to revisit such concerns
until Beals v. Saldanha,9 thirteen years later, in which it affirmed the
international comity branch of Morguard. With that, the lower court
applications of Morguard to transnational cases were essentially vindicated,
14. Morguard, supra note 4, at 1096.
15. Id. at 1098.
16. See Fairley, supra note 13, Blom, supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd. 106 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (B.C.C.A. 1993), leave to
appeal refused, 24 C.P.C. (3d) 294 (S.C.C. 1994), post-Morguard enforcement of pre-Morguard Alaska
Judgment; for other examples, see discussion in Blom, supra note _Ref129568697\h13, at 38-39; Fairley,
supra notel3, at 3-4.
18. See Joost Blom, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Goes Forth Into the World,
28 CAN. Bus L.J. 373 (1997); Fairley, supra note 13, at 3-5; H. Scott Fairley, In Search of a Level Playing
Field: The Hague Project on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 57 (Chi Carnody
et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter, In Search of a Level Playing Field].
19. Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 [hereinafter, Beals].
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including those that yielded harsh results from the Canadian defendant's
perspective such as in Old North State Brewing Co.,20 considered in more detail
below.
The substantial connections test, as laid down in Morguard, forecloses any
re-opening of a case on its merits. In the wake of adopting this new test in the
enforcement of foreignjudgments, the question arises whether existing defenses
to enforcement, elaborated under the previous Anglo-Canadian common-law
approach of formal attornment, should be revised. The Supreme Court of
Canada, in Beals, answered this question-essentially, but not unequivocally-
in the negative. Once the Court satisfies itself that a substantial connection to
the foreign jurisdiction exists, defendants are left only with certain
impeachment defenses-namely, natural justice, public policy, and fraud-to
oppose recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment.
The aforementioned defenses have-and, thus far, continue to retain-
relatively narrow application. For a defense based on natural justice, the
enforcing court measures the foreign judgment against its own standards of
natural justice, but does not impose requirements of conformity with its own
procedural rules. The public policy defense must establish that the foreign law,
on which the judgment is founded, is on its face, not in its application, offensive
to the fundamental morality of the Canadian legal system.2 Finally, a "fraud"
that was adjudicated upon in the foreign court cannot be re-litigated unless
newly discovered and material evidence has become available.2
Morguard, and later Beals, significantly altered the legal landscape for the
enforcement of foreignjudgments in Canada without any assurance of similarly
liberal treatment for Canadian judgments presented for enforcement in other
jurisdictions. The perceived result is a playing field tilted against Canadian
businesses, particularly those in the position of defendant.23
Though, as noted above, some provinces have designated several countries
as reciprocating jurisdictions in their reciprocal enforcement legislation, in
order to facilitate enforcement of judgments through a registration mechanism,
domestic rules alone do not guarantee reciprocal treatment by other countries,
as is the case under international treaties.24 Canada is a party to two treaties in
20. Old North State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Service Inc., 58 B.C.L.R. (3d) 144 (C.A. 1998),
affirming 47 B.C.L.R. (3d) 254 (S.C. 1997) (British Columbia enforcement of North Carolina default
judgment, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.)
21. Beals, supra note 19; see also Beals v. Saldanha, 54 O.R. 3d 641 (C.A. 2001).
22. J.G. CASTEL & J. WALKER, CANADIAN CONFLICrS OF LAW 14-25 (5th ed. 2002).
23. See H. Scott Fairley, Open Season: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Canada after Beals v. Saldauha, 11 ILSA J. INT'L COMP. L. 305 (2005).
24. This is the case of Germany and Austria notably in British Columbia as well as a number of
Australian States in a few provinces that so provide.
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the field of enforcement of judgments: the 1984 Convention between Canada
and the United Kingdom on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 25 and the 1996 Convention
between Canada and France on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters and Mutual Legal Assistance in Maintenance.
2 6
As a simple "enforcement" convention, the Canada/United Kingdom
Convention does not deal with jurisdictional issues and is limited to facilitating
recognition and enforcement of judgments between the two countries.27 The
Canada/France Convention, signed in June 1996, is not in force because the
implementing legislation has not yet been adopted. One interesting feature of
the Canada/France Convention is that it provides a list of bases of jurisdiction
that can illustrate admissible grounds of jurisdiction.28
25. Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada
Providing For the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Apr. 24, 1984, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74. For the federal implementing legislation to this convention, see
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, R.S.C., ch. C-30
(1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canada/United Kingdom Convention].
26. The Enforcement and Judgments Conventions Act, Can-Fr. Rep., June 10, 1996, S.M. 2000,
c. 13. (Can.) [hereinafter Canada/France Convention].
27. Its application has remained fairly marginalized, most probably because it remains largely
ignored by practitioners. Only a handful of cases have relied expressly on the Canada/United Kingdom
Convention, such as in Fabrelle Wallcoverings & Textiles Ltd. v. North American Decorative Products Inc.,
6 C.P.C. (3d) 170 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1992), and J.B.S. Tooling Co. v. Upward Tool Group Inc., 6 C.P.C. (4th)
191 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1996). It was, however, ignored in Union of India v. Bumper Development Corp, 36
C.P.C. (3d) 249 (Alta. Q.B. 1995). The two Ontario cases have read the Canada/United Kingdom Convention
as incorporating the Morguard test.
28. Canada/France Convention, supra note 26, art. 5.
The court of the State of origin shall be deemed to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention
if in particular:
The defendant had his or her habitual residence, if a natural person, or its principal
place of business, if an artificial person, in the State of origin when the proceedings
were started;
a) The defendant had a place of business or branch in the State of origin when the
proceedings were started and was served in that State in connection with a dispute
related to the activities of that place of business or branch;
b) In an action for damages in tort, quasi-delict or delict, the wrongful act occurred in
the State of origin;
c) The claim is related to a dispute in connection with rights in rem in immovable
property located in the State of origin;
d) The defendant expressly submitted in writing to the jurisdiction of the court of the
State of origin;
e) The defendant appeared without challenging the court's jurisdiction or presented a
defence on the merits;
f) The contractual obligation that is the subject of the dispute was or should have been
performed in the State of origin;
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II. LOOKING FORWARD
In the aftermath of Morguard, case law continues to develop in the
common-law provinces regarding the application of the decision's principles
and their extension to foreign judgments. Controversy and uncertainty remain
as those within and outside the legal profession appreciate that the Morguard
principle of comity amounting to full faith and credit might not always be
acceptable because of the variety of legal systems around the world.
A. The Uniform Law
There is growing recognition in Canada of an unequal playing field in
transnational litigation.29 With this perspective in mind, the ULCC set about
drafting the Uniform Act,30 under which it seeks to clarify the enforcement rules
applicable in common law provinces. The Uniform Act establishes a closed list
of acceptable bases of jurisdiction, particularly for default foreign judgments,
in order to limit the application of the "real and substantial connection" test
imposed by the Morguard ruling.3' It also enables the enforcing Canadian court
to exercise some discretion to verify the jurisdiction of the foreign court and,
hence, determine whether enforcement is appropriate, as well as to limit the
enforcement of excessive damages awards.32
The ULCC, in drafting the Uniform Act, gave deep consideration to the
Hague's discussions on a comprehensive, worldwide draft convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in order to ensure that some
degree of congruity and complementarities will exist between legislation based
on the Uniform Act and any Hague treaty or other treaty initiatives that may
eventually emerge. What the Uniform Act does not do is purport to offer a
competitive statutory regime that would interfere with current or future treaty
h) For any question related to the validity or administration of a trust established in the
State of origin or to trust assets located in that State, the trustee, settlor or beneficiary
had his or herhabitual residence or its principal place of business in the State of
origin;
i) In matters of custody of and access to children, the child had his or her habitual
residence in the State of origin at the commencement of the proceedings on the
merits;
j) In matrimonial matters, both spouses had their last common habitual residence in the
State of origin.
Id.
29. See In Search of a Level Playing Field, supra note 18.
30. Uniform Act, supra note 3.
31. Id. § 8.
32. Id. § 6.
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initiatives on the same subject matter. To this end, the ULCC has expressly
stated that the Uniform Act should apply only to the enforcement of foreign
judgments rendered in countries with which Canada has not concluded a treaty
or convention on recognition and enforcement of judgments.33 The Uniform
Act is premised as general legislation that could be augmented by more
specialized regimes such as the HCCCA and, thus, legislation based on the
Uniform Act would not apply to the extent that a proceeding falls within the
ambit of the HCCCA in a Canadian jurisdiction that has enacted and brought
into force both regimes.
To date, Saskatchewan is the only province that has introduced
legislation34 to adopt the Uniform Act, which will replace the province's much
more restrictive Foreign Judgments Act.35 Whether other provinces will enact
similar legislation remains to be seen. Nevertheless, one expects that such
legislation would help avoid, or at least minimize, the sometimes harsh results
that can arise from unqualified applications of Morguard and Beals. How
would the disposition of cases be influenced in the result?
Consider a recent post-Morguard decision of the British Columbia courts,
Old North State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Service Inc.36 There, the vendor (V),
situated in British Columbia, and a purchaser (P), in North Carolina, where the
goods were to be delivered, had signed a typical international sales contract for
the delivery and commissioning of machinery. V sourced a substantial portion
of its business abroad, much of it in the United States, and prudently inserted
into its standard form contract language that it was to be governed by the laws
of British Columbia and that the parties thereto would attorn to the courts of
that jurisdiction. Dissatisfied with the machinery, P sued V for breach of
contract in its home jurisdiction, not in V's home jurisdiction as specified in the
contract. V did not attorn and P obtained a default judgment in North Carolina
and an award of treble damages, pursuant to the local legislation, plus punitive
damages and attorney's fees.
Predictably, P sought enforcement of the judgment in British Columbia,
where V's assets were available to satisfy it. P succeeded at first instance, and
the judgment was upheld on appeal. The enforcing court satisfied itself that "a
real and substantial connection" existed between the lis and the originating
court and, on the basis of Morguard, refused to permit a defense on the merits
33. See UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA, WORKING GROUP ON ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS, UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (REVISED DRAFT & COMMENTARY),
Fredericton, New Brunswick: Aug.10-14, 2003.
34. An Act Respecting the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Sask. Bill No. 101 of 2004-05
(Saskatchewan).
35. The Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.S., c. F-18 (1978).
36. Old North, supra note20.
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by V. Moreover, the trial court found that the parties' choice of forum clause
was non-exclusive. The British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed. It also
agreed that enforcement of both punitive and treble damages by way of a
default judgment in a foreign jurisdiction was not per se contrary to Canadian
public policy.
The application of the Uniform Act to a case like Old North would
possibly yield a much different and, at least from the perspective of the
Canadian defendant, more fair result. When measured against domesticjudicial
standards and litigants' expectations, the jurisdictional analyses of both the
British Columbia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are consistent with
sections 8 and 9 the Uniform Act. The Uniform Act does not expressly prevent
a court from assuming jurisdiction based on a real and substantial connection
when faced with an exclusive choice of court agreement under which the parties
have agreed to be governed by a different jurisdiction. Nevertheless, section
10 of the Uniform Act is an "escape clause" that may have protected the
Canadian defendant in Old North. Section 10 provides that a foreign judgment
may not be enforced if the judgment debtor proves to the satisfaction of the
enforcing court that it was clearly inappropriate for the foreign court to take
jurisdiction. One may not be hard-pressed to argue that the North Carolina
Court inappropriately assumed jurisdiction by ignoring the choice of forum
provision in a typical international sales contract, and refusing to give effect to
the reasonable expectations of two sophisticated parties.
Further, Article 5 of the Uniform Act gives the enforcing Court the power
to reduce enforcement of non-compensatory and excessive compensatory
damages. It provides that, where the enforcing Court determines that a foreign
judgment includes an amount added to compensatory damages as punitive or
multiple damages or for other non-compensatory purposes, it will limit
enforcement of that part of the award to the amount of similar or comparable
damages that could have been awarded in the enforcing jurisdiction. Thus, in
Old North, the British Columbia court would have been encouraged and likely
would have exercised its discretion to eliminate the punitive and treble damages
award of the North Carolina court. Canadian defendants will doubtless
welcome such changes in judicial discretion influenced by the Uniform Act in
future enforcement actions. At the same time, the Uniform Act is also a
unilateral instrument that incoming litigants might view as undercutting the
principles of comity articulated in Morguard. Nevertheless, in the absence of
any alternatives on point, the Uniform Act appears necessary as general law in
aid of a better balanced status quo-a statutory guide to fine-tune a system
Canadian courts have not been prepared to fine-tune on their own.
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B. The HCCCA
Unlike the Uniform Act, which focuses only on recognition and
enforcement, but does so, on a broad front, the HCCCA regulates both the
jurisdiction to adjudicate and the recognition and enforcement of judgments,
but on a narrower front: disputes governed in business to business choice of
court agreements. Earlier convention drafts provided for jurisdiction on the
basis of several enumerated grounds, including a connection between the cause
of action and the court seized of the matter, which conforms with the Morguard
principle that the jurisdiction must have a "substantial connection" to the
action. While the HCCCA, like its earlier drafts, still treats the jurisdiction of
the rendering court as a linchpin, eschewing any general re-examination of
either the choice of law or adjudication on the merits, it establishes only a
single basis forjurisdiction, the parties' choice of forum, subject to safeguards
that may be applied by both originating and enforcing courts.
The HCCCA, as a multilateral convention, creates a level playing field for
Canadian parties to international litigation involving business-to-business
contractual disputes. It will limit-though perhaps not to the extent of its
earlier, wider-ranging drafts-the negative impact, real and perceived, of the
unilateral liberalization of domestic rules on enforcement of judgments in one
jurisdiction without reciprocal benefits accruing in others. International
initiatives have the principal benefit of avoiding the risks of unilateralism that
is counterproductive for important Canadian interests tied to international
commerce, a central concern prompting the Morguard obiter to embrace comity
between nations through their respective courts.37 Further, though the HCCCA
is considerably narrower in scope and effect than as originally envisaged,38 it
offers the possibility of both realistic success in its adoption by member states,
and a solid point of departure from which the Hague could very well expand
upon, working toward more comprehensive rules for jurisdictional
equilibration.
There are three basic rules on which the HCCCA's operation turns: first,
the court chosen by the parties in an exclusive choice of court agreement has
jurisdiction; second, if an exclusive choice of court agreement exists, a court
not chosen by the parties does not have jurisdiction, and shall decline to hear
the case; and, third, a judgment resulting from jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with a choice of court agreement (exclusive or non-exclusive) shall
be recognized and enforced in the courts of other Contracting States.
37. See A New Age of Uncertainty, supra note 13.
38. For a comprehensive discussion on the history of the Hague project and the difficulties
encountered therein see: Ronald Brand, Concepts, Consensus and the Status Quo: Getting to "Yes" on a
Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ISSUES: CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 71 (Chi Carmody et al. eds., 2003).
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Similar to the New York Convention,39 which has given a measure of
predictability to treatment of international arbitration agreements, the HCCCA
establishes rules for enforcing private-party agreements in respect of the forum
for resolution of any resulting disputes, as well as rules for recognizing and
enforcing the decisions issued by the chosen forum.4' Thus, with litigation and
arbitration on a more equal footing within an increasingly globalized legal and
economic order, parties to trans-national transactions are able select the form
of dispute resolution based on its individual merits rather than the parties' level
of confidence in the recognition and enforcement potential of that dispute
resolution mechanism.
4
'
By rationalizing the forum selection process in international contract
litigation before national courts, the HCCCA aims to restore predictability-so
critical to international commercial transactions-that judicial discretion
exercised in such litigation can possibly undermine. Recall that, in Old North,
the North Carolina Court's discretion to consider optimal jurisdictional
placement of a dispute with international elements subverted the reasonable
expectations of the contracting parties; nevertheless, the British Columbia
Court subsequently recognized its jurisdiction and enforced the default
judgment. The HCCCA, which deals with both exclusive and non-exclusive
choice of court clauses, addresses this alarming version of comity.
Article 3 of the HCCCA creates a presumption that if a party lists only one
court or country, the clause is exclusive. This is important to enforcement of the
agreement, because only exclusive "choice of court" clauses are entitled to
enforcement under Article 5. Under Article 8, however, judgments of courts,
which took jurisdiction on the basis of any valid choice of court agreement that
is "exclusive" within the meaning of the HCCCA,42 are entitled to recognition
and enforcement.
In Old North, as noted above, the trial judge held that the contractual
provision committing the parties to attorn to British Columbia was not an
exclusive choice of forum clause. Rather, the trial judge held, and the Court of
Appeal affirmed, that the provision granted concurrent jurisdiction to British
39. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
40. Ronald Brand, A Global Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 10 ILSA J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 345 at 346 (2004).
41. Id. at 351.
42. See HCCCA, supra note 1, art. 22 (addressing reciprocal declarations on non-exclusive choice
of court agreements) ("A Contracting State may declare that its courts will recognize and enforce judgments
given by courts of other Contracting States designated in a choice of court agreement concluded by two or
more parties that meets the requirements of article 3, paragraph c), and designates, for the purpose of deciding
disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, a court or courts
of one or more Contracting States (a non-exclusive choice of court agreement.")).
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Columbia courts with any other court in which the matter was properly brought.
The contractual language interpreted by the British Columbia courts as non-
exclusive would have been deemed exclusive pursuant to Article 3 of the
HCCCA43 and thereby would have qualified for recognition and enforcement
under Article 8. Thus, the North Carolina Court would not have had
jurisdiction to grant default judgment against the Canadian defendant. British
Columbia would have had exclusive jurisdiction as the only jurisdiction listed
in the contracting parties' choice of forum clause. Further, pursuant to Article
11 of the HCCCA, the British Columbia court would have had the discretion to
refuse recognition and enforcement of the North Carolinajudgment on the basis
that the punitive and treble damages awarded by the Court over-compensated
the plaintiff for actual loss or harm suffered. Article 11 provides:
Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary
or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or
harm suffered. The court addressed shall take into account whether
and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve
to cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings."
Interestingly, the HCCCA has a narrower damages provision than the
Uniform Act, which specifically allows the enforcing court to reduce a
compensatory damages award. Until quite late in the drafting process, versions
of the HCCCA provided for the reduction of compensatory damage awards 45;
43. Id. art. 3(b) ("A choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting State
or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have
expressly provided otherwise.").
44. HCCCA, supra note 1, art. 11 (emphasis added).
45. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, DRAFT REPORT OF PRELIMINARY
DRAFT CONVENTION ON ExCLUsIvE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS (Prel. Doc. No. 25), art. 10(2), Mar.
2004, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/dgm-pd25e.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,2006), which reads
as follows:
Where the debtor, after proceedings in which the creditor has the opportunity to be heard, satisfies
the court addressed that in the circumstances, including those existing in the State of origin,
grossly excessive damages have been awarded, recognition and enforcement may be limited to a
lesser amount.
In no event shall the court addressed recognize or enforce the judgment in an amount less
than that which could have been awarded in the requested State in the same circumstances,
including those existing in the State of origin.
Similarly, subsection 6(2) of the Uniform Act, supra note 3, which was based on these earlier
drafts, reads as follows:
Where the enforcing court, on application by the judgment debtor, determines that a foreign
judgment includes an amount of compensatory damages that is excessive in the circumstances,
it may limit enforcement of the award, but the amount awarded may not be less than that which
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however, those provisions were removed on the basis that, where parties had
validly agreed on a certain court, there was no reason to interfere with the
compensatory component of that court's decision.46
Though the HCCCA will go a long way in ensuring predictability and
upholding the reasonable expectations of sophisticated parties to international
business contracts, Article 21 may stand in the way of the Convention's
ultimate effectiveness. Article 21 was originally proposed by the Canadian
delegation-then draft Article 20-to minimize the domestic impact of
asbestos-related litigation in the United States: "Upon ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, a State may declare that it will not apply the provisions
of the Convention to exclusive choice of court agreements in asbestos-related
matters. 47
Other delegations subsequently proposed that the provision refer to
additional specific subject matters such as natural resources and joint ventures.
After continued discussion and drafting, the delegations agreed on a new
provision, which became Article 21 of the HCCCA, as enacted, giving Con-
tracting States a much broader, and seemingly unlimited, power to effectively
contract out of the HCCCA.a8
The only counterweight to the potential sweep of Article 21 declarations-
but it may be a substantial one-is the reciprocity language within it. This
language short-circuits the HCCCA for enforcement purposes in other
Contracting States, with respect to the reserved subject matter, where the
the enforcing court could have awarded in the circumstances.
Id.
46. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE
INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT, IN PARTICULAR ON THE PRELIMINARY TEXT
ACHIEVED AT ITS THIRD MEETING: 25-28 MARCH 2003 (Prel. Doc. No. 22), at 33, June 2003, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd22e.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
47. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROPOSAL BY DRAFTING COMMrITEE,
DRAFT ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS (Work. Doc. No. 110E), art. 20, April 2004,
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmwd l0_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
48. HCCCA, supra note 1, art. 21.
Declarations with respect to specific matters:
1) Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention to a specific
matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that
matter. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration
is no broader than necessary and that the specific matter excluded is clearly and
precisely defined.
2) With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply;
a) in the Contracting State that made the declaration;
b) in other Contracting States, where an exclusive choice of court
agreement designates the courts, or one or more specific courts, of the
State that made the declaration.
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exclusive choice of court agreement designates the courts of the State that made
the reservation at first instance. So the potential chilling effect goes both ways,
ensuring that States reap the consequences of what they sow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Writing on a similar topic for this publication in 2004, one of the present
authors observed: "At this time, Canada taken as a whole and specifically in
individual provinces, is one of the most hospitable jurisdictions in the world for
the recognition and enforcement of judgments from foreign jurisdiction. 49
Adoption of the HCCCA throughout Canada would neither fundamentally alter
nor undermine that appraisal. What the HCCCA would accomplish, however,
is amelioration of some of the harsher effects of the current Canadian common-
law regime and its treatment of Canadian defendants in relation to incoming
foreign judgments, at least those arising from exclusive choice of court
agreements. To the extent that the HCCCA becomes an understood and
appreciated tool by international commercial lawyers, ensuring that it will apply
may become a new drafting point for corporate counsel-but that is a subject
for another forum.
In the absence of the HCCCA taking hold, the Uniform Act may fulfill a
similar role as general law not confined to exclusive choice of court
agreements. It remains, however, that a unilateral statutory substitute for a
multilateral treaty instrument obviously lacks the same spirit of comity as a new
international treaty on point. The premise of the Uniform Act to give ground
in the field(s) occupied by any subsequent treaty instrument(s) appears to
vindicate this view. While the HCCCA is much more limited in scope and
coverage than originally envisaged, and may be disappointing to many of the
state actors who invested close to a decade of time and considerable effort in
the Special Commission's project, it is nevertheless an achievement that should
be welcomed and embraced by member states of the Hague Conference.
In general terms transcending the particular elements singled out for
discussion above, the HCCCA is a good start. From the Canadian point of view
presented here, that we hasten to add is ours and not necessarily that of any
Canadian government, there is also every good reason for Canada to welcome
the HCCCA and no compelling reason we can think of why Canada should not
do so.
49. Fairley, supra note 23, at 316.
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I. THE HISTORY
On June 30, 2005, the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law unanimously adopted a new Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements.' This new treaty is now open for signature and
ratification, or accession, by all States, regardless of whether they are Member
States of the Hague Conference or not. It is hoped that the Convention will do
for choice of court agreements (forum selection clauses) and the resulting
judgments what the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards2 does for arbitration agreements and
the resulting awards.
At the origin was a proposal made by the United States of America in 1992
to include a convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
* Dr. Andrea Schulz, LL.M. is First Secretary at the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. Since 2002, she has been in charge of the negotiations of the Convention discussed in this article. This
article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at
the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1. See generally Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, available at
http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=98 (last visited Mar. 8,2006) [hereinafter 2005
Hague Convention]. A copy of the 2005 Hague Convention is included in the Appendix.
2. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
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in the agenda of the Hague Conference. European Member States of the Hague
Conference, on the other hand, were more interested in harmonizing jurisdiction
rules at a global level, and in particular in limiting U.S. long-arm jurisdiction.
Following some preparatory discussions, formal negotiations started in 1996.
In 1999, a so-called "preliminary draft Convention" was adopted by vote.' The
intention was that the negotiating States should consult their stakeholders back
home on the text and return for one last meeting, the Diplomatic Conference
convened with a view to adopting the Convention. The 1999 text was a
comprehensive "mixed convention" attempting to divide bases of jurisdiction
into three categories: 1) the "good grounds" explicitly listed in the Convention,
which would lead to judgments entitled to recognition and enforcement under
the Convention in other Contracting States; 2) the "bad grounds" explicitly
prohibited by the Convention (which thereby strongly interfered with the
internal law of Contracting States at the jurisdiction stage, and any judgment
based on such ground would not be recognized and enforced in other
Contracting States under the Convention or internal law); and 3) the "gray area"
of bases of jurisdiction existing under national law which were neither
incorporated in the Convention nor expressly prohibited. Recognition and
enforcement of judgments based on such grounds would not be granted under
the Convention but was still possible under national law.
Consultations on the 1999 text showed, however, that this attempt for
global harmonization was too ambitious for its time. Procedural systems were
too different; and this was reflected even in the drafting style. Moreover, there
were opposing interests of stakeholders involved, and the growing importance
of Internet and electronic commerce led to fierce discussions on which were the
"right" rules to deal with the new digital economy. This was true for
substantive law rules, e.g. on the liability of Internet service providers or on the
infringement of intellectual property rights on the Internet, but also traditional
choice of law rules and choice ofjurisdiction rules were questioned. Therefore
the formal Hague negotiations were suspended until 2001 to allow for informal
discussions and further examination of these new questions. In 2001, a first
part of the Diplomatic Conference was held, and it led to a text (known as the
2001 Interim Text)4 which tried to combine civil-law and common-law drafting
styles and cover up differences between U.S. and European civil procedure. In
an attempt to move to consensus-based negotiations rather than to rely on
3. See generally Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (adopted Oct. 30, 1999), available at http//www.hcch.net/upload/wop/dgm-pd I 1.pdf
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
4. See generally Interim Text, available at http://www.hcch.nettupload/wop/jdgm2OOldraft--e.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
voting, square brackets were placed around the controversial items-which left
little outside the brackets.
The Hague Conference is a Member-State driven organization which
means that the work program and policy are decided once a year by its Member
States at a so-called Special Commission on General Affairs and Policy of the
Conference. In 2002, this meeting decided that a small Informal Working
Group should examine the bases of jurisdiction in the 1999/2001 texts and
search for consensus. After three meetings, the group submitted a draft text of
a Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in B2B Cases, and Member
States of the Conference agreed that this could be a good basis for formal
negotiations. This change of scope and policy was strongly supported by the
business world. The International Chamber of Commerce had in fact carried
out an empirical research by circulating a questionnaire to its member
companies through its more than ninety national committees, one of which is
USCIB. The purpose was to find out when and how choice of court agreements
and/or arbitration agreements were included into international commercial
contracts, and what impact the existing legal instruments had on the use of one
or the other clause. The business world stated that more choice would be
welcomed, and that a parallel instrument to the New York Convention would
be highly useful.
II. THE 2005 CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS
A. General Overview
1. Scope
The new Convention was elaborated during two Special Commissions held
in December 2003 and April 2004, and a Diplomatic Session held from June
14-30, 2005. It applies primarily to exclusive choice of court agreements in
international B2B cases in civil or commercial matters (Article 1), with an
optional extension on a, reciprocal basis to judgments given by a court
designated in a non-exclusive choice of court agreement (Article 22).
Consumer and employment contracts, as well as a number of other matters such
as family law matters, rights in rem in immovable property, insolvency, the
carriage of passengers and goods, certain maritime matters, liability for nuclear
damage, the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright and
related rights, claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural
persons, and tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not
arise from a contractual relationship are excluded from the scope of the
Convention. The reasons for those exclusions are in most cases the existence
of other, more specific international instruments, and of national, regional or
international rules on exclusive jurisdiction for some of these matters. The first
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reason applies, inter alia, to the carriage of goods, and to maritime matters.
The second reason applies to the validity of intellectual property rights, rights
in rem in immovable property, and insolvency. While due to the drafting
technique used, this list appears rather long, in most cases it only states the
obvious common denominator of what States would not want to leave to party
autonomy. Should this not be enough for a particular State in an exceptional
case, Article 21 allows for a declaration by that State, excluding any other
specific matter from the scope of the Convention. In relation to all other States
Parties, the State making such declaration will be considered like a non-
Contracting State with regard to that matter. The drafters of the Convention
expressed the strong wish that such declarations be limited to what is strictly
necessary and be as narrow as possible.
2. Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements
An exclusive choice of court agreement is defined as follows in order to
fall within the scope of the Convention (Article 3(a)):
... an agreement concluded by two or more parties that meets the
requirements of paragraph (c) and designates, for the purpose of
deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with
a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or
one or more specific courts in one Contracting State to the exclusion
of the jurisdiction of any other courts.'
So if the parties to a contract choose "the courts of France," or "the courts
of New York or San Francisco" (but not "the courts of New York or Ottawa"),
the agreement is exclusive for the purposes of the Convention. More
importantly, Article 3(b) contains an important "deeming rule" that will change
the legal situation in particular in common law legal systems, and will greatly
expand the scope of the Convention: "[A] choice of court agreement which
designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts in
one Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have
expressly provided otherwise. '"6
This means that where the parties agree, e.g., that "the court in Ottawa
shall decide all disputes arising out of this contract," this choice is deemed
exclusive. Paragraph (c) contains the Convention's form requirement: The
exclusive choice of court agreement must be "concluded or documented-in
5. 2005 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
6. Id. 3(b).
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writing; or by any other means of communication which renders information
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference."7
The wording of subparagraph (ii) is inspired by Article 6 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) and ensures that
choice of court agreements concluded, for example, by an exchange of e-mails
are covered.
3. Three Basic Rules
The Convention contains three main rules addressed to three different
courts:
The chosen court must hear the case if the choice of court agreement
is valid according to the standards established by the Convention (in
particular there is no room for discretion/forum non conveniens in
favor of courts of another State) (Article 5).'
Any court seized that is located in a State other than that of the chosen
court must dismiss the case unless the choice of court agreement is
invalid according to the standards established by the Convention
(Article 6).'
Any judgment rendered by the court of a Contracting State which was
designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement that is valid
according to the standards established by the Convention must be
recognized and enforced in other Contracting States (Article 8)."
4. Exceptions
There are exceptions to these rules: Article 6 lists situations where the
court seized but not chosen may take the case in spite of the choice of court
agreement. Articles 9, 10 and 11 list situations where a judgment given by the
chosen court does not have to be recognized or enforced under the Convention
in whole or in part.,
The main exception for both courts is that the choice of court agreement
is null and void. The Convention does not itself establish rules on consent and
substantive validity. It was considered too ambitious to attempt a global
harmonization of these important aspects of substantive contract law. However,
no rule at all would have created a considerable threat to legal certainty, and to
the foreseeability for the parties which the Convention is intended to enhance.
7. Id. art. 3(c).
8. Id. art. 5.
9. Id. art. 6.
10. 2005 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8.
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Allowing that the chosen court and another court seized, or the enforcement
court, each evaluate the validity of the choice of court agreement under their
own law and come to different results could lead to the following situation: the
chosen court holds the choice of court agreement valid and bases its jurisdiction
on it, but then another court seized holds the agreement invalid under its own
law and also takes the case; which leads to parallel litigation and conflicting
judgments; or the enforcement court refuses to enforce the judgment given by
the chosen court because it holds the agreement to be invalid. In order to avoid
double standards and the situations just described, the Convention takes a
choice-of-law approach. All three courts (the chosen court, any court seized in
spite of the agreement and the court requested to enforce a judgment given by
the chosen court) have to assess the substantive validity according to the law
(including the choice-of-law rules) of the State of the chosen court. Although
this looks like a complicated rule at first sight, it is hoped that this can avoid the
above situations to happen while keeping global harmonization of the law in
this area to the essential minimum.
Another important rule can be found in Article 11, which is addressed to
the court requested to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. The provision
reads:
1) Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if,
and to the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including
exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party
for actual loss or harm suffered."
2) The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what
extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to
cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings. 12
This Article contains a number of important messages. Firstly, judgments
awarding damages are covered by the Convention just like any otherjudgment,
as long as they fall within a choice of court agreement between the parties, and
it was the chosen court that gave the judgment. Secondly, the non-
compensatory part of the judgment may be "shaved off' under Article 11(1).
This can both increase and reduce the enforcement of damage awards, as
compared to the present situation. It can increase enforcement in those States
which at present reject recognition and enforcement to the full extent, even if
only part of the award is non-compensatory. It could reduce enforcement in
those States that currently always enforce to the full extent and now get a tool
to reduce the damages awarded to enforcing only the compensatory part if they
11. Id. art. 11(1).
12. Id. art. 11(2)
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so wish. This is however not very likely because the Convention does not
oblige them to do so, and enforcement to a larger extent under national law
remains possible.
B. Some Particular Issues Highlighted
1. Litigation Concerning Intellectual Property Rights
As mentioned earlier, litigation having as its object/subject the validity of
intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights, is excluded
from the scope of the Convention. Moreover, sheer piracy will normally not
fall within the scope because pirates do not normally conclude choice of court
agreements with the rightholder before infringing intellectual property rights.
But in spite of these exclusions, there is still a large and economically important
body of intellectual property litigation that remains within the scope of the
Convention. This concerns first and foremost litigation over licensing contracts
and other contracts for the transfer or use of intellectual property rights. Where
one party sues the other for royalties, or for damages based on an exploitation
that allegedly exceeds the license granted, litigation brought in contract is
therefore clearly covered. In some countries, however, the plaintiff has to plead
not only the facts but also identify the legal basis for his claim, and there may
be reasons to bring a claim in tort rather than in contract, albeit based on the
same facts as just described. Such tort litigation is also covered by the
Convention, as long as the case could have been brought as well based on a
contract between the parties (Article 2(2) (o)).
Where in litigation covered by the Convention, the invalidity of the
intellectual property right is raised as a defense, this does not exclude the case
from the scope of the Convention (Article 2(3)). If, in the above example, a
money judgment awarding royalties or damages is given, this will normally be
enforced in other Contracting States (Article 8). The preliminary (or implicit)
ruling on validity in the reasoning of the court will not be given any effect (such
as collateral estoppel or similar) under the Convention in other Contracting
States (Article 10(1)). If the money judgment is to be enforced in the State
where the intellectual property right was granted or registered, however, and
there are proceedings pending on that State which have as their object the
validity of the right as such, or it has already been held invalid by the competent
authorities of that State, the money judgment does not have to be recognized
and enforced there (Article 10(3)). This limited exception to the obligation to
recognize and enforce judgments under the Convention protects the sovereignty
of the requested State over intellectual property rights created or granted by it.
2006] Schulz
440 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:433
2. Insurance Litigation
Article 17 makes clear that insurance litigation is also covered by the
Convention:
1) Proceedings under a contract of insurance or reinsurance are not
excluded from the scope of this Convention on the ground that
the contract of insurance or reinsurance relates to a matter to
which this Convention does not apply.
2) Recognition and enforcement of a judgment in respect of
liability under the terms of a contract of insurance or
reinsurance may not be limited or refused on the ground that the
liability under that contract includes liability to indemnify the
insured or reinsured in respect of (a) a matter to which this
Convention does not apply; or (b) an award of damages to
which Article 11 might apply. 3
In other words, if a party takes out an insurance for nuclear liability, is
then held liable for nuclear damages and sues its insurer who refuses to
indemnify it under the insurance contract which contains a choice of court
agreement, the proceedings will be covered by the Convention even though
liability for nuclear damage as the object of the proceedings is excluded by
Article 2(2)(i). The resulting judgment will be recognized and enforced under
the Convention. The same applies where the insured party has taken out an
insurance against having to pay damages, including non-compensatory
damages, to others. Where this party is held liable to pay punitive damages and
claims reimbursement from its insurer, the enforcement of the resulting
judgment may not be refused under Article 11 with regard to the non-
compensatory part of the damages that the insurance is supposed to cover.
3. Relationship with Other Instruments
Article 26 sets out in great detail how the new Convention relates to other
treaties and other instruments. In general, the Convention strives for
compatibility with other treaties, and it respects regional arrangements that may
be based on greater harmonization of law in that region. The important
connecting factor to look at is the residence of the parties. For example, where
among a sub-group of States Parties to the new Hague Convention there exists
another (earlier or later) treaty on the same subject-matter and the case is purely
internal to those States bound by that other treaty because all the parties are
resident either in those States or in States that are only Parties to the other treaty
13. Id. art. 17.
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but not to the Hague Convention, the other treaty prevails (Article 26(2)). The
same applies for rules adopted by a Regional Economic Integration
Organization (e.g. for the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December
2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters [the Brussels Regulation]). In case of a treaty conflict
caused by Article 26(2) (this rule does not apply to rules of a Regional
Economic Integration Organization), Article 26(3) allows a State Party to both
instruments to comply with its obligations towards third States. Earlier and
later treaties on specific subject matters may also prevail, provided that the
State Party to both that treaty and the new Hague Convention makes a
declaration to that effect (Article 26(5)). With regard to recognition and
enforcement, other instruments may continue to apply, but enforcement may not
be granted to a lesser extent than under the Hague Convention (Article 26(4)).
Among all these complicated rules, there is one which, in political terms,
is highly important. It concerns the relationship between the new Hague
Convention and European Community rules, in particular the Brussels
Regulation. This Regulation, together with its predecessor, the Brussels
Convention of September 27, 1968, harmonizes jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters throughout the European
Community with its twenty-five Member States. A judgment given in one of
these States will be enforced in all others without the jurisdiction of the first
court being examined at the enforcement stage. According to its terms, the
Regulation, which also contains an Article 23 on choice of court agreements,
is applicable as soon as one of the parties is domiciled within the European
Community. For non-EU States such as the United States, it would not be very
interesting to conclude a new Hague Convention if being told at the outset that
the EU Member States will continue to apply the Brussels Regulation even if
one party is domiciled in the EU and the other in the United States. So,
reasonably enough, the EU and its Member States agreed that in such a case,
the Hague Convention should apply. This covers only cases where the State in
which the non-EU party is resident-in our example the United States-is also
a Party to the Hague Convention; a further incentive to join this new treaty.
Currently, the co-Reporters Trevor Hartley (United Kingdom) and Masato
Dogauchi (Japan) are preparing the Explanatory Report, an article-by-article
commentary on the new Convention which is based on the deliberations that
took place during the Diplomatic Session in June 2005. Informal consultations
have already started, and as soon as the Report is final, it is expected that
formal consultations with a view to signature and ratification or accession will
begin in the States that participated in the negotiations, and any other interested
States.
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III. APPENDIX
Final Act of the Twentieth Session
The undersigned, Delegates of the Governments of Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, United States of
America and Venezuela, convened at The Hague from 14-30 June 2005, at the
invitation of the Government of the Netherlands, in the Twentieth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Following the deliberations laid down in the records of the meetings, they have
decided to submit to their Governments-
A The following Convention-
CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Desiring to promote international trade and investment through enhanced
judicial co-operation,
Believing that such co-operation can be enhanced by uniform rules on
jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil
or commercial matters,
Believing that such enhanced co-operation requires in particular an
international legal regime that provides certainty and ensures the effectiveness
of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to commercial
transactions and that governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments
resulting from proceedings based on such agreements,
Have resolved to conclude this Convention and have agreed upon the following
provisions-
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CHAPTER I-SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Article I Scope
1. This Convention shall apply in international cases to exclusive
choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters.
2. For the purposes of Chapter II, a case is international unless the
parties are resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship
of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless
of the location of the chosen court, are connected only with that
State.
3. For the purposes of Chapter Mi1, a case is international where
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought.
Article 2 Exclusions from scope
1. This Convention shall not apply to exclusive choice of court
agreements-
a) to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family
or household purposes (a consumer) is a party;
b) relating to contracts of employment, including collective
agreements.
2. This Convention shall not apply to the following matters-
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons;
b) maintenance obligations;
c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property
regimes and other rights or obligations arising out of marriage
or similar relationships;
d) wills and succession;
e) insolvency, composition and analogous matters;
f) the carriage of passengers and goods;
g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims,
general average, and emergency towage and salvage;
h) anti-trust (competition) matters;
i) liability for nuclear damage;
j) claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural
persons;
k) tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not
arise from a contractual relationship;
1) rights in rem in immovable property, and tenancies of
immovable property;
m) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons, and the
validity of decisions of their organs;
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n) the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright
and related rights;
o) infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright
and related rights, except where infringement proceedings are
brought for breach of a contract between the parties relating to
such rights, or could have been brought for breach of that
contract;
p) the validity of entries in public registers.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, proceedings are not excluded from the
scope of this Convention where a matter excluded under that
paragraph arises merely as a preliminary question and not as an
object of the proceedings. In particular, the mere fact that a matter
excluded under paragraph 2 arises by way of defence does not
exclude proceedings from the Convention, if that matter is not an
object of the proceedings.
4. This Convention shall not apply to arbitration and related
proceedings.
5. Proceedings are not excluded from the scope of this Convention by
the mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental
agency or any person acting for a State, is a party thereto.
6. Nothing in this Convention shall affect privileges and immunities of
States or of international organisations, in respect of themselves and
of their property.
Article 3 Exclusive choice of court agreements
For the purposes of this Convention-
a) "exclusive choice of court agreement" means an agreement
concluded by two or more parties that meets the requirements of
paragraph c) and designates, for the purpose of deciding
disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State
or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State to the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts;
b) a choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one
Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one
Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the
parties have expressly provided otherwise;
c) an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded or
documented-
i) in writing; or
ii) by any other means of communication which renders
information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent
reference;
d) an exclusive choice of court agreement that forms part of a
contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. The validity of the exclusive choice
of court agreement cannot be contested solely on the ground that
the contract is not valid.
Article 4 Other definitions
1. In this Convention, "judgment" means any decision on the merits
given by a court, whatever it may be called, including a decree or
order, and a determination of costs or expenses by the court
(including an officer of the court), provided that the determination
relates to a decision on the merits which may be recognised or
enforced under this Convention. An interim measure of protection is
not a judgment.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, an entity or person other than a
natural person shall be considered to be resident in the State-
a) where it has its statutory seat;
b) under whose law it was incorporated or formed;
c) where it has its central administration; or
d) where it has its principal place of business.
CHAPTER 11-JURISDICTION
Article 5 Jurisdiction of the chosen court
1. The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive
choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute
to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void
under the law of that State.
2. A court that has jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not decline to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided
in a court of another State.
3. The preceding paragraphs shall not affect rules-
a) on jurisdiction related to subject matter or to the value of the
claim;
b) on the internal allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a
Contracting State. However, where the chosen court has
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discretion as to whether to transfer a case, due consideration
should be given to the choice of the parties.
Article 6 Obligations of a court not chosen
A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend
or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies
unless-
a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the
chosen court;
b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the
law of the State of the court seised;
c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice
or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State
of the court seised;
d) for exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties, the
agreement cannot reasonably be performed; or
e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case.
Article 7 Interim measures of protection
Interim measures of protection are not governed by this Convention. This
Convention neither requires nor precludes the grant, refusal or termination of
interim measures of protection by a court of a Contracting State and does not
affect whether or not a party may request or a court should grant, refuse or
terminate such measures.
CHAPTER III - RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
Article 8 Recognition and enforcement
1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an
exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced
in other Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter.
Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the
grounds specified in this Convention.
2. Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the application
of the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the
merits of the judgment given by the court of origin. The court
addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court
of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by
default.
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3. A judgment shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of
origin, and shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of
origin.
4. Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if the
judgment is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time
limit for seeking ordinary review has not expired. A refusal does not
prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of
the judgment.
5. This Article shall also apply to a judgment given by a court of a
Contracting State pursuant to a transfer of the case from the chosen
court in that Contracting State as permitted by Article 5, paragraph
3. However, where the chosen court had discretion as to whether to
transfer the case to another court, recognition or enforcement of the
judgment may be refused against a party who objected to the transfer
in a timely manner in the State of origin.
Article 9 Refusal of recognition or enforcement
Recognition or enforcement may be refused if-
a) the agreement was null and void under the law of the State of
the chosen court, unless the chosen court has determined that
the agreement is valid;
b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the
law of the requested State;
c) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent
document, including the essential elements of the claim,
i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in
such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence,
unless the defendant entered an appearance and presented
his case without contesting notification in the court of
origin, provided that the law of the State of origin
permitted notification to be contested; or
ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a
manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles of
the requested State concerning service of documents;
d) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter
of procedure;
e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible
with the public policy of the requested State, including
situations where the specific proceedings leading to the
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judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of
procedural fairness of that State;
f) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the
requested State in a dispute between the same parties; or
g) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in
another State between the same parties on the same cause of
action, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions
necessary for its recognition in the requested State.
Article 10 Preliminary questions
1. Where a matter excluded under Article 2, paragraph 2, or under
Article 21, arose as a preliminary question, the ruling on that
question shall not be recognised or enforced under this Convention.
2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment was based on a ruling on a matter
excluded under Article 2, paragraph 2.
3. However, in the case of a ruling on the validity of an intellectual
property right other than copyright or a related right, recognition or
enforcement of a judgment may be refused or postponed under the
preceding paragraph only where-
a) that ruling is inconsistent with a judgment or a decision of a
competent authority on that matter given in the State under the
law of which the intellectual property right arose; or
b) proceedings concerning the validity of the intellectual property
right are pending in that State.
4. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment was based on a ruling on a matter
excluded pursuant to a declaration made by the requested State under
Article 21.
Article 11 Damages
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary
or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss
or harm suffered.
2. The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what
extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover
costs and expenses relating to the proceedings.
Article 12 Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires)
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting
State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement has approved, or
which have been concluded before that court in the course of proceedings, and
which are enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin,
shall be enforced under this Convention in the same manner as a judgment.
Article 13 Documents to be produced
1. The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall
produce-
a) a complete and certified copy of the judgment;
b) the exclusive choice of court agreement, a certified copy
thereof, or other evidence of its existence;
c) if the judgment was given by default, the original or a certified
copy of a document establishing that the document which
instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was
notified to the defaulting party;
d) any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has
effect or, where applicable, is enforceable in the State of origin;
e) in the case referred to in Article 12, a certificate of a court of the
State of origin that the judicial settlement or a part of it is
enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of
origin.
2. If the terms of the judgment do not permit the court addressed to
verify whether the conditions of this Chapter have been complied
with, that court may require any necessary documents.
3. An application for recognition or enforcement may be accompanied
by a document, issued by a court (including an officer of the court)
of the State of origin, in the form recommended and published by the
Hague Conference on Private International Law.
4. If the documents referred to in this Article are not in an official
language of the requested State, they shall be accompanied by a
certified translation into an official language, unless the law of the
requested State provides otherwise.
Article 14 Procedure
The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or registration for
enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are governed by the law of
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the requested State unless this Convention provides otherwise. The court
addressed shall act expeditiously.
Article 15 Severability
Recognition or enforcement of a severable part of a judgment shall be granted
where recognition or enforcement of that part is applied for, or only part of the
judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced under this Convention.
chapter iv-general clauses
Article 16 Transitional provisions
1. This Convention shall apply to exclusive choice of court agreements
concluded after its entry into force for the State of the chosen court.
2. This Convention shall not apply to proceedings instituted before its
entry into force for the State of the court seised.
Article 17 Contracts of insurance and reinsurance
1. Proceedings under a contract of insurance or reinsurance are not
excluded from the scope of this Convention on the ground that the
contract of insurance or reinsurance relates to a matter to which this
Convention does not apply.
2. Recognition and enforcement of a judgment in respect of liability
under the terms of a contract of insurance or reinsurance may not be
limited or refused on the ground that the liability under that contract
includes liability to indemnify the insured or reinsured in respect
of-
a) a matter to which this Convention does not apply; or
b) an award of damages to which Article 11 might apply.
Article 18 No legalisation
All documents forwarded or delivered under this Convention shall be exempt
from legalisation or any analogous formality, including an Apostille.
Article 19 Declarations limiting jurisdiction
A State may declare that its courts may refuse to determine disputes to which
an exclusive choice of court agreement applies if, except for the location of the
chosen court, there is no connection between that State and the parties or the
dispute.
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Article 20 Declarations limiting recognition and enforcement
A State may declare that its courts may refuse to recognise or enforce a
judgment given by a court of another Contracting State if the parties were
resident in the requested State, and the relationship of the parties and all other
elements relevant to the dispute, other than the location of the chosen court,
were connected only with the requested State.
Article 21 Declarations with respect to specific matters
1. Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention
to a specific matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the
Convention to that matter. The State making such a declaration shall
ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary and that the
specific matter excluded is clearly and precisely defined.
2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply-
a) in the Contracting State that made the declaration;
b) in other Contracting States, where an exclusive choice of court
agreement designates the courts, or one or more specific courts,
of the State that made the declaration.
Article 22 Reciprocal declarations on non-exclusive choice of court
agreements
1. A Contracting State may declare that its courts will recognise and
enforce judgments given by courts of other Contracting States
designated in a choice of court agreement concluded by two or more
parties that meets the requirements of Article 3, paragraph c), and
designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or
may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, a court
or courts of one or more Contracting States (a non-exclusive choice
of court agreement).
2. Where recognition or enforcement of a judgment given in a
Contracting State that has made such a declaration is sought in
another Contracting State that has made such a declaration, the
judgment shall be recognised and enforced under this Convention,
if-
a) the court of origin was designated in a non-exclusive choice of
court agreement;
b) there exists neither a judgment given by any other court before
which proceedings could be brought in accordance with the non-
exclusive choice of court agreement, nor a proceeding pending
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between the same parties in any other such court on the same
cause of action; and
c) the court of origin was the court first seised.
Article 23 Uniform interpretation
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard shall be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application.
Article 24 Review of operation of the Convention
The Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
shall at regular intervals make arrangements for -
a) review of the operation of this Convention, including any
declarations; and
b) consideration of whether any amendments to this Convention
are desirable.
Article 25 Non-unified legal systems
1. In relation to a Contracting State in which two or more systems of
law apply in different territorial units with regard to any matter dealt
with in this Convention-
a) any reference to the law or procedure of a State shall be
construed as referring, where appropriate, to the law or
procedure in force in the relevant territorial unit;
b) any reference to residence in a State shall be construed as
referring, where appropriate, to residence in the relevant
territorial unit;
c) any reference to the court or courts of a State shall be construed
as referring, where appropriate, to the court or courts in the
relevant territorial unit;
d) any reference to a connection with a State shall be construed as
referring, where appropriate, to a connection with the relevant
territorial unit.
2. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, a Contracting State with
two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply
shall not be bound to apply this Convention to situations which
involve solely such different territorial units.
3. A court in a territorial unit of a Contracting State with two or more
territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not be
bound to recognise or enforce a judgment from another Contracting
Schulz
State solely because thejudgment has been recognised or enforced in
another territorial unit of the same Contracting State under this
Convention.
4. This Article shall not apply to a Regional Economic Integration
Organisation.
Article 26 Relationship with other international instruments
1. This Convention shall be interpreted so far as possible to be
compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States,
whether concluded before or after this Convention.
2. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting
State of a treaty, whether concluded before or after this Convention,
in cases where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State
that is not a Party to the treaty.
3. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting
State of a treaty that was concluded before this Convention entered
into force for that Contracting State, if applying this Convention
would be inconsistent with the obligations of that Contracting State
to any non-Contracting State. This paragraph shall also apply to
treaties that revise or replace a treaty concluded before this
Convention entered into force for that Contracting State, except to
the extent that the revision or replacement creates new
inconsistencies with this Convention.
4. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting
State of a treaty, whether concluded before or after this Convention,
for the purposes of obtaining recognition or enforcement of a
judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that is also a Party
to that treaty. However, the judgment shall not be recognised or
enforced to a lesser extent than under this Convention.
5. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting
State of a treaty which, in relation to a specific matter, governs
jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments, even if
concluded after this Convention and even if all States concerned are
Parties to this Convention. This paragraph shall apply only if the
Contracting State has made a declaration in respect of the treaty
under this paragraph. In the case of such a declaration, other
Contracting States shall not be obliged to apply this Convention to
that specific matter to the extent of any inconsistency, where an
exclusive choice of court agreement designates the courts, or one or
more specific courts, of the Contracting State that made the
declaration.
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6. This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a
Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this
Convention, whether adopted before or after this Convention -
a) where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that
is not a Member State of the Regional Economic Integration
Organisation;
b) as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as
between Member States of the Regional Economic Integration
Organisation.
CHAPTER V-FINAL CLAUSES
Article 27 Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory States.
3. This Convention is open for accession by all States.
4. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be
deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, depositary of the Convention.
Article 28 Declarations with respect to non-unified legal systems
1. If a State has two or more territorial units in which different systems
of law apply in relation to matters dealt with in this Convention, it
may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession declare that the Convention shall extend to all its territorial
units or only to one or more of them and may modify this declaration
by submitting another declaration at any time.
2. A declaration shall be notified to the depositary and shall state
expressly the territorial units to which the Convention applies.
3. If a State makes no declaration under this Article, the Convention
shall extend to all territorial units of that State.
4. This Article shall not apply to a Regional Economic Integration
Organisation.
Article 29 Regional Economic Integration Organisations
1. A Regional Economic Integration Organisation which is constituted
solely by sovereign States and has competence over some or all of the
matters governed by this Convention may similarly sign, accept,
approve or accede to this Convention. The Regional Economic
Integration Organisation shall in that case have the rights and
obligations of a Contracting State, to the extent that the Organisation
has competence over matters governed by this Convention.
2. The Regional Economic Integration Organisation shall, at the time of
signature, acceptance, approval or accession, notify the depositary in
writing of the matters governed by this Convention in respect of
which competence has been transferred to that Organisation by its
Member States. The Organisation shall promptly notify the
depositary in writing of any changes to its competence as specified
in the most recent notice given under this paragraph.
3. For the purposes of the entry into force of this Convention, any
instrument deposited by a Regional Economic Integration
Organisation shall not be counted unless the Regional Economic
Integration Organisation declares in accordance with Article 30 that
its Member States will not be Parties to this Convention.
4. Any reference to a "Contracting State" or "State" in this Convention
shall apply equally, where appropriate, to a Regional Economic
Integration Organisation that is a Party to it.
Article 30 Accession by a Regional Economic Integration Organisation
without its Member States
1. At the time of signature, acceptance, approval or accession, a
Regional Economic Integration Organisation may declare that it
exercises competence over all the matters governed by this
Convention and that its Member States will not be Parties to this
Convention but shall be bound by virtue of the signature, acceptance,
approval or accession of the Organisation.
2. In the event that a declaration is made by a Regional Economic
Integration Organisation in accordance with paragraph 1, any
reference to a "Contracting State" or "State" in this Convention shall
apply equally, where appropriate, to the Member States of the
Organisation.
Article 31 Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month
following the expiration of three months after the deposit of the
second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
referred to in Article 27.
2. Thereafter this Convention shall enter into force-
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a) for each State or Regional Economic Integration Organisation
subsequently ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to it,
on the first day of the month following the expiration of three
months after the deposit of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession;
a) for a territorial unit to which this Convention has been extended
in accordance with Article 28, paragraph 1, on the first day of
the month following the expiration of three months after the
notification of the declaration referred to in that Article.
Article 32 Declarations
1. Declarations referred to in Articles 19, 20, 21, 22 and 26 may be
made upon signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
or at any time thereafter, and may be modified or withdrawn at any
time.
2. Declarations, modifications and withdrawals shall be notified to the
depositary.
3. A declaration made at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession shall take effect simultaneously with the entry
into force of this Convention for the State concerned.
4. A declaration made at a subsequent time, and any modification or
withdrawal of a declaration, shall take effecton the first day of the
month following the expiration of three months after the date on
which the notification is received by the depositary.
5. A declaration under Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26 shall not apply to
exclusive choice of court agreements concluded before it takes effect.
Article 33 Denunciation
1. This Convention may be denounced by notification in writing to the
depositary. The denunciation may be limited to certain territorial
units of a non-unified legal system to which this Convention applies.
2. The denunciation shall take effect on the first day of the month
following the expiration of twelve months after the date on which the
notification is received by the depositary. Where a longer period for
the denunciation to take effect is specified in the notification, the
denunciation shall take effect upon the expiration of such longer
period after the date on which the notification is received by the
depositary.
Article 34 Notifications by the depositary
The depositary shall notify the Members of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, and other States and Regional Economic Integration
Organisations which have signed, ratified, accepted, approved or acceded in
accordance with Articles 27, 29 and 30 of the following-
a) the signatures, ratifications, acceptances, approvals and accessions
referred to in Articles 27, 29 and 30;
b) the date on which this Convention enters into force in accordance
with Article 31;
c) the notifications, declarations, modifications and withdrawals of
declarations referred to in Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29 and 30;
d) the denunciations referred to in Article 33.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed
this Convention.
Done at The Hague, on 30 June 2005, in the English and French languages,
both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in
the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and of
which a certified copy shall be sent, through diplomatic channels, to each of the
Member States of the Hague Conference on Private International Law as of the
date of its Twentieth Session and to each State which participated in that
Session.
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The issue before our panel today is a subpart of a larger question: Are
obligations assumed by states under international human rights treaties
applicable extraterritorially during periods of armed conflict and military
occupation? Do the protections provided by the international human rights
treaties normally apply extraterritorially, outside the government-governed
relationship? If so, what is the precise relationship between the protections
provided under human rights instruments and international humanitarian law
(the law of war) in cases of armed conflict or military occupation?
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author. Part of the material contained in this paper was previously published
in Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict
and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005). This article is a revised reproduction of oral
remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, from October 20-22, 2005.
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Even though the atrocities committed during World War II served as a
catalyst for the development of the International Covenants on Human Rights'
as well as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the linkage between human rights
and humanitarian law has never been clear. The traditional view has been to
distinguish the two: "the two systems are complementary," Jean Pictet
observes, but "humanitarian law is valid only in the case of armed conflict
while human rights are essentially applicable in peacetime."2 Proponents of
this position have noted that the original paradigm of human rights governed
relations between the state and its own nationals; on the other hand, the law of
war dealt with those concerning the state and enemy nationals, and
humanitarian law was intended primarily to protect enemy noncombatants.
More recently, a conflicting school of thought has concluded that "[t]he
conventional division between the law of war and the law of peace is no longer
tenable" and that "the law of war no longer automatically excludes the
application of the law of peace."3 Last year, the International Court of Justice
indicated in its advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,4 that the provisions of the
Covenants and the Convention on the Rights of the Child5 applied
extraterritorially during military occupation and that "the protection offered by
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through
the provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the
[ICCPR]."6
In my view, this comment by the Court is not consistent with state practice
concerning the application of human rights treaties extraterritorially during
times of armed conflict and military occupation.' For example, during the
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter the Covenants].
2. JEAN PICTET, HuMANrrARIAN LAW AND PROTECTION OF WAR VIc-rims 15 (1975).
3. Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationships of the Laws, 31
AM. U. L. REv. 935,941-42 (1982).
4. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1009 [hereinafter Wall Opinion].
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
6. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 106.
7. The provisions of the two bodies of law may overlap when armed forces act solely within their
own territory in domestic armed conflict, since common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I of 1977 apply to a state's own nationals, as well as the international human rights
treaties. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32; Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
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recent military occupation of Iraq, the Commission on Human Rights called
upon parties only "to abide strictly by their obligations under international
humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
Regulations including those relating to essential civilian needs of the people of
Iraq." 8 Similarly, in Resolution 1483, the Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, called upon "all concerned to comply fully with
their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907."' Subsequently, in
Resolutions 1511 and 1546, again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Security Council authorized the multinational force "to take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq."'
Both resolutions also refer to the obligation of states to comply with
international humanitarian law. However, no mention is made of any obligation
on the part of states to comply with international human rights instruments.
During the briefing and argument of the Wall case, most states addressed only
jurisdictional issues, while a few summarily argued that Israel had violated the
Covenants, without substantively addressing the relationship between the two
bodies of law.
The Chairperson of our panel has posed several excellent questions
concerning the applicable law with regard to extraterritorial detention during
periods of armed conflict and military operation. I will use those questions as
a framework for my presentation this morning.
I. DOES EITHER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN OR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
COVER EXTRATERRITORIAL DETENTION DURING PERIODS OF ARMED
CONFLICT?
As indicated above, states have considered the extraterritorial detention of
individuals during armed conflict or military occupation to be covered by
international humanitarian law. It is generally acknowledged that "[lthe
humanitarian law conventions offer far more protection than do the general
U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] [collectively Geneva Conventions]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflict, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter Protocol 1), and Protocol;24005;24005 Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinafter Protocol I1) [collectively Additional
Protocols of 1977].
8. C.H.R. Res. 84, U.N. Doc. 2003/84 (Apr. 25, 2003). For the relevant instruments concerned,
see Geneva Conventions, supra note 7, and the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, annexed to Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
9. S.C. Res. 1483, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
10. S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1546, 10, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
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guarantees of the human rights conventions."" For example, with respect to
detention, the protections in international human rights instruments generally
focus on restrictions to freedom following a criminal offence, where a final
decision has not been made in such cases by domestic courts. On the other
hand, these protections are defined in a far more precise manner in international
humanitarian law instruments for persons detained in situations of armed
conflict or military occupation. The Third Geneva Convention, as well as the
customary law of armed conflict, provides specific guidance concerning the
treatment of prisoners of war and enemy combatants, while the Fourth Geneva
Convention provides detailed rules concerning internment of civilians of enemy
nationality. Moreover, if international human rights treaties apply
extraterritorially, then the possibility of conflict with international humanitarian
law is all the greater. For example, Article 5 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) lists the cases when a person may be deprived of
liberty, but fails to mention the capture of prisoners of war or the internment of
civilians.1 2
The two human right instruments that are most relevant to our inquiry
concerning the application of human rights law to extraterritorial detention are
the ICCPR (with 155 states parties) and the ECHR (with forty-five states
parties). This presentation assumes that the relevant criteria for ascertaining
whether the standards set forth in these instruments apply to extraterritorial
detention must begin with the ordinary meaning of each instrument in its
context and in light of its object and purpose, its preparatory work, and state
practice thereunder-in short, the standard tools of treaty interpretation as set
forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 3
A. Scope of Application Provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR
While both the ECHR and the ICCPR reflect a territorial notion of
jurisdiction, their specific scope of application is different. Article 1 of the
ECHR states that "the High Contracting Party shall secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of the
Convention." On the other hand, Article 2(1) of the ICCPR stipulates that
"[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant without discrimination of any kind."
11. Schindler, supra note 3, at 940.
12. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 1. While
the U.S. is not a party to this Convention, the principles for treaty interpretation are recognized as part of
customary international law.
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Hence, on the basis of the plain and ordinary meaning of the scope of
application provisions, the reach of the ECHR would appear to be broader than
that of the ICCPR. The ECHR applies to anyone within the jurisdiction of a
state, while the ICCPR applies to individuals who are both within its territory
and subject to its sovereign authority.
B. Preparatory Work of ICCPR
What was the reason for the difference in the scope of application
provisions of the two instruments? The preparatory work of the Covenant
actually establishes that the reference to "within its territory" was included in
Article 2(1) in part to make clear that states were not obligated to secure the
rights therein in territories under military occupation. In 1950 the draft text of
Article 2 then under consideration by the Commission on Human Rights, like
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, would have required
that each state ensure Covenant rights to everyone "within its jurisdiction." The
United States, however, proposed the addition of "within its territory."'4
Eleanor Roosevelt, the U.S. representative and then-chair of the Commission,
emphasized that the United States was "particularly anxious" that it not assume
"an obligation to ensure the rights recognized in it to the citizens of countries
under United States occupation" or in what she characterized as "leased
territory.""s She explained:
The purpose of the proposed addition [is] to make it clear that the
draft Covenant would apply only to persons within the territory and
subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting states. The United States
[is] afraid that without [the proposed] addition the draft Covenant
might be construed as obliging the contracting State[ ] to enact
legislation concerning persons, who although outside its territory were
technically within its jurisdiction for certain purposes. An illustration
would be the occupied territories of Germany, Austria and Japan:
persons within those countries were subject to the jurisdiction of the
occupying States in certain respects, but were outside the scope of
legislation of those States. Another illustration would be leased
territories; some countries leased certain territories from others for
14. Compilation of the Comments of Governments on the Draft International Covenant on Human
Rights and on the Proposed AdditionalArticles, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess. at 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/365 (1950) (U.S. proposal). The U.S. amendment added the words "territory and subject to its"
before "jurisdiction" in Article 2(1). Id.
15. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 193rd mtg. at 13, 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 193 at 13, 18 (1950); Summary Record of the Hundred
and Ninety-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess., 194rd mtg. at 5, 9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR. 194 (1950) (statements of Eleanor Roosevelt).
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limited purposes, and there might be a question of conflicting
authority between the lessor nation and the lessee nation. 6
Several delegations spoke against the U.S. amendment, including Ren6
Cassin (France) and Charles Malik (Lebanon). They argued that a nation
should guarantee fundamental rights to its citizens abroad as well as at home.'7
However, the U.S. amendment was ultimately adopted at the 1950 session by
a vote of 8-2 with five abstentions. 8 Subsequently, after similar debates, the
United States and others defeated French proposals to delete the phrase "within
its territory" at both the 1952 session of the Commission 9 and the 1963 session
of the General Assembly.2" As Egon Schwelb concludes:
The words "within its territory" amount to a limitation of the scope of
the Covenant in regard to which the Covenant differs, e.g., from the
European Convention on Human Rights, by Art. 1 of which the High
Contracting Parties undertook to secure the rights "to everyone within
their jurisdiction." Misgivings about this restriction were felt both in
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and in the General
Assembly. In a separate vote on the words "within its territory" these
words were retained, however.2
C. Subsequent Practice Concerning ICCPR
Initially, commentators endorsed a literal reading of Article 2(1), and
further argued that Covenant obligations applied, in the context of armed
conflict, only with respect to acts of a state's armed forces executed within that
2territory. The Human Rights Committee first departed from this literal
16. Summary Record of the Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 138th mtg at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.138 (1950).
17. See Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 6th Sess., 193rd mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/SR.193 (1950) (proposal by Ren6 Cassin (France));
Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess.,
193rd mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.193 (1950) (statement by Charles Malik (Lebanon)).
18. Summary Recordofthe HundredandNinety-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 194rd mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.194 (1950).
19. Draft International Convention on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation, U.N.
ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 8th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/L.161 (1952) (French amendment);
Summary Record of the Three Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 8th
Sess., 329th mtg. at 14, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.329 (1952) (vote rejecting amendment).
20. U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 18th Sess., 1259th mtg. 30, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.1259 (1963)
(rejection of French and Chinese proposal to delete "within its territory").
21. Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of December
1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103, 109 (Asbjorn Eide & August Schou eds.,
1968).
22. See, e.g. Manfred Nowak, The Effectiveness of the International Covenant on Civil and
Dennis
reading of Article 2(1) in several early decisions on individual communications
(cited with approval by the International Court of Justice in its Wall opinion),
where it found that it had jurisdiction in "exceptional instances" when state
agents had taken unlawful action against citizens of that state living abroad.23
However, these opinions support the position that the provisions of the ICCPR
do not apply extraterritorially in situations of armed conflict and military
occupation. In two of those cases (L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay and Celiberti v.
Uruguay), involving exceptional instances where Uruguayan state agents
abducted citizens living abroad into Uruguayan territory, Committee member
Christian Tomuschat observed that "[t]he formula [within its territory] was
intended to take care of objective difficulties which might impede the
implementation of the Covenant in specific situations." He specifically cited
occupation of foreign territory as an "example of situations which the drafters
of the Covenant had in mind when they confined the obligation of States parties
to their own territory."24
More recently, the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No.
31 (May 2004) abandoned the literal reading altogether, taking the position that
the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States
Parties but must also be available to all individuals... who may find
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State
Party. This principle also applies to those within the power or
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its
territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national
Political Rights-Stocktaking After the First Eleven Sessions of the UN-Human Rights Committee, 1 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 136, 156 (1980); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL.,NEW RULESFOR VICTIMSOFARMED CONFLICTS 635
(1982).
23. In its Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 109, the International Court of Justice cited the Human
Rights Committee's views in U.N. Human Rights Committee, L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, Commc'n No.
52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR!C/13/D/52/1979 (1981) [hereinafter L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay] ; U.N. Human
Rights Committee, Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 56/1979, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/13/D/56/1979 (1981) [hereinafter Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay]; and U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Montero v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 106/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, at 136 (1983/1990).
24. L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 23, appendix.
Tomuschat further stated:
Never, was it envisaged ... to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to
carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of
their citizens living abroad. Consequently, despite the wording of article 2(1), the
events which took place outside Uruguay come within the purview of the Covenant.
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contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping
or peace enforcement operation.25
The ICJ' s conclusion in its Wall advisory opinion that the ICCPR extends
to the West Bank and Gaza appears to have been based upon the unusual
circumstances of Israel's prolonged occupation. The Court did not cite General
Comment No. 31 in its opinion. Instead, it relied on earlier concluding
observations of the Committee concerning "the long-standing presence of Israel
in [the occupied] territories, Israel's ambiguous attitude toward their future
status, as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeliforces therein"
and the Committee's conclusion that
in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to
the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all
conduct by the State party's authorities or agents in those territories
that affect[s] the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and
fall[s] within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the
principles of public international law.26
Indeed, the Court's specific holding was founded on ICCPR Article 12(1),
which contains an express territorial limitation: "Everyone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence." Thus, arguably the most
logical reading of the Court's advisory opinion is that it was based only on the
view that the West Bank and Gaza were part of the "territory" of Israel for
purposes of the application of the Covenant.
The Committee's recent interpretation of Article 2 in General Comment
No. 31, while departing from the territorial approach clearly intended by the
negotiators, nonetheless finds support in the work of some distinguished
commentators who argue that the phrase "within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction" should be read as a disjunctive conjunction.27 However, Manfred
Nowak, in his commentary on the ICCPR, disagrees:
25. General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
Parties to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.13 (May, 26, 2004) (emphasis added).
26. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 110 (emphasis added) (quoting U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
63rd Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel 18/08/1998, U.N. Docs.
CCPR/CI79/Add.93, 10 (1998); U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 78th Sess., Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Israel 21/08/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 11 (2003)).
27. See e.g. Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HuMAN RIGHTS 72, 74 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Theodor
Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 (1995).
[The] grammatical (re)interpretation in the sense of a "disjunctive
conjunction" . . . fails, however, to convince because ... States are
not responsible for all violations of the Covenant on their territory
(e.g., by insurgents, by occupation forces, etc.). The correct
interpretation, which is oriented on the purpose of the Covenant in
light of its historical background, was convincingly presented by
Tomuschat in individual opinions in L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, No.
52/1979, and Celiberti v. Uruguay, No. 56/1979.2"
The effective control rationale employed by the Human Rights Committee
in concluding that Israel was responsible for implementing Covenant rights in
occupied territory is also doubtful, especially outside the context of a long-term
occupation. As Professor Tomuschat observes, "Normally a state lacks
consolidated institutions abroad that would be in a position to provide to an
aggrieved individual all the guarantees, which in particular, Articles 9 and 14
CCPR require., 29 In all events, as he points out, the position taken by the
Human Rights Committee, that Israel is responsible for implementing the
Covenant in the occupied territories "to the extent that it exercise[s] 'effective
control,"' is not supported by the text of the ICCPR. "[T]his broad construction
of Article 2(2) may give rise to serious doubts as to the proper role of the
[Committee]. Is it authorized to interpret the CCPR in an authentic fashion?
The language of Article 2(2) is relatively clear."3
States have also expressed disagreement with the Committee's view that
the Covenant applies to acts of a state's armed forces performed outside that
state's territory. For example, in its recent periodic report to the Committee on
Human Rights concerning the implementation of ICCPR, the United States has
once again taken the position that the provisions of the treaty do not apply
outside the territory of a State at any time.3' Earlier, the Netherlands challenged
a request by the Committee on Human Rights to provide information about the
fall of Srebrenica.32 The Netherlands told the Committee that:
28. Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR COMMENTARY 43 (2d
rev. ed. 2005).
29. CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HumAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 110 (2003).
30. Id.
31. U.S. DEP'T OFSTATE, UNITED STATES SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT CONCERNINGTHE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2005), available at
http://www.state.uov/g/drl/rls/55504.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). The United States also informed the
Committee during the presentation of its initial report that "[t]he Covenant was not regarded as having
extraterritorial application" because of the "dual requirement" of Article 2(1). Summary Record ofthe 1405th
Meeting: United States of America, 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1405 (Mar. 31, 1995).
32. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Netherlands, 27, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/72/NET (Aug. 27,2001).
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[t]he Government disagrees with the Committee's suggestion that the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
are applicable to the conduct of Dutch blue helmets in Srebrenica....
Article 2 of the Covenant clearly states that each State Party
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals "within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction" the rights recognized in the
Covenant, including the right to life enshrined in article 6. It goes
without saying that the citizens of Srebrenica, vis-b-vis the
Netherlands, do not come within the scope of that provision.33
What is even more important, although various overseas military missions
involving states parties have been undertaken since the adoption of the
Covenant, most recently in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), not one state has indicated, by making
a derogation from those rights as provided under Article 4 of the Covenant, a
belief that its actions abroad constituted an exercise of jurisdiction under the
Covenant. All derogations under Article 4 have been lodged with respect to
internal laws only.34
D. Subsequent Practice Concerning ECHR
In its recent decision in Bankovic v. Belgium, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights relied upon similar state practice with respect
to derogations in finding that victims of the extraterritorial acts by NATO
forces in bombing the headquarters of Radio Television Serbia were not "within
the jurisdiction" of the member states for purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR.35
The European Court stated that "Article 1 of the Convention must be
considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of
jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special
justification in the particular circumstances of each case."36 Perhaps most
significant for present purposes, the Court described the territorial scope of
Article 2 of the ICCPR as having been "definitively and specifically confined"
by the drafters. "[I]t is difficult to suggest," the Court observed, "that
exceptional recognition by the Human Rights Committee of certain instances
of extra-territorial jurisdiction (and the applicants give one example only
33. Replies of the Government of the Netherlands to the concerns expressed by the Human Rights
Committee: Netherlands, 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.I (Apr. 9, 2003).
34. MULTILATERALTREATIES DEPOSrrED WITH THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch.4.4, available
athttp://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bibleenglishintemetbiblepartltchapterlV/chapterV.asp (last visited Oct.
8, 2005).
35. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
36. Id. 37.
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[Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay]) displaces in any way the territorial jurisdiction
expressly conferred by" Article 2(l)."
By contrast, in its earlier decisions involving Cyprus and Turkey, the
European Court had concluded that a state's responsibility may be engaged
where, as a consequence of military action, whether lawful or unlawful, it
exercises effective control outside its national territory.38 In Bankovic,
however, the Court pointed out that in contrast to the situation in Cyprus, the
FRY had not ratified the European Convention prior to the bombing and that
"the desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights' protection has
so far been relied on by the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction when
the territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would
normally be covered by the Convention."39
One of the key conclusions of the European Court in Bankovic was that the
obligations of Article 1 of the ECHR could not be divided under the effective
control rationale. The Court observed that: "The wording of Article I does not
provide any support for the applicants' suggestion that the positive obligation
in Article 1 ... can be divided in accordance with the particular circumstances
of the extraterritorial act in question."4 ° Subsequently, the Court also confirmed
in Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia that if the ECHR applies under the effective
control rationale, a state's responsibility is not confined to the acts of its
soldiers or officials in that area but also extends to acts of the local administra-
tion.4
Recently, two courts struggled with the application of the ECHR in Iraq.
Although it ultimately rejected the case on other grounds, a chamber of the
European Court cast doubt on the significance of Bankovic in Issa v. Turkey,
a case involving a large-scale cross-border raid by Turkish military forces into
northern Iraq. The Chamber relied on the views of the Human Rights
Committee in Lopez Burgos and Celiberti (which, as discussed above, had been
cited with approval by the ICJ in its Wall opinion) as evidencing a broad
jurisdictional exception-that "the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to
allow a state party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of
another state, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory."42 Even more
recently, in Al Skeini & Others v. Secretary of State for Defence, which
involved alleged violations of rights under the ECHR by British occupation
forces in Iraq, the England and Wales High Court concluded that the "broad
37. Id. 54.
38. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2216, 2234-35; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (Grand Chamber).
39. Bankovic, XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 1 80.
40. Id. 175.
41. Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 316.
42. Issa v. Turkey, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 71.
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dicta" of Issa were "inconsistent with Bankovic."4 The High Court found, inter
alia, that it did not have "broad, world-wide extra-territorial personal jurisdic-
tion" over "the case of deaths as a result of military operations" since "it would
drive a coach and horses through the narrow exceptions" recognized in
Bankovic and because "there would be nothing to stop jurisdiction arising, or
potentially arising, across the whole range of rights and freedoms protected by
the Convention."" The Court did find that the case of an individual who had
been arrested by British forces on charges of terrorism and was being held in
"a British military prison, operating in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi
sovereign authorities," and not as a "prisoner of war," "falls within a narrowly
limited exception exemplified by embassies, consulates, vessels and aircraft,
and in the case of Hess v. United Kingdom, a prison.""
E. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
Is Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of any relevance? It specifically
provides that an occupying power must take "all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Where the
territorial sovereign has not ratified a treaty prior to the commencement of the
occupation, is the administrator of the occupied territory required to preserve
the rights of the territorial sovereign, which chose not to ratify the particular
treaty?' Should Israel be deemed responsible for implementing the provisions
of the Covenants and the CROC in the West Bank and Gaza, even though those
treaties were not ratified by the territorial sovereign prior to the occupation?
If the treaties apply extraterritorially, should Israel for that reason remain
residually responsible for implementing the full range of rights and freedoms
protected in those instruments where it transferred most responsibilities for civil
government in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the Palestinian
Authority? "
43. Al Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Defense [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, In 263, 265 (Eng.).
44. Id. It 269, 284, 285. As a result the High Court dismissed appeals by relatives of five Iraqis
who died in shooting incidents in the southern Basra area.
45. Id. ft 286-87.
46. As Oppenheim points out: '"rhere is not an atom of sovereignty in the authority of the
occupant ..." L. Oppenheim, The Legal Relations Between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants, 33
L.Q. REV. 363, 364-65 (1917).
47. In its appearances before the international human rights treaty bodies, Israel has consistently
maintained that as a result of the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the 1995 Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip that it "has no say, control, or jurisdiction" over the Gaza Strip and in Areas
A and B of the West Bank, where the vast majority of the Palestinian population resides, and thus that it has
no ability to implement the rights enshrined in these treaties. See, e.g., STATE OF ISRAEL, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CONVENTION THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN ISRAEL: RESPONSE OF ISRAEL TO THE "LIST OF ITEMS TO
BE TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE INITIAL REPORT OF ISRAEL," 43 (2002),
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By way of example, the Coalition Provisional Authority did not attemptto mplmen •48
to implement he provisions of the Convention Against Torture in Iraq, as Iraq
had not ratified the treaty prior to the occupation. The Committee Against
Torture, in contending that the U.K had an obligation to implement the
provisions of the Convention in Iraq, "observe[d] that the Convention
protections extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of a State party and
considere[d] that this principle includes all areas under the de facto effective
control of the State party's authorities."49 Nonetheless, the United Kingdom
continued to maintain with respect to application of the Convention Against
Torture in Iraq that it "could not have taken legislative or judicial measures of
the kind envisaged since legislative authority was in the hands of the CPA and
judicial authority was largely in the hands of the Iraqi courts."50
The Human Rights Committee will no doubt face an uphill struggle in
seeking to implement its views on the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR
in situations of armed conflict and military occupation, even after the ICJ
decision. Unlike judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,5 the
views of the Human Rights Committee under the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR are not considered to be legally binding. 2 In any event, the
Committee's position in its General Comment No. 31 and in its concluding
observations concerning Israel is at odds with the plain meaning of Article 2(1),
the practice of states that have ratified the Covenant, and the original intent of
the negotiators.
available athttp://www.unhchr.chhtml/menu2/6/crcdoclreplies/wr-israel-l.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,2006).
48. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
49. Conclusions and Recommendations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- Dependent Territories, I 4(b), U.N. Doc. CATICICRJ33/3 (Dec. 10, 2004).
50. Al Skeini, [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, 103. At the close of the negotiations on the
Convention Against Torture in 1984, the United States maintained that the treaty "was never intended to
apply to armed conflicts and thus supersede the 1949 Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law in armed
conflicts and the 1977 Protocols additional thereto." Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working
Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 at 5. No delegation contradicted
the U.S. statement. See also Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/39/499, at 15 (1984) (statement
of Norway) ("For these kinds of armed conflicts, the Geneva Conventions and the First Additional Protocol
established a system of universal jurisdiction and of implementation that must be considered equal to the
system of the convention against torture.").
51. Article 46(2) of the European Convention, supra note 12, gives the Committee of Ministers
authority to ensure enforcement of any final judgments.
52. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 302. Article 5(4) of the Protocol gives the Committee only the authority to "forward its views
to the State Party concerned and to the individual." See, e.g., KIRSTEN YOUNG, THE LAW AND PROCESS OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 176 (2002); Christian Tomuschat, Evolving Procedural Rules: The UN
Human Rights Committee's First Years in Dealing with Individual Communications, 1 HUM. RTS. L.J. 249,
255 (1980). Additionally, only 105 out of the 155 states parties to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) have ratified the First Optional Protocol.
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II. IF BOTH HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLY, DOES THE
FORMER PREVAIL AS LEX SPECIALIS?
What explains the lack of notice of derogations by states concerning the
extraterritorial application of the Covenant and the European Convention
during periods of armed conflict and military occupation as discussed above?
Two possible legal theories suggest themselves: that states believe that the
obligations assumed under these instruments apply only within their territory
and not to acts of armed forces executed outside their territory; or that the lex
specialis of humanitarian law suspends the extraterritorial application of the
instruments during periods of armed conflict and military occupation. At times,
the United States has maintained both positions. For example, with respect to
the detainees in Guantanamo, the United States has taken the position that "the
ICCPR would not govern this case if it were otherwise privately enforceable
and applicable outside U.S. territory.... [The ICCPR] ... is intended to secure
'civil and political rights'-that is, the rights and obligations between a
government and the governed." Noting that the Guantdnamo detainees are
being held under the law of war, which "applies during armed conflict to
regulate interactions between governments and members of enemy forces," the
U.S. position states that this separate law of war "addresses specifically and in
detail obligations with respect to detainees seized in combat" and is the law that
"covers the detainees. 53
The ICJ Wall advisory opinion apparently recognizes that the lex specialis
of international humanitarian law may exclude the general application of the
provisions of the ICCPR during situations of armed conflict and military
occupation. The Court suggests that the specific protections provided by the
two categories of instruments could be split into three groups of rights: "some
rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may
be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both
these branches of international law."54 However, the Court did not offer
specific guidance on how to subdivide the rights into these categories. Without
further analysis of the lex specialis, the Court determined that Israel's security
barrier "impede[s] the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory ... as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."55
53. Brief for Appellees at 45-46, Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153
(9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-55367). Plaintiffs had argued that the ICCPR creates judicially enforceable rights
that may be properly invoked in habeas corpus proceedings. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case without
reaching the issue.
54. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 1 106.
55. 1d. 134.
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One important doorway to understanding the Court's opinion is its factual
determination that "the military operations leading to the occupation of the
West Bank in 1967 ended a long time ago."56 Under Article 6 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, the provisions of the Convention ceased to apply in the
territory of Israel when the military operations ended and one year later in the
occupied territories. Thus, the Court's logic left it with a highly unusual
situation; while under Article 6 some of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention continued to apply to the extent Israel exercised the functions of
government, many other protections provided under the Convention relating to
civil and political rights were no longer applicable. In fact, the Court's finding
rendered inapplicable two provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that
would appear to be in conflict with the relevant provisions of the ICCPR.
Articles 42 and 78 permit internment or placement in assigned residence of
protected persons where the security of the detaining power makes it absolutely
necessary.
In its earlier advisory opinion in Legality of the Threat or the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, the Court also observed in abstract terms that "the protection
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in
wartime, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. 57 The
Court further cautioned, however, that the "most directly relevant applicable
law ... is that relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations
Charter and the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct
of hostilities" and that "whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a
certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life
contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the
law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the
Covenant itself., 58 Hence, based on the reasoning employed by the ICJ in its
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, even if the provisions of the ICCPR could
be said to apply during periods of armed conflict, whether the detention of
combatants seized in armed conflict or the internment of civilians is "arbitrary"
under Article 9 of the ICCPR could only be decided by reference to
international humanitarian law.
Moreover, as the UN independent expert on the protection of human rights
in countering terrorism (Robert Goldman) recently observed, while the
"[h]uman rights treaty bodies have no common approach on how human rights
law relates to rules of international humanitarian law," the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has "looked to rules and standards of
56. Id. 125.
57. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 25
(July 8).
58. Id., U 25, 34.
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international humanitarian law .. as the lex specialis in interpreting and
applying the American Convention or the American Declaration in combat
situations." 59 For example, in the context of a case involving the Guantanamo
detainees the IACHR observed that:
In certain circumstances, however, the test for evaluating the
observance of a particular right, such as the right to liberty, in a
situation of armed conflict may be distinct from that applicable in
time of peace. In such situations, international law including the
jurisprudence of the Commission, dictates that it may be necessary to
deduce the applicable standard by reference to international
humanitarian law as the applicable lex specialis.'
In short, it would appear that the best reading of the interrelationship
between the ICCPR and international humanitarian law at least with respect to
detention of combatants or the internment of civilians, is the more traditional
view that international humanitarian law should be applied as the lex specialis
in determining what a state's obligations are during armed conflict or military
occupation.
Before turning to the question of derogations, I would like to consider
briefly the role that the Security Council has played in resolving possible
differences within the international community over what specific rules of
international law govern extraterritorial detention by multinational forces. The
Council has authority under Chapter VII, when necessary "to maintain or
restore international peace and security," to authorize measures that may be
inconsistent with otherwise applicable treaties. Under Article 103 of the UN
Charter, "[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail."
For example, the extraterritorial security detention currently employed by
the MNF in Iraq has been authorized by UN Security Council resolution 1546.
The resolution "[diecides that the multinational force shall have the authority
to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and
stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution." The
59. U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 29-30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103 (Feb. 7, 2005).
60. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures, Mar. 12,2002,41 LL.M. 532, 533. See also
OFFICEOFU.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER OFHUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORKING GROUPON ARBrrRARY DETENTION,
FACT SHEEr No. 26, ANNEx IV (stating that "Situations of armed conflict, covered by the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols, do not fall within the competence of the
Group"), available at http://www.ohchr.org/englishlabout/publications/docs/fs26.htm#A4 (last visited Mar.
19, 2006).
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letter from the U.S. Secretary of State annexed to the resolution states that the
MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute
to the maintenance of security in Iraq, including "internment where this is
necessary for imperative reasons of security."
Recently, the United Kingdom's High Court of Justice issued an important
decision that addresses the authority of the MNF to detain security internees
under UNSCR 1546 and the relationship of that authority to the human rights
protections provided under Article 5 of the ECHR concerning arbitrary
detention. In Al Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defense, a British citizen who
had been detained for nine months by British forces in Iraq on security grounds
challenged the detention as inconsistent with the United Kingdom's domestic
law implementing Article 5 of the ECHR.6' The Court concluded that by
UNSCR 1546 the Security Council authorized the MNF "to continue the
powers exercisable in accordance with Article 78 of Geneva IV but inconsistent
with Article 5 of the ECHR" and "to intern those suspected of conduct creating
a serous threat to security in Iraq.' '62 The Court further found that since the
resolution was made under the provisions of the Charter, in particular those
authorities established under Chapter VII, "the resolution does.., in principle
override Article 5 of the Convention in relation to the claimant's detention in
Basra.
' 63
LII. IF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLIES, WHAT IS THE PERMISSIBLE
SCOPE OF POSSIBLE DEROGATIONS?
As noted at the outset, the ICJ concluded in its Wall advisory opinion that
the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind
to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and that Israel had forfeited its right to derogate from the right to liberty
of movement because of its failure to give other states proper notification of
such an intent. The Court repeatedly emphasized that Israel's notification of
intent to derogate involved only Article 9 of the Covenant, "which deals with
the right to liberty and security of person and lays down the rules applicable in
cases of arrest or detention."' The other Articles of the Covenant therefore
remained applicable not only on Israeli territory, but also on the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.
Two issues would appear to present themselves in the context of our
discussion concerning extraterritorial detention: would states be able to
61. Al Jedda v. Sec'y of State for Defense, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 1809, (Eng).
62. Id. 7 92-93.
63. Id. 122.
64. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 1 127.
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derogate from rights automatically if they are involved in an armed conflict or
military occupation; and could they derogate entirely from the protections
provided under international human rights instruments concerning arbitrary
detention.
A. Suspension of Rights Generally
Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, like Article 15 of the ECHR, provides that
states "may take measures derogating from their obligations" under the
Covenant "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed." The article was based on
the constitutions or emergency legislation of states, including the United
Kingdom, empowering the head of state or government to declare a state of
emergency and suspend domestic rights, such as through denial of liberty of
movement, detention without trial, press censorship, and the creation of special
tribunals. The Uruguayan representative, during the negotiations of Article 4,
appears to have reflected the views of most delegations by emphasizing that the
executive is authorized to suspend constitutional guarantees "in most national
legislations. 65
As pointed out above, states in actual practice have notified other states
under ICCPR Article 4(3) of the suspension of their domestic laws during
periods of internal disturbance. But not one state has submitted a notice of
derogation suspending the application of the Covenant extraterritorially during
periods of international armed conflict or military occupation. Indeed, it is
difficult to see how generally states contributing troops to multilateral forces
would be able to suspend civil and political rights during periods of armed
conflict and military occupation. The individual states contributing troops to
a multinational force may or may not be party to the ICCPR, or, face a public
emergency that threatens the life of that nation as required by Article 4(1) of the
ICCPR. Could some members of a coalition suspend ICCPR rights
extraterritorially on behalf of other members?
This "state of legal uncertainty" concerning the ability of participating
states in a multilateral force to derogate from international human rights
instruments was one of the key factors that led the British High Court in Al
Jedda to conclude that the provisions of UNSCR 1546 applied in lieu of Article
5 of the ECHR. The Court observed that individual states contributing troops
to the MNF in Iraq might not face a "war or public emergency threatening the
life of the nation" as required by Articles 15 of the ECHR and that
"[p]articipating states need to know where they stand when faced with making
65. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-fifth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., 6th Sess., 195th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 (1950) (statement of the representative of
Uruguay).
decisions at very short notice., 66 The Court also relied on the fact that no state
has derogated in relation to actions abroad at the invitation of the Security
Council since 1951.
The extraordinary and unprecedented proposition in the ICJ Wall case that
the provisions of international human rights instruments apply extraterritorially
unless there has been a specific derogation appears to put at risk the
participation by states in United Nations and other multinational operations
outside their own territory, by placing them in the position of undermining,
through their own liability, the human rights situations in territories where the
operations are conducted.
B. Permissible Scope of Derogations.
With respect to the permissible scope of derogations, Article 4(2) of the
ICCPR stipulates that no derogation may be made from Articles 6 (right not to
be arbitrarily deprived of one's life), 7 (prohibition of torture), 8 (prohibition
of slavery and servitude), 11 (prohibition of detention for debt), 15 (prohibition
of retroactive criminal laws), 16 (recognition as a person before the law), and
18 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion). However, the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment No. 29 argued that the list of nonderogable
provisions in Article 4 is not exclusive and it proceeded to list a number of
additional rights from which no derogation could be made.67 For example, with
respect to detention, the Committee stated that "in order to protect
nonderogable rights, the right [under Article 9(4)] to take proceedings before
a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of
detention, must not be diminished by a state party's decision to derogate from
the Covenant. 68
Nonetheless, states in actual practice have frequently derogated from
Article 9 in its entirety with respect to their domestic legislation. As of October
12, 2005, twenty-seven states had submitted notifications under Article 4(3) of
the Covenant, with seventeen states derogating from Article 9 completely.
Moreover, the negotiating history of the Covenant establishes that states clearly
intended that Article 9 of the ICCPR could be suspended in its entirety (if it is
assumed that the provision applies to a particular conflict). During the 1950
drafting session of the Commission on Human Rights, the French proposed an
amendment that would have included Article 9 within the listing of
nonderogable rights under Article 4 of the ICCPR. At that time, Mrs. Roosevelt
proposed a sub-amendment that would have included only Article 9(4) (right
66. AiJedda, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 1809, 91.
67. General Comment No. 29, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add.11, 13 (Aug. 31, 2001).
68. Id., 1 16.
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to challenge detention in court) 69 France hastily withdrew its entire proposal,
noting that it "was particularly opposed to the inclusion of paragraph [4] of
Article 9, from which any country in time of war would be forced to
derogate."70
During the negotiations, states were also particularly concerned that the
catalog of nonderogable rights contained in Article 4(2) not interfere with the
ability of states to intern enemy aliens. For example, at the 1950 session, states
rejected a proposal that would have made Article 26 of the Covenant
nonderogable (guaranteeing all persons equal protection of the law, and equal
and effective protection against discrimination), after several delegations
pointed out that it was impossible to treat enemy aliens on the same basis as
citizens during periods of armed conflict.7" The representative of the
Philippines stressed that "in time of war an early measure often taken by
Governments was the segregation of enemy aliens in detention camps" and that
while "[s]uch a measure constituted only temporary discrimination.... it was
evident that while in such camps the persons in question could not avail
themselves of the normal processes of law."72
When the General Assembly later reviewed Article 4 at its 1963 session,
states examined whether it was appropriate to make Article 23(2) nonderogable
as well (right of men and women to marry). The proposal was withdrawn after
several states maintained that they must be entitled to prevent marriage
domestically during periods of hostilities, because marriage would give enemy
nationals their spouse's nationality. The representative of the Netherlands
specifically reminded delegations that when the Germans had invaded his
country in May 1940, the "Government had found it necessary to intern persons
of German origin living in its territory, . . . due to the need to protect the
national security, and to the danger which Nazi infiltration had presented to the
country. 73
Thus, there is clear evidence in the negotiating record of the ICCPR that
much thought was devoted to deciding what articles would be nonderogable and
that omissions from the list in Article 4(2) were not inadvertent. In short, the
proposition that there are other nonderogable rights in the ICCPR in addition
69. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Sixth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 196th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 196 (1950) (statement of Eleanor Roosevelt).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-fifth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 6th Sess., 195th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/SR. 195 (1950) (statement of representative of
Belgium); Summary Recordofthe HundredandNinety-sixth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts.,
6th Sess., 196th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 196 (1950) (statement of Eleanor Roosevelt).
72. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-fifth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., 6th Sess., 196th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 196 (1950) (statement ofrepresentative of Philippines).
73. Summary Recordofthe HundredandNinety-fifth Meeting, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 18th Sess.,
1259th mtg. 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1259 (1963) (statement of representative of Netherlands).
to the catalog of nonderogable rights provided in Article 4(2) is doubtful, even
if it is assumed that states are obligated to derogate from the extraterritorial
application of human rights instruments during periods of armed conflict and
military occupation.
IV. IF ONLY HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLIES, WHAT CONSTRAINTS
DOES IT IMPOSE ON DETENTIONS?
The answer to the question would vary depending upon a series of
circumstances including, inter alia, whether:
1) The detention involves enemy combatants or civilian internees;
2) The conflict was international or of a non-international
character;
3) The UN Security Council authorized the particular detention;
4) The state in question had ratified the Additional Protocols of
1977 (or if relevant provisions in those instruments are
customary international law).
The adoption of the Additional Protocols of 1977 also supports the view
that states did not intend that there be a general merger of human rights and
international humanitarian law in situations of extraterritorial detention. Both
Protocols include various derogable and nonderogable rights contained in the
ICCPR. For example, Article 5 of Protocol II provides special and elaborated
protections for persons whose liberty has been restricted, including by
internment, while Article 75(3) of Protocol I expands on the derogable
protections provided in Article 9(2) of the ICCPR concerning the need to
inform detainees of the reason for their detention. On the other hand, states did
not include other specific guarantees provided for in the ICCPR within either
Protocol. As Dietrich Schindler concludes, "The adoption of the two 1977
Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions is a proof that a separate set of
rules for armed conflict is in fact what States want. ' 74
74. Dietrich Schindler, The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights, 208
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 3, 14 (1979). The ICRC gave the following reason for restating various provisions
of the ICCPR in Protocol II:
The system of protection set up by international humanitarian law... differs from that
provided by instruments on human rights. Nevertheless, the view was held that some
basic provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-parti-
cularly those from which no derogation may be made even in time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation-should be applicable in the context
of armed conflict.... As every legal instrument specifies its own field of application,
some of the Covenant's provisions have been restated within the framework of the
draft Protocol.
ICRC, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12,1949: COMMENTARY 134
(No. CDDH/3, 1973).
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V. CONCLUSION
Doctrinal clarity is likely to advance respect for international norms in
conflict situations and specifically in the case of extraterritorial detention. This
does not mean, however, that more law is necessarily better, or that the two
branches of law-human rights and humanitarian law-should overlap. The
obligations assumed by states under the main international human rights
instruments were never intended to apply extraterritorially during periods of
armed conflict. Nor were they intended to replace the lex specialis of
international humanitarian law. This distinction is not a trivial one. Its
importance was fully understood by the architects of the Covenants.
To ignore this distinction in favor of the application of international human
rights instruments to situations of international armed conflict and military
occupation is, in effect, to ignore what the international community has agreed
upon. To ignore this distinction is to offer a dubious route toward increased
state compliance with international norms.
FILLING THE VOID: PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK
FOR THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
MILITARY COMPONENT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR THROUGH APPLICATION OF BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Professor Geoffrey S. Corn*
In 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Mapp v. Ohio' that
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required
imposition of the exclusionary rule for evidence improperly seized by State
officials. In that case, the Court emphasized the significance of compliance
with basic principles of legality when it noted "[N]othing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence." 2 Although this case had nothing
to do with the legal regulation of military operations, the concept expressed by
the Court is, in the opinion of this author, at the core of the issues addressed by
the Panel on which I participated at the recent International Law Weekend.
This Panel was called upon to address the sufficiency of international
humanitarian law to deal with the treatment of individuals detained during the
War on terror, and whether the application of international human rights norms
was essential to regulate such activities.
Like the issue confronted by the Supreme Court in Mapp, the legal
regulation of military operations related to the War on terror provides a
* Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law. Prior to joining the faculty at South
Texas, Mr. Corn served as the Special Assistant to the US Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War
Matters, and Chief of the Law of War Branch, US Army Office of the Judge Advocate General International
and Operational Law Division. Mr. Corn also served as a member of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General's Corps from 1992-2004. Previously, he was a supervisory defense counsel for the Western United
States; Chief of International Law for U.S. Army Europe; and a Professor of International and National
Security Law at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School. Mr. Corn has served as an expert
consultant to the Military Commission Defense team, and has published numerous articles in the field of
national security law. He is a graduate of Hartwick College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, and earned his J.D., highest honors at George Washington University and his L.L.M., distinguished
graduate, at the Judge Advocate General's School. He frequently lectures on law of war and national
security law topics. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law
Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20
to 22, 2005.
1. 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
2. Id.
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profound example of the corrosive effect of adopting of policies that are
inconsistent with the fundamental charter of an organization-in this case the
armed forces. Unlike the domestic realm, this charter does not take the form of
a constitution. Nor, in the opinion of this author, does it take the exclusive
form the treaties, although these certainly reflect aspects of this charter.
Instead, the "charter for the existence" of a professional armed force consists
of the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict 3 (LOAC) developed
over the centuries by warriors, diplomats, scholars, and humanitarian activists.
These fundamental principles reflect a careful and delicate balance between the
dictates of military necessity and the humanitarian goal of limiting the harmful
effects of mortal combat, and provide the foundation for developing and
maintaining the professionalism, discipline, and moral integrity of a military
organization. Acknowledgment of these principles as non-derogable standards
applicable to any military operation involving the application of force or the
detention of opposition personnel is therefore essential to the legally legitimate
execution of such operations.
While these principles are certainly reflected in numerous LOAC treaty
provisions, in the opinion of this author, the failure to acknowledge their
applicability even when the technical triggering requirements of the treaties in
which they are codified have not been satisfied has manifested itself in the
suggestion that certain aspects of the War on terror occur in a legally
unregulated environment. This, I believe, has been reflected in much of the
debate related to the applicability of the LOAC to individuals detained by
United States armed forces as "enemy combatants" and has been a pervasive
factor in the development of United States policy related to this issue. It was
also a prominent aspect of the presentations by the various members of the ILW
Panel.
This treaty "application analysis" approach has become the focal point of
much of the debate and analysis related to the international legal regulation of
the War on terror. Thus, proponents of expansive United States war execution
powers assert the inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions to non-state actors
captured during the trans-national war on terror. In response, proponents of
humanitarian protections argue for a more protective interpretation of these
treaties. In the alternative, many such proponents also assert that the inability
of LOAC treaties to address every humanitarian issue related to the war on
terror requires the United States to acknowledge the applicability of
3. The term law of armed conflict will be used throughout this essay to refer to international treaty
and customary law developed to regulate the means and methods of warfare and provide humanitarian
protections for the victims of war. Although often referred to as international humanitarian law, in the
opinion of this author, this characterization diminishes the significance of the means and methods prong of
this body of law.
international human rights norms to the conduct of military operations, a
position that is contrary to the traditional United States position vis-a-vis the
scope of human rights law.
Each of these positions was represented by fellow panelists at the ILW
conference, all of whom were called upon to address the sufficiency of LOAC
to address the international legal regulation of the war on terror, with specific
emphasis on detention. In response to this question, I asserted that the LOAC
was sufficient to provide the essential framework of regulation for the military
component of this struggle, but with one critical qualification-only if the non-
derogable nature of basic LOAC principles 4 is affirmatively acknowledged by
United States policy makers. Such an acknowledgment is essential to ensure
that the armed forces of the United States are never called upon to engage in
operations involving the application of combat power in a legally unregulated
environment; or, phrased differently, that they will never be called upon to
engage in activities that are inconsistent with the basic charter of a professional
and disciplined armed force reflected in these principles.
The United States must endorse such an interpretation of LOAC, and
makes the fundamental principles of the LOAC the foundation for all policies,
doctrine, and operational decisions related to execution of military operations
by United States forces. Absent such an endorsement, these forces will
continue to be required to engage in conduct that risks contravention of the
most fundamental notions of humanity and professionalism. Such an outcome
degrades not only international legitimacy, but also the discipline and
effectiveness of our own force.
This dynamic has already been witnessed with regard to detention and
interrogation directives indicating that humane treatment was merely a "policy"
mandate, and not a legal obligation. Such an approach to the regulation of the
armed forces presents a serious danger of debasing respect for the constraints
on combatant conduct, and encouraging the instinct prevalent among so many
military professionals throughout history: that military necessity is an
unlimited source of authority for the execution of military operations. The
potential consequence of such an approach to the regulation of hostilities poses
significant dangers to the credibility of the overall United States effort to defeat
4. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATrLEFIELD 3 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ROGERS]. Stating that:
The great principles of customary law, from which all else stems, are military
necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality. According to the UK Manual
of Military Law, the principles of military necessity and humanity as well as those of
chivalry have shaped the development of the law of war. Chivalry may, however, be
classified as an element of the principle of humanity.
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terrorist organizations, and is fundamentally inconsistent with the well-
established limitation on the principle of military necessity.'
Unfortunately, the longstanding and well-established limited scope of the
authority derived from the principle of military necessity has apparently been
dismissed by policy makers adhering to a short-term cost/benefit analysis to
determine appropriate conduct of the armed forces. In the opinion of this
author, such an approach fails to consider a primary purpose of adhering to a
framework of legal principles constraining the unlimited scope of the principle
of necessity: protection of the moral integrity of the citizens called upon to
serve our nation in uniform.
There are certain truisms in war that persist through time. First, war
involves the deliberate infliction of suffering upon warriors, and the inevitable
incidental infliction of suffering on the people and property of an opponent.
Second, suffering is not inflicted for personal reasons, but because some
national or organizational leadership entity directs such activity. Third, those
who engage in mortal combat do not do so for profit or personal vendetta, but
because they have been called upon to do so by the authority they serve. For
the warriors who serve this nation, and many other nations, this results in an
implied covenant between them and the nation under whose flag they fight, kill,
destroy, and detain. The essence of this covenant is a willingness to inflict the
suffering associated with warfare based on the belief that doing so will be
consistent with the inherent values of the cause for which they serve. For most
human beings, imbued with an inherent value for human life, preserving this
covenant is essential to reconcile their innate sense of morality with the
suffering their duty requires them to inflict.
Military professionals historically understood that preserving a sense of
morality would be most severely stressed during armed conflict. As a result,
they were at the forefront of developing non-negotiable rules to limit the
brutality of warfare, and in so doing limit the corrosive moral consequence of
conflict. Thus, another truism of war is that limitations imposed on the conduct
of hostilities-limitations developed by warriors to limit the infliction of
suffering to only that which is legitimately necessary- protect not just the
adversary, but the moral and psychological integrity of the members of the
5. U. S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 3 (July 1956).
The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by "military necessity"
which has been defined as that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden
by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of
the enemy as soon as possible. Military necessity has been generally rejected as a
defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war inasmuch
as the latter have been developed and framed with consideration for the concept of
military necessity.
force regulated by such constraints. The significance the LOAC plays in
preventing deviation from a standard of morality was clearly understood by the
Telford Taylor, the Chief United States prosecutor at Nuremburg. According
to Taylor:
Another and, to my mind, even more important basis of the laws of war is
that they are necessary to diminish the corrosive effect of mortal combat on the
participants. War does not confer a license to kill for personal reasons-to
gratify perverse impulses, or to put out of the way anyone who appears
obnoxious, or to whose welfare the soldier is indifferent. War is not a license
at all, but an obligation to kill for reasons of state; it does not countenance the
infliction of suffering for its own sake or for revenge.6
The great irony of the current debate related to the applicability of the
LOAC to the military component of the war on terror is that it seems to reflect
the lack of appreciation for this fundamental aspect of embracing expansive
application of LOAC principles so effectively articulated by Taylor. It is
equally ironic that proponents of expansive United States wartime power
continually assert the "new paradigm" reflected in the war on terror. In the
opinion of this author, this assertion is a subterfuge for those who seek to
dispense with the constraints that result from good faith application of LOAC
principles, and adopt an unlimited definition of military necessity-an idea that
was flatly rejected following the Second World War. Instead of characterizing
the war on terror as a new paradigm, it is more appropriate to consider why the
framework of basic LOAC principles must be applied to any armed conflict,
regardless of the nature of the enemy.
The possibility-if not probability-of engaging in armed conflict in a
context not contemplated by the treaties regulating warfare was acknowledged
in 1899 in the Preamble to the first multi-lateral treaty regulating the methods
and means of warfare was adopted by the international community. Known as
the Marten's Clause (in recognition of the author of this provision, the Russian
diplomat Feodor Martens),7 this provision required armed forces to comply with
the "dictates of humanity" during all military operations, a mandate that has
been replicated in subsequent law of war treaties! The exact language of the
original clause stated: "in cases not covered by the attached regulations, the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law
of nations' as derived from the usages established among civilized people, the
laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience." 9
6. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 40-41 (1970).
7. This was the name of the Russian representative who drafted the language. See ROGERS, supra
note 4, at 6 n.36.
8. See id. at 7 n.37.
9. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18. 1907, 36 Stat. 2277;
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Describing the purpose of this clause, A.P.V. Rogers highlights the
drafters intent to ensure humanitarian protections applied during
warfarewarfare for all those affected by a conflict, not only civilians:
The purpose of the clause was not only to confirm the continuance of
customary law, but also to prevent arguments that because a particular activity
had not been prohibited in a treaty it was lawful. Humanity is, therefore, a
guiding principle which puts a brake on the undertakings which might
otherwise be justified by the principle of military necessity.°
It therefore appears that both the profession of arms and the international
community have understood, for over a century, that when armed forces of a
state engage in operations involving "combat" activities, even when such
conflict falls outside the scope of treaty regulation, restraint consistent with
basic notions of humanity apply ipso facto to such operations. Any other
conclusion would require the armed forces to "disregard of the charter of its
own existence." Thus, the basic principles of the LOAC - including both the
authority derived from the principle of military necessity and the constraint on
that authority derived from the principle of humanity, must serve as the
framework for such operations. This balance between the necessity to destroy
an enemy force and the dictates of humanity is summarized by one text as
follows:
Not all means or methods of attaining even a 'legitimate' object of
weakening the enemy's military forces are permissible under the laws of armed
conflict. In practice, a line must be drawn between action accepted as
'necessary' in the harsh exigencies of warfare and that which violates basic
principles of moderation."i
This proposition is in no way novel for the United States armed forces.
Indeed, it has formed the basis for the Department of Defense law of war policy
for more than two decades. This policy, reflected in the Department of Defense
Law of War Program,1 2 mandates that the armed forces of the United States
must treat any armed conflict as the trigger for application of the law of war.'3
see also Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-1, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE at 5 (December 1956).
10. ROGERS, supra note 4, at 7.
11. HILLAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT, 226
(1992).
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (1998),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/d5i0077p.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
13. Id. at 5.3.1 (stating that the Heads of the Department of Defense (DoD) Components shall
"[e]nsure that the members of their DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts,
however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other
operations."); see also Major Timothy E. Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game Disguised as an
Enlightened Policy: United States Laws of war Obligations During Military Operations Other Than War,
159 Mil. L. Rev. 152 (1999) (analyzing the potential that the U.S. law of war policy could be asserted as
This mandate has been the foundation for application of the LOAC principles
during every phase of the war on terror, and reflects the basic proposition that
armed conflict requires application of these basic principles, no matter how the
conflict is characterized. In the opinion of this author, the time has come to
alter the characterization of "policy" attached to this mandate to that of "legal
obligation." This conclusion is justified by treating this mandate as a reflection
of an underlying norm of customary international law; or, in the alternative, a
reflection of a "principle of law recognized by civilized nations."'4 Such an
endorsement would eliminate any uncertainty as to the application of basic
principles of the LOAC, as a matter of legal obligation, during military
operations associated with the war on terror.
With regard to application of these basic principles, the ILW Panel, like
so many other experts who have been called upon to comment on United States
policies, focused specifically on the treatment of detainees. This was certainly
appropriate, as the issue of treatment of detained personnel who fail to meet the
criteria for prisoner of war or protected civilian status truly serves as a
metaphor for the broader application of this basic LOAC principle framework.
There are few other situations where the tension between military necessity and
the dictates of humanity is more profoundly stressed than when a member of an
opposition force is captured and presumed to possess information of significant
value to the capturing force. Indeed, it has been precisely this aspect of the
current United States detention policy that has been cited by the Bush
administration as the justification for considering, and in some cases endorsing,
detention and interrogation standards that would not be permitted for prisoners
of war. Classifying the humane treatment standard as a "policy" vice legal
mandate has provided the purported legal flexibility to implement such policies.
Unfortunately, what this practice has failed to acknowledge is that the
principle of humanity, and more specifically the obligation to ensure the
humane treatment of all captured or detained personnel, is part of the basic non-
derogable "charter" of the armed forces. It serves to limit the instinct to do all
that is necessary to achieve a given military objective, no matter how
evidence of a customary norm of international law). Other armed forces have implemented analogous policy
statements. For example, the German policy to apply the principles of the law of war to any armed conflict,
no matter how characterized, was cited by the ICTY in the Tadic jurisdictional appeal as evidence of a general
principle of law extending application of the law of war principles derived from treaties governing
international armed conflict to the realm of internal armed conflict. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-
I-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, 118 (Oct. 2, 1995) (citing the German Military Manual of 1992), reprinted
in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
14. STATUTEOFTHEINTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE art. 38(l)(c), Oct. 24, 1945,59 Stat. 1031.
See also Geoffrey S. Corn, Taking the Bitter with the Sweet: A "Full and Fair" Critique of the Use of
Military Commissions to Prosecute Terrorism, - STETSON L. REV. __ (2006) (discussing customary
nature of the basic LOAC principles) [forthcoming] (on file with author).
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inconsistent with basic notions of humanity. In the realm of interrogation, that
instinct will almost invariably lead to proposals to adopt more and more
aggressive techniques against detainees perceived to be non-compliant.
Removing humane treatment from the realm of legal obligation and
downgrading it to policy is a dangerous invitation for commanders and policy
makers to endorse a "whatever it takes" approach. As we have witnessed since
9/11, such an approach will ultimately require members of the armed forces to
implement such techniques, which in turn will produce a conflict between their
basic sense of morality and their duty to obey what are characterized as lawful
orders (because of the exceptional nature of the subjects of interrogation).
This, in turn, can (and throughout history often has) lead to a dangerous erosion
of discipline within the force.
Treating humane treatment as a non-derogable obligation leads to a
different result, and reflects the approach that is, as this author stated during the
ILW presentation, essential for the maintenance of a disciplined and morally
grounded military. Once both necessity and humanity are acknowledged as
basic principles of the LOAC, applicable whenever and wherever the armed
forces are called upon to engage in operations against a hostile force possessing
military type capabilities (in short, "armed conflict"), the traditional process of
balancing these two principles will animate policy and operational decisions.
Although humane treatment is an ill-defined concept beyond providing the
basic incidents of life and health, 5 a simple test will enable military
commanders to assess whether a proposed tactic or technique intended to
efficiently achieve the military objective will transgress the limitation of
humane treatment. This test asks whether the proposed technique, if used
against a "friendly" subordinate, would be considered improper. If so, it is
almost certainly inconsistent with the principle of humane treatment.
It is important to note the paternalistic aspect of this test. Because most
military personnel pride themselves on their ability and willingness to endure
brutal treatment in the service of their nation, the traditional "do unto others"
test will be ineffective. However, within the military culture, only mission
accomplishment is paramount to caring for subordinates. As a result, most
military leaders will possess a strong protective instinct over their subordinates.
Thus, framing the question as "would I consider this tactic improper if
employed against a soldier entrusted to my leadership" will create the proper
frame of reference for assessing the permissibility of the tactic. This flexible
and pragmatic approach has been the cornerstone of United States interrogation
doctrine for decades, and as with the dictate of the Marten's Clause, there is no
justifiable reason to question the continuing validity of this approach.
15. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al. eds.,
2005).
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The military aspect of the war on terror will no doubt continue to present
complex challenges for our nation, and for the armed forces called upon to
conduct operations in pursuit of national strategic objectives. But such
complexity is not, as many critics of the LOAC posit, unprecedented in the
history of warfare. Conducting military operations against highly organized
non-state actors has been an aspect of the American way of war since the
inception of the nation.' 6 What is new is the suggestion that the conduct of
such operations is, because of the nature of the enemy, legally unregulated.
Such a suggestion fundamentally undermines the basic "charter" of a
professional armed force, creates a dangerous risk of encouraging the darkest
instincts of those called upon to "deliver" results, and corrodes the moral
integrity of the men and women who serve this nation. Only a rejection of this
proposition, and an endorsement of the obligation to comply with a framework
of basic principles of the LOAC during all military operations will restore and
preserve the appropriate balance between the dictates of necessity and the
interests of humanity, and prevent the conduct of such operations from
degenerating into what appears more like personal vendettas that the application
of force for reasons of state. The armed forces have historically, and continue
to understand this. It is time that those who create policies they must conform
to also recognize this fact, a necessity articulated so effectively by eminent law
of war historian Geoffrey Best:
I do not fall into the most common, flattering and delusive of
civilian assumptions, that civilian = good and military = bad. Far
from it. So far as one can distinguish them from each other...
civilians have often been ascendant in the political leadership under
which . . . the military are seen to have done terrible things.
Militarism... may be a nasty thing, but let the military man ponder
on my conviction, that there can be no nastier a militarist than a
civilian one. 17
16. See generally MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN POWER (2002).
17. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 26-27 (1980).
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HUMANITIES:
DOES LOVE OF LITERATURE PROMOTE
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Daniel J. Kornstein*
Re-examining a basic assumption is always useful. This is so because
many serious errors can flow from an assumption uncritically accepted. An
example may be the relationship between international law and the humanities,
specifically literature. A seemingly taken-for-granted assumption, long and
deeply held, is that a love of good literature has a cultivating and civilizing
effect that promotes humanistic values transcending national boundaries, an
effect that, if only indirectly, humanizes international law and prevents
atrocities. Today we ask: Is this assumption correct?
History and current events supply many examples of apparently highly
civilized societies-where the reading of good books has been much
esteemed-that have violated international law and acted with atrocious
inhumanity. This gap between soothing assumption and harsh reality more than
justifies re-examination of our premise. We need to call into question, we need
to dig away at the foundations, we need to critically study, some of our deepest
assumptions about the virtues of a passion for great literature. If we at least
start this process, we may be surprised, perhaps even shocked, at what we find.
We may discover, contrary to our implicit, firmly embedded notions, that
devotion to literature is not enough by itself to advance international law, that
in fact too much reading of literature can, paradoxically and counter-intuitively,
hurt rather than help international law.
I.
To say "reading is good" is extraordinarily trite. It is the most obvious sort
of conventional wisdom, a clichd on the order of "the world is round." Ever
since we were children, we have been told the benefits of reading, especially
reading good literature. Books supply us with riveting, arresting, life-changing
experiences and insights. They teach us about people, about human nature,
* Daniel J. Kornstein, a partner in the New York City law firm of Komstein Veisz Wexler &
Pollard, LLP, is a former president of the Law and Humanities Institute and current chair of the Law and
Literature Committee of the New York County Lawyers' Association. While in the U.S. Army during the
Vietnam War, he helped prosecute one of the My Lai Massacre courts-martial. This article is a revised
reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005
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about social interactions, about emotions. As Thomas Carlyle put it, "All that
mankind has done, thought, gained or been.., is lying as in magic preservation
in the pages of books."'
The supposed benefits of literature for international law are easily
outlined. Great literature, it is said, humanizes the reader, it makes people more
human. Literature can lead to personal transformation, self-knowledge, and
rich development of the individual's inner life. Reading gives us revelation and
insight, new ideas and new understanding. Good books have a capacity to
criticize and challenge life as it is, and often to gesture toward something better.
Literature is thus a force for betterment.
Like all art and music, like all the humanities, literature contributes to
international law by tapping primal energies, expanding cultural perspectives,
and breaking down barriers between nations and peoples. It is a great unifier
that reveals and encourages interconnectedness, a broad, enlightened vision as
a universal human right. It affects our emotions, makes people more
empathetic, more aware of cultural variety and the nuances of individual
motivation. Literature can enlarge our consciousness and help us identify with
varied characters and ambiguous situations, with different people in faraway
lands, with other people in our own land. The result should be a sense that we
each bear moral responsibility for all forms of degradation-repression,
coercion, exploitation, torture, prejudice-wherever they occur.
For support, one could string many apt literary quotations. A particularly
appropriate line that leaps to mind comes from our own Walt Whitman's
Leaves of Grass: "Whoever degrades another degrades me, and whatever is
done or said returns at last to me."2 Or, from the same poem: "By God! I will
accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the same terms."3
Sentiments like these, spoken on behalf of "many long dumb voices,"4 come
from writers and inspire readers without borders.
More generally, literature can provide unique insights in morals and ethics.
It can enrich, refine and stabilize moral perceptions and sensibilities. It can
teach about ethics in law and promote greater ethical awareness. The fully
experienced literary masterpiece tends to liberate. Great literature is rarely
repressive.
Many of these observations form the core of the modem law and literature
movement. Behind that movement lies the idea that literature helps us
1. Thomas Carlyle, Hero as a Man of Letters, in ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC
IN HISTORY 388 (Univ. of Neb. Press, 1966) (1840).
2. Walt Whitman, Song of Myself in WALT WHrrMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 188, 210 (The Library
of America, 1982) (1855).
3. Id. at 211.
4. Id.
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understand the underpinnings of law. Literature provides sources of
understanding about legal ideas that are more accessible than traditional sources
of legal philosophy.5
Blessed with such benefits, a love of reading literature should, at least in
theory, further international understanding and law. But the test is how the
theory works in practice.
II.
Experience has not always borne out the benefits of literature for
international law. Theory has not always matched reality. This unhappy track
record raises the strange question whether the benefits of reading good
literature-the benefits of culture generally-may have been oversold in terms
of their humanizing and civilizing effects on the international stage.
We all know historical examples of societies famous for their
distinguished culture that have engaged in war, persecution and torture.
Germany in the 1930s and 40s is only the most obvious and oft-cited example.
There are others, and, lest we become too self-satisfied, some of them uncom-
fortably close to home. Terms like "extraordinary rendition," disheartening
goings-on at places like Abu Ghraib Prison or My Lai, or current opposition to
humane interrogation techniques-all these make us Americans uneasy. What
does this mean for our assumption about the civilizing impact of a love of
literature and the humanities?
One of the most perceptive and provocative comments on this point comes
from eminent cultural and literary critic George Steiner, a man who has spent
most of his life reading and writing about books. "The simple yet appalling
fact," wrote Steiner in his 1967 book Language and Silence, "is that we have
little solid evidence" that reading good books does Avery much to enrich or
stabilize moral perception, that they humanize."'6 He went on to lament, "[w]e
have little proof' that such reading "in fact makes a man more humane."'7 In the
end, Steiner, himself a champion of the humanities, found himself "unable to
assert confidently that the humanities humanize." 8
To illustrate his point, Steiner cited the familiar example of World War II:
"When barbarism came to twentieth century Europe," explained Steiner, "the
arts faculties in more than one university offered very little resistance, and this
is not a trivial or local accident. In a disturbing number of cases the literary
5. See, e.g., JAMESBOYDWHrrE, THELEGALIMAGINATION (James B. White ed., 1973); RICHARD
WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITATURE (1992).
6. GEORGE STEINER, Silence and the Poet, in LANGUAGE AND SILENCE 61 (McClelland & Stewart
Ltd., 1967) (1958).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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imagination gave servile or ecstatic welcome to political bestiality." 9 As a
result, Steiner arrived at the sad conclusion that, "literary values and the utmost
of hideous inhumanity could exist in the same community," even "in the same
individual sensibility."'"
These remarks from so cultivated and astute an observer as George Steiner
are troubling and seriously undermine our assumption about love of literature
and international law. And Steiner is by no means alone. Although he wrote
almost forty years ago, his disquieting attitude has been echoing hauntingly ever
since. "People to whom literature is important may prefer to obtain their
knowledge of human nature from books rather than from living people,"
commented Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit in his stimulating 1988
book Law and Literature." "But whether books are superior to life as a source
of such knowledge is an undemonstrated and not especially plausible
proposition."'" Judge Posner questioned whether literature is an "essential
source" of either "psychological or moral knowledge."' 3
Similar questions rose to the surface in 1990, in connection with, of all
things, a Supreme Court appointment. David Souter has always been an avid,
voracious reader of good books-literature, history, philosophy as well as law.
His fondness for books struck some people as a threat to the Republic and as a
reason not to confirm him when he was nominated the Supreme Court by
President Bush I. According to Time magazine in 1990, the "more serious
question" about Souter was "whether a man who seems to prefer books to
people can empathize with and understand the problems of ordinary people."' 4
On the New York Times Op-Ed Page, a professor worried whether Souter's
reading of so many books precluded him from developing what all judges
should have a: "genuine feel for the human condition."' 5
Doubts about the virtues of reading have continued to be heard from some
unexpected quarters. In 2003, in an essay in, of all places, the prestigious New
York Times Book Review, Laura Miller complained, "I can't say I've seen
much evidence to support the notion that reading is good for you."' 6 Less than
a year later, the same publication ran a similar essay by Christina Noring
entitled Books Make You a Boring Person. In that essay, Noring wrote of "a
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LtTERATuRE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 303 (1988).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Margaret C. Washington, An 18th Century Man David Souter is a Flinty New Englander with
a Love of Books and a Reverence for Legal Precedent, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990, at 19.
15. Roy L. Brooks, What About Souter's Human Resume?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1990, at A21.
16. Laura Miller, The Great Books Workout, N.Y. TDMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at 31.
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new piety in the air: the self-congratulation of book lovers .... [B]ookworms
have developed a semi-mystical complacency about the moral and mental
benefits of reading." 7
What is happening here? Why is reading-one of our most highly prized
values-coming under attack? These comments by Steiner, Posner, Miller and
Noring are not anti-intellectual, philistine attacks on reading or on culture
generally. They are serious, heart-felt, subtle, even profound criticisms, from
leading thinkers and writers in respectable literary publications. They need to
be explored a bit. Why does the flagship book review in America publish two
essays, one in 2003 and one in 2004, questioning the benefits of reading? And
how does this bear on international law?
III.
We can begin to offer at least a few tentative, primarily psychological
explanations.
First is the possibility that too much reading can alienate us from life and
experience. Reading, as happened with Emma Bovary, "can even spoil your
appetite for real life."' 8 Overmuch genteel reading of books can create a
collective indifference. A genuine distinction exists between reading about
something and actually experiencing or feeling it. Unlike books, human
interaction supplies first-hand, face-to-face experience, which often makes a
deeper, more emotional, more indelible impression that merely reading about
the same thing. To suffer a broken heart is much more intense than to read
about it in Wuthering Heights; to experience an unwanted pregnancy is a far cry
from reading The Scarlet Letter.
Preoccupation with books, taken to an extreme, can distance readers from
real people and juices of real life. This can dull how we react to real-life
situations. "The focusing of consciousness on a written text," Steiner
explained, may "diminish the sharpness and readiness of our actual moral
response."' 9 If we "give psychological and moral credence to the imaginary, to
the character in a play or a novel, to the condition of spirit we gather from a
poem," added Steiner, "we may find it more difficult to identify with the real
world, to take the world of actual experience to heart."2
In a trenchant and powerful insight, one that lingers in the mind of any
serious reader, Steiner noted, "The capacity for imaginative reflex, for moral
17. Christina Nehring, Books Make You a Boring Person, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, at 23.
18. Miller, supra note 16.
19. STEINER, supra note 6.
20. Id.
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risk in any human being is not limitless."' 21 Such qualities, rather, "can be
rapidly absorbed by fictions. 22 The consequence could be, in Steiner's words,
that "the cry in the poem may come to sound louder, more urgent, more real
than the cry in the street outside. The death in the novel may move us more
potently than the death in the next room. '2 3 Steiner's conclusion, the far-
reaching implications of which have yet to be fully appreciated, is absolutely
devastating. "Thus," he wound up his disconcerting discussion, "there may be
a covert, betraying link between the cultivation of aesthetic response and the
potential of personal humanity."24
Wow! Steiner's pathbreaking comments, translated into everyday
language, become the tremendously unsettling message that: The more you
read, the more you may become an immoral or amoral monster because you are
only a passive observer rather than an active participant; you are unfettered to
real people and real life. An individual can be remarkably insensitive to others
not only despite but precisely because of having studied stacks of novels.25
This is revolutionary and deeply disheartening. Steiner's trailblazing thesis
ranks with those of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud in its power to overthrow
generally accepted truths.
While not on the same level of Steiner's devastating analysis, other
possible drawbacks to overmuch reading exist. There is, for example, the
danger of second-hand thinking and living. "By filling yourself up with too
much of other folk's thoughts," wrote Christina Noring, "you can lose the
capacity and incentive to think for yourself."26 Rather than becoming creative,
compulsive readers may be rigid thinkers.27
Books do not necessarily make for better people. "There's not much
indication, either," wrote Noring, "that reading substantially improves anyone' s
character, in fact, it often seems to have the opposite influence."28 Nor, she
added, "does it sweeten the disposition.'"29 People who read literature do not
appear to have higher ethical standards than people who do not.
There is also the danger of elitism. People who are passionate about
reading tend to be well educated and somewhat intellectual. Books could thus
be a status symbol, a way to distinguish those who regard themselves as
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. STEINER, supra note 6.
25. Nehring, supra note 17, at 23.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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cultured thinkers from the mere bourgeoisie or lower classes. The upshot may
be a class attitude of disrespect or even resentment for those who lack the same
devotion or who are more mesmerized by material things than by ideas. The
tone of the anti-reading comments by Miller and Noring, for instance, carry a
distinct whiff of snooty elitism, as if reading good literature should not be
experienced-and can never be properly experienced-by the masses.
Whether we agree or disagree with these observations, they at least cast
some doubt on the supposedly beneficial relationship between love of literature
and its civilizing effect on international law.
IV.
What we have here is a nice little Hegelian dialectic. The thesis is that
love of literature promotes humanistic values and therefore facilitates
international law. The antithesis is that reading too many books may actually
dehumanize and lead to violations of acceptable international behavior. The
task now is to try to formulate a plausible, creative synthesis. Such a tentative
synthesis might turn on the simple, fundamental concept of balance, of keeping
the impulse to read within limits, of combining reading with life.
The problem may ultimately be one of harmony. The trouble may not be
reading, but too much reading, reading at the expense of living, at the expense
of human interaction. This may be an example where you can have too much
of a good thing. Life is lived not only through books.
In this sense of a good thing that can be overdone, reading may have
something in common with religion. Like reading, religion can be and has been
an important force for betterment. Most, if not all, religions have an uplifting
and comforting ethical and moral core. Taken to extremes, however, even
religion can be dangerous. The world has seen too many wars, persecutions and
intolerance in the name of religion-some of which are happening even
today-not to be wary of religious extremism. Extremism in the defense of
reading or religion may be a vice; moderation in the pursuit of both may be a
virtue.
That at least seems to be Wordsworth's point about reading when he says,
"Close up those barren leaves" and "Up up my friend and quit those books."
30
Book smarts only go so far. Reading without what Daniel Goleman calls
"emotional intelligence" is counterproductive. 3 Of course, reading is much too
important, much too vital to trash the way Laura Miller and Christina Noring
do, and one wonders if they themselves really believe what they say. In any
30. William Wordsworth, The Tables Turned, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF WORDSWORTH 481
(Thomas Hutchinson, ed., 1933).
31. DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATER MORE THAN IQ (1995).
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event, here as well as elsewhere, the solution may be to search continuously for
the right balance in one's life.
Exactly here is where lawyers play a special and prominent role. By virtue
of their profession, lawyers have traditionally tried to balance the contemplative
life with the active life, a life of study with a life of action. That is what
lawyers do; they engage with life. Lawyers are scholarly types who give up the
peace and quite of the study for the rough and tumble of the courtroom, the
back and forth of the negotiating table, the stresses and strains of real people's
problems. It was Cicero, a Roman combination of lawyer, statesman and
philosopher, who famously said, "The whole glory of virtue is in activity. "32
The proper combination, the right blend, of reading and living is what
counts. One without the other, or too much of one and too little of the other, is
not good. Louis Brandeis, for all his vast and compulsive reading, understood
this point perfectly. The key to practicing law, he once wrote, "can never come
from books." "The controlling force is the deep knowledge of human
necessities.., no hermit can be a great lawyer.., a lawyer who does not know
men is handicapped."33 To avoid becoming stunted, we need human contact,
from people, from life.
Justice Brandeis's comments apply equally to literature and international
law. His perspective may point the correct way to thinking about literature and
international law--one should read great books but one should also devote as
much energy to living too and to dealing with real people. In the end, it all
comes down to balance. We do indeed need to steer clear of any "semi-
mystical complacency about the moral and mental benefits of reading."34 And
that final insight makes re-examination of our basic assumption worthwhile.
32. ROBERT A, FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 74 (1984) (quoting Marcus
Tullius Cicero).
33. ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 79-80 (1946) (quoting Justice
LouisBrandeis). Brandeis's comments about the balanced legal life resemble Flaubert's attitude toward
writing. In terms of how much a writer should be involved in life, "Flaubert occupied a half-and-half
position.... He put it best, perhaps, when he said that a writer must wade into life as into the sea, but only
up to the navel." JULIAN BARNES, FLAUBERT'S PARROT 132 (Vintage Books, 1990) (1984).
34. Nehring, supra note 17.
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With the advent of the global economy, arbitration has become the
preferred mechanism for resolving international disputes. Today international
arbitrators resolve billions of dollars worth of disputes.' Arbitration has taken
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1. Billions of dollars are at stake in international commercial arbitration. See Michael D
Goldhaber, Big Arbitrations, AMERICAN LAWYER, Summer 2003, at 22 (focusing on only 40 arbitrations with
a European connection that were worth over $200 million and describing a single arbitration related to a
merger worth up to US$26 billion and another claim related to a Kuwaiti project worth up to US$7 billion);
see also Joseph M. Matthews, Consumer Arbitration: Is It Working Now and Will It Work in the Future,
79-APR. FLA. B.J. 22, 24 (2005) (referring to significant amounts of money usually involved" in international
arbitration); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION
BuLLETIN 16:1, at 12 (2005) (indicating the amount in dispute in arbitration cases pending before the
International Chamber of Commerce and noting that the proportion of cases where the amount in dispute was
between US$1-50 million had increased to 52.4%). There are also significant amounts at stake in investment
treaty arbitration. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter Franck,
Inconsistent Decisions] (noting that there are "billions and billions" of dollars of claims at stake in investment
arbitration); see also Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard:Treaty Disputes, AMERICAN LAWYER,
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on such prominence in the international context that commentators express
"little doubt that arbitration is now the first-choice method of binding dispute
resolution" and has "largely taken over litigation."'
Arbitration has historically been extolled as a confidential, quick, and cost-
efficient method for resolving disputes, which creates an internationally
enforceable award. Those virtues, however, have eroded with the expansion in
the number of parties using arbitration, the increasingly adjudicative nature of
the process and the shift in the group serving as arbitrators, which has grown
beyond the "grand old men" to a younger generation of arbitration technocrats.3
Instead, arbitration may now take just as long and be just as costly as
litigation before national courts.4 Confidentiality has eroded as institutions
such as the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter "AAA") and
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter
Summer 2005, available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/treaty0605.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2006) (noting that in the context of investment treaty arbitration there are at least 59 claims worth in
excess of $ 100 million).
2. Adrian Winstanley, Why Arbitration Institutions Matters, in LAW IN TRANSITION: CONTRACr
ENFORCEMENT 39 (2001), available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/5083.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2006).
3. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE 36-44 (1996) [hereinafter
Dezalay & Garth, VIRTUE ] (describing the evolution of international arbitration and the shift from grand old
men to arbitration technocrats).
4. See CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
140-48 (1996) (noting the mixed evidence as to the decreased cost and efficiency of international arbitration
and suggesting that generally arbitration is not less expensive but it may be quicker); see also Jack J. Coe,
Jr., Toward A Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes-A Preliminary Sketch, 12
U.C. DAVIS INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 11 (2005) (observing that arbitration "has come to resemble in many respects
common law style commercial litigation, albeit without the procedural predictability engendered by codes
of civil procedure and established rules of court" and arbitrators may do little to expedite a complicated
proceeding). This may, however, depend upon the type of the speed of the particular national court. For
example, in one case, the courts of India would allegedly take twenty-five years to resolve a dispute.
Bhatnagar v. Surrenda Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1227 (3d Cir. 1995) (referring to expert evidence that
the "Indian legal system has a tremendous backlog of cases--so great that it could take up to a quarter of a
century to resolve this litigation if it were filed in India."). In these circumstances, arbitration is likely to be
faster than court litigation. In contrast, Australian courts can be much more efficient. See Andy O'Donaghoe,
Small Claims Division Established: Fast, Cheap, Informal ArenaforDispute Resolution, 30 N. WALES LAW
Soc'Y J. 61 (1992) (describing Australia's small claims court system, its utilization of various ADR
techniques and noting the the speedy resolution of disputes); Fiona Tito Wheatland, Medical Indemnity
Reform In Australia: "First Do No Harm", 33 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 429,437 (2005) (referring to Australia's
various "litigation streamlining processes to reduce the time and cost of litigation ... [implemented] under
the court management reforms that have been continuing at different speeds through most Australian
jurisdictions over the past decade."). In such an instance, the national courts of Australia may be more likely
to resolve disputes quickly and cheaply. During her remarks on the panel for which this paper was prepared,
Sherry Williams, a senior counsel at Halliburton, explained that in her experience arbitrations take less time
and cost half as less as litigation before U.S. national courts.
Franck
"ICSID") draft rules with presumptions in favor of the public disclosure of
arbitral awards.5 Perhaps more significantly, the recent signing of the Hague
Convention on Choice of Courts means arbitration awards do not have the same
monopoly on streamlined enforcement mechanisms.6
Given these shifts in arbitration's paradigm,7 what is left to make
arbitration preferable to national court litigation? It is neutrality, but neutrality
in two different senses. First, there is neutrality of forum, where the place of
dispute resolution does not unfairly benefit either party or create a "home
court" advantage.8 One might call this international arbitration's function as a
geographical half-way house. Second, there is the neutrality of the decision-
making process. In other words, having arbitrators who are bound to and
selected by the parties, but are nevertheless required to render decisions in an
"independent" or "impartial" manner, offers adjudicative neutrality.9
These remarks consider this second aspect of neutrality and the
appropriate role of arbitrators in the context of international arbitration. This
issue is neither new nor unique to international commercial dispute resolution.
As long ago as the 1930s and the 1940s, domestic U.S. labor arbitrators asked
similar questions about the appropriate role of arbitrators. ' Thirty-seven years
5. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
art. 27(8), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22090 (last visited Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter AAA
International Rules] (stating that unless the parties agree, the AAA "may publish or otherwise make publicly
available selected awards, decisions and rulings that have been edited to conceal the names of the parties and
other identifying details or that have been made publicly available in the course of enforcement or
otherwise"); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Suggested Changes to the ICSID
Rules and Regulations 9 (May 12, 2005) (Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/052405-sgmanual.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) (introducing a
presumption for the publication of redacted arbitration awards) [hereinafter Working Paper].
6. Instead, parties can now sign up to exclusive choice of court clauses, and when the Convention
is ratified, parties will have an opportunity to have those foreign court judgments enforced in the same way
as a sister state judgment. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 3, June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294 (2005); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Fifty Years Late to the Party? A New International
Convention For Non-Arbitral Forum Selection Agreements, INT'L LIT. QUART. (forthcoming 2005). The
Convention is not yet in force, however, and there are also a variety of reservations which countries could
adopt to narrow the Convention's scope.
7. BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4, at 148 (describing international arbitration's "metamorphosis
from a 'gentlemen's game,' where commercial disputes were resolved informally among peers, to a highly
sophisticated judicial procedure with amounts at stake that are 10 to 100 times larger than they used to be
30 years ago").
8. William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration and Court
Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998).
9. See generally Andreas Lowenfield, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International
Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 59 (1995); M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and
Neutrality of Arbitrators, 9:4 J. INT'L ARB. 31 (1992).
10. Labor arbitration specialists have explored whether arbitrators act as independent adjudicators
2006]
502 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:499
ago, the U.S. Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings also grappled with the
appropriate role of arbitrators. At that time, Justice White wrote that "the Court
does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial
decorum of Article l1hjudges, or indeed of any judges. It is often because they
are men of affairs, not apart from the marketplace, that they are effective in
their adjudicatory function."' 1 Given the evolution of international arbitration,
however, it is now useful to re-consider the appropriate role of international
arbitrators.
Subject to the parties' clear agreement to opt for commercial determina-
tions or partisan decision-making, arbitrators must provide independent,
adjudicative services in order to both honor the parties' expectations and
contribute to the legitimacy of international arbitration. This symposium piece
first addresses the expectations of the parties and describes how these
contribute to a conception of the proper role of international arbitrators.
Second, it describes the adjudicatory functions of international arbitrators and
discusses the importance of impartiality. Third, the piece considers potential
mechanisms for regulating arbitrator conduct. Finally, it speculates on the
future opportunities to promote the integrity of arbitrations and enhance the
legitimacy of international arbitration.
I. PARTY EXPECTATIONS
Arbitration is a creature of contract.'2 This means that parties can contract
for what they want and expect from their dispute resolution process. Parties
articulate minimal expectations about the proper role of arbitrators by picking
a specific dispute resolution mechanism. This typically happens when parties
choose particular institutional rules, under which arbitrators must exercise their
discretion, or subjecting their agreement to national laws, which articulate
standards of appropriate arbitrator behavior.' 3 Such articulation creates a set
or take on a more flexible role designed to fix perceived gaps in parties' legal relationship. LAURAJ. COOPER,
THE PROCESS OF PROCESS: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE FtFrY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING (forthcoming
2006) (on file with author).
11. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968), reh'g denied,
393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
12. Claude R. Thomson & Annie M.K. Finn, Managing an InternationalArbitration: A Practical
Perspective, 60-JUL. DISP. RESOL. J. 74, 76 (2005) (noting "arbitration is a creature of contract, [and] it can
be customized to meet the parties' needs."); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,570
(1960); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 82 (2000) (noting the consensual nature of
international arbitration).
13. See Robert M. Kossick, Jr. and Julian Fernandez Neckelmann, Structuring Private Equity
Transactions in Mexico, 6 NAFFA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 105, 154 (2000) (discussing choice of law clauses,
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of shared understandings and manages party expectations about the appropriate
role of decision-makers.
If parties wish to have a decision-maker who is an expert in a particular
industry who exercises commercial judgment but does not engage in legal
analysis, they might avoid arbitration entirely and instead choose expert
determination. 4 Likewise, if parties do not want neutral adjudicators but
instead want partisan arbitrators, they might adopt rules that do not require
arbitrator impartiality and independence. 5 In other words, parties who want a
commercial decision or partisan decision-making can and should specifically
contract do to so.
But these processes are not international arbitration as we know it. The
modem reality is that parties do not generally want the open-textured discretion
of international arbitration's past or rampant partisanship of decision-making. 6
Rather, they prefer the outcomes of their disputes to be warranted by a record
arbitration clauses, and specifying procedures to address dispute resolution); Volker Vietchbauer, Arbitration
in Russia, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 355, 434-36 (1993) (discussing the choice between available arbitral
institutions and ad hoc arbitration in Russia); Michael G. Weisberg, Note, Balancing Cultural Integrity
Against Individual Liberty: Civil Court Review of Ecclesiastical Judgments, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 955,995
(1992) (explaining that a "formal agreement to arbitrate requires a minimum standard of appropriate conduct
from the arbitrators in order for the proceeding to be legally valid.").
14. See Dr. Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 167,202-04
(2001) (discussing expert determination as a form of ADR and alternative to litigation that is especially
appropriate to disputes in technical areas such as intellectual property or valuation); see generally JOHN
KENDALL, EXPERT DETERMINATION (2001). But see Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act,
8 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 225, 233 (1997) (suggesting the proposition that "arbitration has its greatest utility
in providing expert determinations of contested matters of fact" is antiquated); Alan Scott Rau, The Culture
of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, 487, 492 (2005).
15. The American Arbitration Association, for example, historically did not require party-appointed
arbitrators to be independent and impartial; but this has recently changed. Compare AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, SEPT. 1, 2000, RULE R-19, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22175#R-17 (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (only requiring independence and
impartiality for the neutral third arbitrator) with AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES, SEPT. 15, 2005, RULE R-17, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2006) (abolishing the bias and dependence of party-appointed arbitrators by requiring all
arbitrators to be independent and impartial-unless the parties choose otherwise); see generally David J.
Branson, American Party-AppointedArbitrators-Not the Three Monkeys, 30 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 (2004)
(examining the historical shift in the approach of law and arbitration rules on the properness of appointing
neutral or biased arbitrators); see also Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators:
The Neutrality of Party-Appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite Panel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1815, 1823-32
(2003) (noting the evolution away from bias towards independent and impartial decision makers and the
neutrality historically required in international commercial arbitration).
16. Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 347, 353 (2002) [hereinafter Rogers, Fit and Function];
Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 957, 991 (2005)
[hereinafter Rogers, Vocation].
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and independent legal analysis-with a fair process that justifies the
expenditure of significant legal fees on dispute resolution in pursuit of broader
commercial objectives. 7
H. ARBITRATORS AS ADJUDICATORS
A. The Paradigm Shift
Historically, arbitration awards were not revered so much for their legal
analysis, but more for their sense of fairness and industry knowledge.' 8 But
with the proliferation of alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, mechanisms,
international business has become more sophisticated resolution of disputes.19
Arbitrators are no longer prized for their capacity to reach compromise
outcomes, particularly where other ADR mechanisms, such as mediation and
negotiation, can achieve this objective more efficiently.20 Today, businesses
use international arbitration to provide a neutral, adjudicative dispute resolution
process where arbitrators independently apply the law to facts, and this in turn
promotes the legitimacy of international arbitration.2'
17. See Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 991-92; see also BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4, at
204-07 (explaining that international businesses need to calculate risks and take decisions in order to reduce
their risks and have effective conflict management and noting the concern parties express when arbitrators
do not act upon the basis of the record and try to mediate disputes); Delissa A. Ridgway, International
Arbitration: The Next Growth Industry, 54-FEB. DisP. RESOL. J. 50, 50-51 (1999) (suggesting that
international commercial arbitration is a growth industry because of parties' perceived fairness in the process
and the predictability and certainty of the result).
18. Rogers, Fit and Function, supra note 16, at 350-55, 417; Catherine A Rogers, Regulating
International Arbitrator: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 53,66 (2005) [hereinafter Rogers, Standards of Conduct]; see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing
About the Forum: Categories and Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 285, 295 (1996).
19. See Van Anderson & Biff Sowell, Staying Ahead of the ADR Curve in South Carolina, 16-JUL
S.C. LAW 37, 38 (2004) (observing that "the proliferation of ADR in our system ofjustice has dictated a more
thoughtful approach to dispute resolution" and discussing the obligation of lawyers to counsel their clients
on ADR options); see also BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4 at 392-94 (noting international businesses have a
variety of dispute resolution options open which can be used dynamically to achieve the best result).
20. Todd B. Carver, ADR-A Competitive Imperative for Business, 59-OCT. DISP. RESOL. J. 67,
79 (2004) (reporting survey results that show that businesses perceive mediation as a more efficient way to
settle disputes and noting the decline of "splitting-the-baby" outcomes in arbitration); see also William W.
Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1999).
21. Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 988-89; see also Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and
Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 453,
457-58 (1999) (referring to parties desire in international arbitration to have a "neutral adjudicatory process"
and not to opt out of legal rules but suggesting this approach is Western in orientation); Nathalie Voser,
Current Development: Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International
Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 319, 356 (1996) (affirming that arbitrators can and should
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B. Arbitrators Adjudicatory Function
Adjudicators perform common core functions. Adjudication is a decision-
making process that permits party participation by submitting evidence and
offering reasoned arguments; it requires an adjudicator to render a final and
binding decision that is supportable based upon the record and the adjudicator's
independent judgment and legal analysis.22 When adjudication is infected with
partiality, it is not based upon reasoned application of applicable legal rules or
premised upon the parties' proofs-but rather on a decision-maker's personal
relationships, preconceptions, objectives, and interests.23
Modem international arbitration requires the objective application of rules
to facts and the exercise of bounded discretion to ensure that the process and
final outcome is warranted.24 While parties may pick arbitrators with particular
apply mandatory rules of applicable law as it supports the legitimacy of international arbitration).
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982) (referring to adjudicative
functions); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (referring to adjudication as the "legal process of
resolving a dispute"); see also Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 59-60 (describing the
adjudicatory function of international arbitrators and the link between impartial adjudication and normative
legitimacy); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes:
What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 949,959-60 (2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics] (suggesting adjudicators share the desire to be fair and impartial but arguing that this requires
adoption of a standard code of ethics); Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 987 (arguing "modem
international arbitration outcomes are like judicial outcomes in that they are produced by an objective
tribunal's reasoned application of established rules to facts."); but see Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus.,
Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n. 12 (8th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that the arbitration system is an inferior system of
justice "structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law");
BENJAMIN N. CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-23 (1921) (describing the process of
applying precedent to unique legal and factual situations).
23. Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 69; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determninacy, Objectivity and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (1993) (suggesting that when judges
are faced with the penumbra of general legal terms "a judge has no option but to help fix the meaning through
the exercise of a discretionary authority") (citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 607-15 (1958)).
24. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 7 (1998),
httpJ/www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf-documents/rules/nilesarb-english.pdf(ast visited Mar.
12, 2006) (requiring arbitrators to be "independent" and sign a statement of independence) [hereinafter ICC
RULES]; LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES] art. 5.2 (1998), available at
http://www.lcia.orglARBjolder/arbenglish main.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (requiring arbitrators to
be "impartial and independent") [hereinafter LCIA RULES]; RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTrTE OF THE
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE arts. 6, 17 (1999), available at
http://www.chamber.selarbitration/english/rules/scc_rules.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (requiring the
tribunal and the SCC to be impartial and independent); U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, ARBITRATION
RULES arts. 7, 9-10, U.N. Doc A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) (requiring arbitrators to be impartial and
independent and permitting challenge for lack of these qualities) [hereinafter UNC1TRAL Rules]; see also
Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 60 n.39 citing Susan H. Shin, Comparison of the Dispute
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cultural and legal backgrounds and specific personal experiences,25 arbitrators
also generally have an obligation to disclose those matters that would call into
question their independence.26 Although all humans are inevitably influenced
by their experiences, in international arbitration, parties ask arbitrators to put
Settlement Procedures of the World Trade Organization for Trade Disputes and the Inter-American System
for Human Rights Violations, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 95 (2003) (suggesting that the failure to carefully
define the role of adjudicators in other contexts has undermined the legitimacy and efficacy of those systems);
Laurence Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator's Responsibility Vis-A-Vis Legal Standards, 57-
APR DIsP. RESOL. J. 32, 79 n.51 (2002) (suggesting international arbitration is about private adjudication).
But see Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 487 (1997) (suggesting
impartiality is traded for expertise and asserting parties prefer a hearing that is more a form of private self-
government than a form of private adjudication); see generally Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d
673 (7th Cir. 1983).
25. See Toby Landau, Report, Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal Articles 14 to 36,
9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 59 (1998); James F. Hogg, Civil Justice Reform Introduction, 24 WM. MrrCHELL
L. REV. 287, 293 (1998).
26. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 24, art. 9 (requiring a "prospective arbitrator shall
disclose to those who approach him in connexion [sic] with his possible appointment any circumstances
likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence"; ICC RULES, supra note 24, art.
7.2 (requiring a prospective to "disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might
be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the parties"); LCIA
RULES, supra note 24, art. 5.3 (requiring an arbitrator to "sign a declaration to the effect that there are no
circumstances known to him likely to give rise to any justified doubts as to his impartiality or independence,
other than any circumstances disclosed by him in the declaration"); see also U. N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law Report, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Annex 1, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(June 21, 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law Report (requiring an arbitrator to "disclose any
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence"); English
Arbitration Act § 24, 1996 (Eng.), available at, http://www.opsi.gov.uklactslactsl996/1996023.htm (last
visited Mar. 27, 2006) (permitting courts to remove arbitrators where "circumstances exist that give rise to
justifiable doubts as to [their] impartiality") [hereinafter English Arbitration Act]; INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSoCIATION, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION 7 (2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guideines%20text.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (offering a set
of non-binding standards that require arbitrator an arbitrator to be objectively independent and impartial and
requiring an arbitrator to disclose those matters which "may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as
to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence") [hereinafter IBA GuIDELINES].
27. See generally CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES (Daniel Kaneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000);
see also CARDozO, supra note 22, at 13 (suggesting that humans "may try to see things as objectively as we
please. Nonetheless, we can never see them with any eyes except our own."); Rogers, Standards of Care,
supra note 18, at 68 (noting that "absolute impartiality is impossible as a matter of cognitive psychology");
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator On
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 546
(1998) (suggesting "we hold some notion of neutrality, objectivity, or impartiality over our head, like an
unreachable halo to remind us of what we need to aspire to, as we work on cases situated before us, where
we are grounded in who we are"). But see JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-50 (1971) (suggesting
that it possible to ensure superhuman impartiality by insulating decision makers from their own selfish
personal interests but acknowledging this still permits some common human emotions and attitudes to operate
behind the veil).
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aside biases in order to fairly and impartially exercise their independent
judgment and apply their expertise to the facts on the record to render a
decision based upon the law.28
C. Functional Distinctions Between Arbitrators and Judges
While the current literature suggests that arbitrators' urge to render neutral
and impartial decisions reflects the "judicialization" of arbitration,29 arbitrators
differ from judges3" in fundamental ways. 31 But these distinctions need not
detract from an international arbitrator's obligation to engage in impartial
decision-making. Irrespective of whether the decision-maker is a national court
judge or an arbitrator, the neutral adjudicative function should be fostered to
encourage impartial analysis and decision-making.3 2
28. Henry Gabriel &Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics For CommercialArbitrators: Basic Principles
and Emerging Standards, 5 WYO. L. REV. 453,453-56 (2005); Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson,
Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and a Proposal for a
Private/Arbitral and Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 195 (2002); Chiara
Giovannucci Orlandi, Ethics for International Arbitrators, 67 UMKC L. REV. 93, 93-94 (1999).
29. Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 67; see generally INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? (Richard B. Ullich
& Charles N. Brower, eds., 1993); see also Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation
in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 95 (1995). But see Jose E. Alvarez, The New
Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 405, 411-15 (2003) (describing as a
"half-truth" the principle that "[t]he recent proliferation of international tribunals constitutes the
'judicialization' of international law.").
30. Judges in different countries differ dramatically. While some may adhere to the rule of law,
there are other jurisdictions where this is less likely to be true. Kif Augustine-Adams, Considering the Rule
of Law: A Step Back from Threats and Dangers, 15-SPG EXPERIENCE 14, 16 (2005); see also Matthew J.
Spence, American Prosecutors as Democracy Promoters: Prosecuting Corrupt Foreign Officials in U.S.
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1187-88 (2005) (discussing the lack of adherence to the rule of law in
developing countries, such as the Ukraine); Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant IfHe Stays With
His Sheep? Justice In Rural China, 114 YALE L.J. 1675, 1709 (2005) (noting that "basic court judges in rural
China have little in common with the visions dancing in senators' heads when they condition aid on progress
toward the rule of law"); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 Sup. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 2 (2003) (describing how in Eastern Europe "societies have struggled to rediscover the rule of law"
and how in "impoverished kleptocracies of Africa, the challenge is even greater and the lack of even
embryonic rule of law institutions is stark").
31. Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and
Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y. L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 23-24 (2000) [hereinafter Franck,
Liability].
32. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 22, at 959-60 (recognizing that judges and arbitrators
are adjudicators and that "impartiality and neutrality, are a necessary part of maintaining the integrity and
legitimacy" of the dispute resolution process); see generally, IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 26; Dezalay &
Garth, VIRTUE, supra note 3.
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Conducting a functional analysis of the common adjudicative goals of
arbitration and litigation can offer insights about the appropriate role of
arbitrators.33 Judges and arbitrators share certain functional similarities, which
relate to the adjudicative nature of their decision-making obligations.34 Some
similarities implicate the nature of the decision-maker's mandate, the
independence of adjudication and internal checks on discretion. Other
functions implicate their administrative obligations, including effective case-
management and providing parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Irrespective of the external distinctions, these two core functions require both
arbitrators and judges to perform their role in a fair, efficient, and impartial
manner.
1. Adjudicatory Role
The mandate of arbitrators and judges relates to their jurisdiction and the
entities to which they are responsible. There are subtle differences in the
mandate of arbitrators and judges. Judges derive theirjurisdiction and authority
from the state, whereas arbitrators derive their jurisdiction from parties.35
Nevertheless, the state indirectly sanctions arbitration to the extent national
legislation or judicial decisions permit arbitration.36 These differences are
33. Such an analysis can create an independent basis of arbitrator impartiality, which in turn
"reinforces the normative legitimacy of the international arbitration system." Rogers, Standards of Conduct,
supra note 18, at 59-60. This legitimacy encourages states to permit private resolution of important public
issues, which might otherwise be resolved by courts and not permitted to be the subject of arbitration. See
generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) [hereinafter Franck,
POWER OF LEGITIMACY] (referring to various indicators of legitimacy); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITIMONS (1995) [hereinafter, Franck, FAIRNESS]; Deseriee A. Kennedy,
Predisposed With Integrity: The Elusive Questfor Justice in Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
749, 768 (1995) (suggesting that if adjudication ignores "fundamental judicial precepts of neutrality and
impartiality... [then] the integrity of the entire process is undermined."); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985) (holding that anti-trust claims are arbitral and
commenting favorably on the independence, impartiality and experience of the international arbitrators
involved in the case); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 21 (1991) (permitting the
arbitration of RICO claims and declining "to indulge [the] speculation that the parties and the arbitral body
will not retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators, especially when both the [institutional]
rules and the FAA protect against biased panels."); see also Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas.
Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (commenting favorably on the impartiality and fairness of modem arbitrators)
(White, J. concurring).
34. Hong-lin Yu & Laurence Shore, Independence, Impartiality, and Immunity ofArbitrators-US
and English Perspectives, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 935, 960 (2003); Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at
18-24.
35. Imre S. Szalai, The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Greentree Financial Corp.
v. Bazzle, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 45 (2004); George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters, Local 354,
722 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984).
36. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 768-69; see generally, Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:
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minor and should not affect an adjudicator's capacity and willingness to render
impartial decisions.
Arbitrators and judges also differ as to whom they are ultimately
responsible. This distinction implicates both how decision-makers are
remunerated and how they are selected. The government collects taxes to pay
judges from parties who may or may not be litigants, whereas parties are
directly responsible for the remuneration of arbitrators.37 On its face, a more
direct financial relationship might appear to affect the outcome; nevertheless,
this need not be the case, particularly where the parties have contracted for
decision-makers who are independent and impartial.38 There are also
distinctions related to the appointment process. Judges tend to be randomly
assigned to cases, whereas parties have a hand in selecting their decision-
makers.39 Presumably this means that parties using arbitration have a greater
control in selecting a decision-maker' ° whose professional, legal, and cultural
experiences may predispose them to understanding evidence and arguments in
a particular way.4' It does not, however, necessarily predispose the outcome,
particularly where there may be the effect of balancing of such inherent biases
by a three-member tribunal.42
A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000).
The state also retains residual jurisdiction in those instances when it determines claims are not arbitral. Alan
Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 290-293 (1999).
37. Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at 23.
38. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70
TENN. L. REV. 63, 94-95 (2002) (discussing the problem of potential bias in hopes of future business from
"repeat players"); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 709
(2001).
39. Rogers, Fit and Function, supra note 16, at 356,357; Rogers, Standard of Conduct, supra note
18, at 56-67; Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation andArbitration: An
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STuD. 549, 559 (2003).
40. To the extent that parties believe that they have greater control over the process, they are more
likely to buy-in psychologically to the dispute resolution process; this in turn is likely to decrease the parties'
dissatisfaction with the process and lead to an award that a party is less likely to contest. See Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 Swiss J. ECON. & STATISTICS 219, 222-27 (1997)
(suggesting that compliance with the law is linked to the legitimacy of the authorities and the procedural
fairness of administering the law); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WrrHOuT GIVING IN 27 (2nd ed. 1981) (observing that if parties "are not involved in the process,
they are hardly likely to approve the product" and instead arguing that parties should be given a stake in the
process).
41. Judges, just like arbitrators, are human beings with a concomitant set of experiences and
predispositions. See supra note 27, and accompanying text (referring to Justice Cardozo's observations about
the partiality of judges and human beings).
42. See S. I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An
Infringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L.
915, 929 (1998) (suggesting "arbitrators rule on the facts and legal or equitable principles before them, not
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There are also distinctions in the checks placed upon judges' and
arbitrators' exercise of discretion. Irrespective of the variances in how discre-
tion is restricted, there is a common theme. The discretion of both arbitrators
and judges has limitations, and such limitations do not prevent them from
impartially and fairly adjudicating disputes.
One way to check the unfettered discretion of decision-makers is through
adherence to the rule of law. For example, common law judges are bound by
precedent.43 While arbitrators are not necessarily bound by precedent-nor do
they create de jure precedent-adherence to precedent is not an indispensable
element in the adherence to the rule of law. Judges in civil and Islamic law
countries, for instance, are constrained by rules articulated in the civil code and
rely less infrequently on precedent.'
Arbitrators are subject to a slightly different check on their discretion; the
parties' agreement. More specifically, arbitrators are not only bound by the
parties' agreement about the extent of their discretion but they are also bound
by the express or implied rules of law the parties have chosen.45 Where parties
bring controlling law and persuasive authority to a tribunal's attention-bound
as they are by the parties' agreement as to the scope of their authority-
arbitrators can and should neutrally evaluate the relevant case law to render a
fair and impartial decision. Adhering to traditional concepts of fair and
on party affiliation" and that the most lawyers "can do is make an educated guess, based on each candidate's
professional background, as to who might be more inclined toward a particular perspective.").
43. See generally LEGAL RuLES AND LEGAL REASONING (Larry Alexander ed., 2000); James
Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 571, 589, 595-96 (1987); see also Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the
Accused and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. I11,
118 (1998) (suggesting that a lack of precedent in courts with common law traditions is troubling).
44. Dr. Abou Ramadan, Judicial Activism of the Shari'ah Appeals Court in Israel (1994-2001):
Rise and Crisis, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 254, 273 (2003) (explaining that "on the substantive level Islamic
law does not recognize the principle of binding precedent"); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, First Worldwide
Congress on Mixed Jurisdictions: Salience and Unity in the Mixed Jurisdiction Experience: Traits,
Patterns, Culture, Commonalities: Language and Style in a Mixed System, 78 TuL. L. REv. 151, 172 (2003)
(discussing the lack of common law precedential restraint and instead the notion of restraint and interpretation
in civil law traditions).
45. See, e.g., Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of
Law in International Commercial Arbitration?, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 59, 65 (1992); Sigvard Jarvin,
The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers, 2 ARB. INT'L 140 (1986); Bernard G. Poznanski, The
Nature and Extent of an Arbitrator's Powers in International Commercial Arbitration, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 71,
84 (1987). Should an arbitrator fail to adhere to their legal obligations, it may be possible to hold an
arbitrator directly liable for their inappropriate conduct. See generally Franck, Liability, supra note 31;
Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279,
1303-06 (2000); Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach For Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV.
151 (2004); see also supra note 31 and infra notes 80, 82 (discussing the possibility of arbitrator liability for
inappropriate conduct).
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consistent treatment4 6 both honors the parties' agreement and promotes the
integrity of an adjudicative system.47
Another way to check the discretion of decision-makers is to create a
process which reviews their decision. While arbitrators and judges are subject
to different review processes, both processes provide an opportunity to evaluate
their conduct. Typically, judges' determinations are judicially reviewable for
substantive and procedural errors.48 In contrast, while some jurisdictions do
permit a limited evaluation of the legal merits of a tribunal's award, 9 the
international trend is to review the procedural aspects of an arbitrator's award.5°
46. Treating similarly situated individuals similarly is a classic element of the rule of law. Ann
Althouse, Saying What Rights Are-In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis. L REV. 929, 949 (1991); Schauer,
supra note 43; see generally Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under
Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J INT'L L. & POL'Y, 47,
55-62 (2005) (describing the importance of consistent treatment in arbitration) [hereinafter Franck, Bright
Future].
47. See Franck, FAIRNESS, supra note 33 at 41-46 (suggesting that adherence to traditionally
accepted norms and approaches is likely to increase the legitimacy of a methodology). Investment treaty
arbitration, for example, is struggling with the proper application of law to fact this issue as tribunals are
creating a body of defacto precedent upon which parties rely in planning their conduct and to which tribunals
refer when articulating the bases of their decisions. See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at
1612; Franck, Bright Future, supra note 46, at 57; see generally Franck, POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note
33.
48. Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of
Discretionary Review, 44 U. Prrr. L REv. 795, 796 (1983) (referring to the error correcting function of
appellate courts); David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among Institutional Decision Makers in
Louisiana State-Court Negligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1997) (indicating
that appellate judges review various issues in a "variety of procedural and substantive contexts.").
49. In the United States, for example, courts can vacate arbitral awards where a tribunal "manifestly
disregards" the law, specifically where a tribunal correctly states the law and subsequently ignores it. See
Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (articulating the "manifest disregard" dictum followed by
subsequent courts) overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Howard M. Holtzmann & Donald Francis Donovan, National Report on the
United States, in INTERNATIONALHANDBOOKONCOMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 53,58 (Pieter Sanders & Albert
Jan van den Berg eds., 1998) (describing the "non-statutory ground of 'manifest disregard' as a basis for
vacating an award in the United States") [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK]; see generally Noah
Rubins, "Manifest Disregard of the Law" and VacaturofArbitral Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 363 (2001) (describing the application of "manifest disregard" in various circuits). England also
provides for limited review of arbitral awards. English Arbitration Act, supra note 26, § 69 (permitting, for
example, appeal on a point of law where the appellate court agrees to hear the case, "determination of the
question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties" and "the decision of the tribunal on
the question is obviously wrong"). But see Robert Briner, National Report on Switzerland, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, infra at 33-35 (noting that "even a clear violation of the law or a manifestly
wrong finding of facts are as such not sufficient to constitute" a grounds for setting aside awards);
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, arts. 35, 36 (failing to provide appeal on a point of law as a ground
for vacatur or denying recognition and enforcement).
50. See Park, supra note 20, at 815 (explaining "most legal systems do not impose merits review").
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Procedural review does not prevent a meaningful review of awards, however.
Arguably, the various procedural mechanisms can be used as a substitute gauge
of the appropriateness of the award.5 Moreover, arbitrators, likejudges, do not
like to have their awards annulled, set aside or denied enforcement, and
arbitrators tend to exhibit a great deal of care to retain the integrity of the
process.' 2 Ultimately, this suggests that the review process makes arbitrators
and judges functionally similar, and such similarity suggests that arbitrator's
should strive to apply the applicable law in a neutrally and fair manner.
2. The Administrative Function
Both judges and arbitrators are being increasingly called upon to manage
the dispute resolution process fairly and efficiently. 53 The administration of the
dispute resolution processes are different. Judges must adhere to rigid rules of
civil procedure and evidence; whereas, subject to party agreement, arbitrators
have discretion to articulate the applicable procedures.54 Nevertheless, both
judges and arbitrators should manage the adjudicative process efficiently and
fairly. Judges in the United States, for example, often have a great deal of
discretion to engage in case management, and typically these decisions are only
reversed upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.56 Arbitrators are held to a
51. Id. at 817.
52. See Guzman, supra note 45, at 1282 (observing arbitrators have an incentive to act properly "in
order to develop a reputation as a desirable arbitrator"); Steven Walt, Decision By Division: The
Contractarian Structure Of Commercial Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 369, 411-13 (1999) (observing
international arbitrators have an incentive to behave impartially and properly in the resolution of disputes lest
there be an adverse effect upon their reputation); but see Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 22, at 956
(suggesting that arbitrators may experience a conflict of interest where they may be repeatedly appointed by
one parties and that they "must 'satisfy' or please the choosing parties sufficiently to be chosen again,
particularly if the arbitrator is more or less a full time arbitrator who depends exclusively on arbitration for
income").
53. See Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America,
and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301,322-23 (2004) (discussing the
essence of a stable legal order).
54. Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration
Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'LL.J. 89,90 (1995); see LCIA RULES, supra note 24, art. 22; ICC RULES, supra note
24, art. 15; UNC1TRAL Rules, supra note 24, art. 15; see also Kennedy, supra note 33 (suggesting that,
unlike in arbitration, rules of evidence and procedure in court litigation result in consistent judicial processes
and noting the flexibility inherent in arbitration).
55. See generally Garcia, supra note 53.
56. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1268-1269 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(noting a "court is entitled to establish proper pre-trial procedures and set an appropriate pre-trial schedule"
and holding "the district court did not ... abuse its discretion" in this case.); State ex rel. Appalachian Power
Co. v. MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d 300, 305 (W. Va. 1996) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by formulating a trial-management plan to consolidate all pending asbestos premises-liability cases, and
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different standard but with a similar objective of facilitating a fair process.
Should arbitrators fail to abide by the parties' agreement in conducting the
proceedings or exceed their discretion, the award can be set aside or denied
enforcement.57 While there are critical distinctions between arbitrators and
judges,58 the differences are not so broad as to prevent either type of adjudicator
from evaluating the merits in a neutral manner and managing the process
impartially.
11. OPPORTUNITIES TO ADDRESS MISCONDUCT
The formalization of the legal process is a function of international
arbitration's impulse to promote the rule of law, recognize their vital role as
neutral adjudicators and foster the internal integrity of the process.59 Neverthe-
less, human beings are not perfect. There are a variety of opportunities to
address perceived misconduct and offer incentives to ensure that arbitrators
maintain an independent and impartial role. These opportunities can occur
during the proceedings, after the proceedings and through other informal
mechanisms, or "market forces."
A. During the Proceedings
During an arbitration, there are opportunities to challenge arbitrators for
inappropriate conduct based upon information--either disclosed or undisclosed
stating that "this case is probably the best example of why a trial court should be given broad authority to
manage its docket...").
57. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. V(2), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (establishing the grounds for refusing enforcement of
arbitral awards) [hereinafter New York Convention]; Swiss Private International Law Act on International
Arbitration, arts. 190, 194, in National Report on Switzerland in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note
49, Annex IL 4-5 [hereinafter Swiss Arbitration Law]; English Arbitration Act, supra note 26, §§ 68, 101
(establishing the grounds for vacating and denying enforcement of arbitral awards); UNCITRAL Model Law,
supra note 26, arts. 34(2)(a)(ii-iii), 36(l)(a)(ii-iii).
58. Arbitrators, for example, only have jurisdiction over the parties to an arbitration agreement; they
have limited or no authority over non-parties. See, e.g., Jason F. Darnall & Richard Bales, Arbitral Discovery
of Non-Parties, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 305 (2001) (discussing the split of opinion in U.S. courts over whether
arbitrators should be able to order pretrial discovery from non-parties and advocating a broad-power
approach). Judges, in contrast, have the authority over parties and non-parties subject to its general
jurisdiction.
59. Although in the past the flexibility and lack of adherence to precedent has been a strength of
arbitration, there is a growing literature to suggest this presumption may no longer be correct-particularly
in the international context where users of international arbitration demand more certain and reasoned
outcomes. Rogers, Fit and Function, supra note 16, at 366-67; Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 976-80.
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-which indicates arbitrators are not acting impartially or independently. 6'
Typically, these challenges can either be brought before an arbitral institution
and/or a national court.6' The general trend is to challenge and remove
arbitrators where there are circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts
about an arbitrator's independence or impartiality.62
Defining the meaning of "independence" and "impartiality" can be
challenging. Arbitral institutions tend not to particularize these standards.63
The workings of the ICC Court, which evaluates arbitrator challenges, are
confidential.' National courts also give mixed guidance about the meaning of
the phrase. For example, in the United Kingdom, the AT&Tv. Saudi Cable case
suggested that Yves Fortier's inadvertent non-disclosure of his role as a non-
executive director with one of AT&T's primary competitors was insufficient
to lead to "real danger of bias."65 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Commonwealth Coatings held that inadvertent non-disclosure of a business
relationship with a party did create an appearance of bias and partiality.'
Some extreme cases do offer some guidance. The infamous case of
Challenge to Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeiei involved a physical attack in the
Peace Palace against a Swedish arbitrator at the U.S. [you might want to do a
60. See Yu & Shore, supra note 34, at 963; see also ICC RULES, supra note 24, art. 11; LCIA
RULES, supra note 24, art. 10; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 24, arts. 10-11; English Arbitration
Act, supra note 26, § 24; Swiss Arbitration Law, supra note 57, arts. 179-80; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 26, arts. 12-13.
61. ICC RULES, supra note 24, art. 11 (permitting the ICC Court to rule on challenges to
arbitrators); LCIA RULES, supra note 24, art. 10 (permitting the ICC Court to remove arbitrators if an
arbitrator "dies, falls seriously ill, refuses, or becomes unable or unfit to act" or "if circumstances exist that
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence"); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra
note 24, art. 12 (providing that challenges can be made by appointing authorities); English Arbitration Act,
supra note 26, § 24 (providing that a court can remove an arbitrator if where "circumstances exist that give
rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality); Swiss Arbitration Law, supra note 57, art. 180(l)(c)
(permitting party to challenge of an arbitrator in court where "circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence"); UNCITRAL Model Law Report, supra note 26, art. 13 (permitting courts
to hear challenges to arbitrators).
62. For a discussion of the arbitrator independence and neutrality and comparison of the U.S.
justifiable doubt standard with British real danger standard see generally Yu and Shore supra note 34;
Orlandi, supra note 28, at 96-103 (comparing a variety of civil law and common law countries' conceptions
of arbitrator independence and impartiality).
63. See ICC RULES, supra note 24, arts. 7.2-7.3; LCIA RULES, supra note 24, arts. 5.2-5.3;
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 24, arts. 6.4, 9.
64. ICC RULES, supra note 24, app. 1, art. 6.
65. AT & T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] 2 All E.R. 625 (Eng. C.A. 2000); see Branson, supra
note 15, at 29; Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 28, at 458 n.28; but see A.S.M. Shipping Ltd. of India v.
T.T.M.I. Ltd. of England, [2005] All E.R. 271 (Q.B. 2005) (removing an English arbitrator for reason of
"apparent bias").
66. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 150.
global check for punctuations in abbreviations of US and UK]-Iran Claims
Tribunal by two Iranian arbitrators who claimed the neutral arbitrator was
"already a corpse" because he had sided with the U.S.67 The removal of the
Iranian arbitrators in this case suggests that where conduct "shocks the
conscience" and undermines confidence in the integrity of the dispute resolu-
tion system, arbitrators will be dismissed.6" But perhaps what shocks the
conscience of one legal culture with a strong tradition of the rule of law may be
less likely to shock the conscience of someone from a different legal or cultural
tradition.
B. After the Proceedings
Immediately after the tribunal renders an award, there are also
opportunities to address inappropriate conduct. First, parties can seek to vacate
the award at the seat for procedural irregularities.69 But some countries, such
as England, provide limited opportunities to review awards for errors of law.70
Second, during enforcement proceedings, parties might use New York
Convention grounds to argue arbitrator misconduct should result in the denial
of recognition of the award. 7
While arbitrators-similar to trial courts-do not like to have their awards
vacated or denied enforcement,72 there is also a lack of clarity as to what
arbitrator conduct is sufficient to affect the integrity of the award adversely."
67. Memorandum Re: Challenge to Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeifei by the Government of the
United States of America, 7 IRAN U.S.-CL. TRiB. REP. 281, 292 (1986) [hereinafter Memorandum]. One
Iranian judge was quoted as saying: "If Mangard ever dares to enter the tribunal chamber again, either his
corpse or my corpse will leave it rolling down the stairs." Iranian Judge Threatens A Swede at The Hague,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1984, at A5. Subsequently, the Tribunal's President suspended all tribunal proceedings.
U.S.-Iran Arbitration Suspended at The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1984, at A9.
68. See Memorandum, supra note 67, at 296-98.
69. 9 USC § 10 (2005); English Arbitration Act, supra note 26, §§ 67-96; Swiss Arbitration Law,
supra note 57, art. 190; UNCITRAL Model Law Report, supra note 26, art. 34; see generally William W.
Park, Illusion and Reality in International Forum Selection, 30 TEx. INT'LL.J. 135,186 (1995); ALBERTJAN
VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION (1981).
70. English Arbitration Act, supra note 26, § 69.
71. See generally New York Convention, supra note 57; JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS
& STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003).
72. See David E. Robbins, Calling All Arbitrators: Reclaim Control of the Arbitration
Process-The Courts Let You, 60 APR. DIsP. RESOL. J. 99 (2005) (suggesting that "arbitrators are fearful that
the courts, when reviewing their conduct, will vacate their awards"); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock ofNAFTA
Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues and Methods, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1437 (2003) (indicating that "[w]hen vacatur occurs, the award's flaws--and by
extension, the arbitrators' missteps--are typically made public, further discouraging ill-considered awards.").
73. The FAA does articulate general standards as to what conduct is sufficient to lead to vacatur
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While it might be useful to have a clearer set of guidelines as to what type of
arbitrator misconduct will result in non-recognition or vacatur [you might want
to run a global on the term vacatur-it's a term of art and is typically in italics],
this will depend on the national law of the courts evaluating the award.74
C. Market Forces
There are three different types of market forces that offer an opportunity
to remedy arbitrator misconduct and provide guidance as to the appropriate role
of international arbitrators. First, professional reputation and word of mouth
in the arbitration marketplace can impact arbitrator conduct. Second, other
market-based incentives can create incentives for appropriate behavior. Third,
institutional incentives can provide guidance for arbitrator conduct and provide
incentives for appropriate conduct and adverse consequences for improper
conduct.
1. The Arbitrator Marketplace
The internal arbitrator marketplace, where professional credibility and
word-of-mouth recommendations affect appointment and re-appointment of
arbitrators, plays a significant role.75 Arbitrators can earn hundreds of
of the award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2005) permits vacatur:
(1) [W]here the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators . . .; (3) where the
arbitrators... refus[ed] to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of the any party have been prejudiced.)
Courts, however, have come to mixed results in interpreting these standards.
See, e.g., Stephanie Smith, Establishing Neutrality in Arbitrations Involving Closely-
Knit Industries, 12 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 237, 238 (2001) (noting the
confusion in U.S. courts on the standard of partiality required for vacatur). Things can
get even more challenging when one considers that different national laws, which are
also likely to vary, may apply to the issue of what type of arbitrator misconduct is
inappropriate. See, e.g., James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration
Procedure: The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral
Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 53 (2004)
(acknowledging a lack of uniformity in national laws for the vacatur of an arbitral
award).
74. Gaitis, supra note 73, at 53.
75. Coe, supra note 4; see also Guzman, supra note45, at 1303-06 (suggesting that arbitrators seek
to develop proper reputations); Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 37, 82-85 (1996) (explaining "arbitrators would be selected on
the basis of their status in the world of international commercial arbitration, as well as because of their
expertise," acknowledging information in the arbitrator marketplace affects appointments, and describing how
these reputation factors permitted that "arbitrators freed themselves from significant partisan influence from
the disputants.").
thousands of dollars from a single arbitration and gain personal prestige from
having been involved in a significant case.76  For those "repeat-players,"
reputation and credibility as a fair, independent, and reasoned decision maker
is vital. In multi-million and multi-billion dollar disputes, parties are likely to
be unwilling to appoint an arbitrator who is likely to be challenged, who cannot
fully consider fully the facts and laws at issue and who may be incapable of
rendering an enforceable award.
Newcomers or "one-shot-arbitrators," who may not appreciate or be
cognizant of these informal market mechanisms, present a greater challenge.
There may also be "toxic" arbitrators who leak confidential tribunal delibera-
tions to parties; and such disclosures may put a party, who may be disatisfied
with the application of the law to the facts, in a position to disrupt proceedings
or challenge the award.77 Incentives beyond mere reputation and word of mouth
are therefore necessary to deter inappropriate conduct.
2. Market-based Incentives
Second, market based incentives related to compensation play a role in
shaping arbitrator conduct. For example, legislators might pass laws, such as
those in Canada or South Africa, which prevent arbitrators from receiving
remuneration where the have been removed for improper conduct. 78 Likewise,
arbitrators might be held personally liable for damages related to a failure to
adjudicate disputes impartially and independently.79
Particularly for toxic arbitrators, such financial incentives may be
necessary to encourage proper execution of their arbitral mandate. Whether the
76. See generally John Y. Gotanda, Setting Arbitrators' Fees: An International Survey, 33 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779 (2000); see also Garcia, supra note 53, at 352-53 (describing the compensation of
arbitrators as "generous" and noting, in the context of investment arbitration, that arbitrators can be paid US
$2,400 per day and referring to the prestige that accrues from sitting on an international arbitration panel);
Guzman, supra note 45, at 1302-03 (noting that "arbitrators perform their function for private gain [can be]
solely financial or a combination of financial compensation, prestige, and influence over events...").
77. In one case, an arbitrator "unleashed his own wave of vituperative in what can only be described
as a scathing dissent. In it, he broadly accuses the other two arbitrators-including a former President of the
International Court of Justice, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel--of unethical conduct, including bias, and secretly
colluding with one another and discriminating against him in a manner which deprived him of his opportunity
to duly participate in the deliberations and preparation of the award." Garcia, supra note 53, at 351. This lead
to a challenge of the award in the Svea Appellate Court in Stockholm where Judge Schwebel and the other
two arbitrators provided testimony in court about the deliberations and the allegations of arbitrator
misconduct; the challenge was dismissed. Id.; see also Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V., 42
I.L.M. 919 (Svea Ct. App. 2003) (Swed.).
78. Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at 36-38.
79. See generally Id.; Guzman, supra note 45.
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remedy is either in tort or contract,8 0 personal liability in appropriate circum-
stances can provide an incentive for arbitrators to perform their adjudicatory
function independently and not take steps to disrupt the proceedings or make
it impracticable to carry out their own mandate.
3. Institutional Incentives
Finally, institutions can play a role in creating incentives for appropriate
conduct. For example, arbitral institutions can also play a market-based role in
by removing arbitrators from their lists-or refusing to confirm arbitrators-
who have violated specific ethical obligations.8 ' The AAA already takes this
type of measure.8 ' Likewise, professional organizations might consider
imposing sanctions against arbitrators who, in the past, have engaged in
inappropriate conduct. In Ex Parte Armstrong, where an arbitrator had engaged
in inappropriate conduct that did not rise to the level of "professional
misconduct," an English court permitted the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
to require the arbitrator to submit all his decisions to the Chartered Institute in
advance. 3 Actions from institutions can therefore provide significant guidance
as to the appropriate role for arbitrators and sanctions for non-compliance.
IV. THE FUTURE ROLE OF ARBITRATORS
Thomas Franck once wrote that having decision makers who are perceived
to be legitimate enhances the legitimacy of the dispute resolution system.' 4 The
80. See Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at 3-11 (discussing both the contractual and tortuous
nature of arbitrator liability); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFICE, ARBITRATIoN-FiNLAND, SUPREME
COURT RULES ON ARBITRATORS' LtABILITY, Mar. 24, 2005, available at http://www. inter-
nationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?r=-9560&i=1013606 (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (discussing
the potential contract and tort-based liability and determining an arbitrator's liability is based on contract);
see generally Finnish Supreme Court Rules on the Immunity ofArbitrators, International Dispute Resolution
(White & Case LLP, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2005, available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/
68d5514e-440c-4afa-b287-c7399367e80c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3d24lebf-9452-46ef-8a6f-
c7bfa0056304/newsletteridm_0305.pdf (last visted Mar. 12, 2006) (providing more information on the
Ruolas case).
81. Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 978-79; Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at
70-73.
82. See generally American Arbitration Association, Failure to Disclose May Lead to Removal
From the National Roster of Neutrals, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22241 (last visited Dec.
15, 2005); see also Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China art. 38, 1995 (China), available at
http:I/www.cietac.org.cn/english/laws/laws._5.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (providing that an arbitrator
who has engaged in misconduct shall be responsible at law and will have their name stricken from the panel
of possible arbitrators).
83. Franck, Liability, supra note 31, at 55-56.
84. See generally Franck, POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 33.
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integrity and the legitimacy of international arbitration therefore depends, in
large part, upon the perceived integrity of arbitrators as well as their
independence and impartiality.
As the number of disputes continues to increase and the pool of arbitrators
has continued to expand, the role of arbitrators has evolved. No longer are
arbitrators a select pool of "grand old men" or a "gentlemen's club" made up
of those individuals with a close connection to a particular area of laws, a
relationship to the parties and perhaps with pre-existing knowledge of a dispute
whose independence was founded upon the notion of a personal sense of duty
and honor.85 The intimacy and limited size that are typical prerequisites for
informal social controls in the international arbitration community has given
way to a host of other pressures brought by its growth and expansion.86 Today,
international commercial arbitrators have transformed themselves into a group
of technocrats who are experts in arbitration procedure and theory.87
As the constituency of international arbitration has grown, there have been
shifts in what is expected of arbitrators; not just by the parties but perhaps by
arbitrators themselves, who come from an increasingly diverse group who may
have different assumptions of what constitutes proper conduct.88  The
85. Dezaly & Garth, supra note 3, at 33-36 (describing the "grand old men" who "played a central
role in the emergence and the recognition of arbitration"); see generally Louise Barrington, Arbitral Women:
A Study of Women in International Commercial Arbitration, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE: THE
1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 229-41 (Geoffrey M.
Beresford Hartwell ed., 1996) (describing the lack of women in international arbitration but their increasing
presence in international commercial arbitration); Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Prsidente, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER, Summer 2004, available at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/arbitration04.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (describing the
lack of women in arbitration but the increasing numbers); Dr. K.V.S.K. Nathan, Well, Why Did You Not Get
the Right Arbitrator?, 15 MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 10 (2000) (noting that "[t]he majority in a multimember
international arbitral tribunal is always white" and interpreting a British arbitrator's commentary as
improperly suggesting that, "arbitrators from the developing countries and women simply do not or cannot
satisfy the selection criteria" for arbitrators).
86. Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 61-62; Dezalay & Garth, VIRTUE, supra note
3, at 36-38.
87. Dezalay & Garth, VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 36 (describing the shift from "grand old men" to
technocrats and referring to interviews where people said the grand old man are "probably just more full of
themselves than other people and the new generation of arbitration specialists are "technically better equipped
in procedure and substance"); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 22, at 958-59 (describing the shift away
from grand old men to a technocratic, litigation oriented and ethically trained generation).
88. For example, the U.S. has a detailed approach to conflict of interests. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7-1.8 (2000) available at
http://www.abanet.orglcpr/mrpc/mrpctoc.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121-35 (2000); Bradley Wendel, The Deep Structure of Conflicts of Interest
in American Public Life, 16 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (2005). In contrast, the U.K. approach
which is not as rule-based and is more flexible and open-ended. See THE LAW SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE
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International Business Association (the "IBA") Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest 9 are a very useful starting place. Scholars, arbitrators, lawyers and
parties should continue to evaluate their impact particularly as the conducts its
own analysis of the Guidelines' utility and courts throughout the world are
beginning to use them to evaluate arbitrator behavior and misconduct. 90
As the international arbitration constituency continues to expand
arbitrators should give into their impulse to professionalize the services they
render.9 By seeking out opportunities to enhance their independence and
impartiality, this will benefit the integrity of international arbitration by
confirming the neutrality and fairness of the underlying process.92
One might consider whether the time has come for parties to incorporate
more particularized rules about independence directly into their arbitration
agreements.9 3 This will permit the parties to set their common expectations and
will put potential arbitrators on notice as to the manner in which the parties
expect the arbitration process to be managed. This is precisely why the AAA
and the Milan Chamber of Commerce have articulated ethical standards, which
are incorporated in the arbitrator's mandate.94 By clarifying an arbitrator's role
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS 313-22 (Nicola Taylor ed., 8th ed. 1999) (referring to the English
rules related to conflicts of interest); see also Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules:
A New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and
Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1150 (1999) (noting that in some countries, professional
ethics are handed down as an oral tradition, whose strictures address only the most obvious conflicts of
interest). The author is grateful to Susan Poser for her comments on these issues.
89. See generally, IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 26.
90. E-mail from Mark Kantor to Susan Franck, Dec. 14, 2005 (on file with author).
91. Rogers, Vocation, supra note 16, at 961, 976-83.
92. See supra notes 32, 33 (referring to the legitimacy gained by having neutral and independent
adjudicators).
93. Rogers, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 72-73, 111; see also See Hans Smit, A-
National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 631 (1989) (proposing language by which ethical codes can be
incorporated into the arbitration agreement via reference to some national body of law); Dr. lur. Oliver
Dillenz, Drafting International Commercial Arbitration Clauses, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 221,
250n.71 (proposing contract language for parties to incorporate the International Bar Association, Ethics for
International Arbitrators in their agreements). In the absence of such party agreement, U.S. courts hesitate
to impose arbitrator codes of conduct. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc.,
173 F.3d 493, 502 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that there was no basis for setting aside awards based on
nondisclosure because there were no applicable rules requiring disclosure); A1-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85
F.3d 680, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that there is no source for any such generalized duty in the
absence of expressly applicable codes).
94. MILAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, CODE OF ETHICS OF
ARBITRATORS arts. 1, 13 (2004), available at http://www.jus.uio.nollmmilan.chamber.of.commerce.
international.arbitration.rules.2004/toc (last visited Dec. 14, 2005) (requiring acceptance of the code as a
condition of appointment and permitting dismissal of the arbitrator as a penalty for noncompliance with the
code); see generally AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
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in this fashion, institutions decrease the need for arbitrators to negotiate their
professional obligations directly with the parties, which might otherwise create
an adversarial relationship with the potential to set up a basis for challenging
the arbitrator or eradicate the parties' trust in the arbitrator(s).
While not as advanced as the approach of the AAA and Milan, the ICC
and even recent proposals for ICSID95 suggest another way to manage-namely
by having arbitrators sign confirmations that they have continuing obligations
to remain impartial and independent. Particularly for parties who are engaging
in international arbitration for the first time, expanding and clarifying the
expected code of conduct for arbitrators will undoubtedly decrease mispercep-
tions and misunderstandings amongst parties, lawyers, and arbitrators.
V. CONCLUSION
Fostering the legitimacy of arbitrators is critical.96 They are the guardians
of a system that is imperative for the flourishing of international trade and
investment. Setting clear and reliable expectations about arbitrators' proper
role will help promote the legitimacy of a system with a critical impact on the
global economy.
Parties, arbitrators, and institutions should appreciate the respect to be
gained by engaging in independent decision-making. They should therefore
articulate clearly what conduct is expected of international arbitrators and
provide incentives to avoid inappropriate conduct. In this way we can further
arbitration's ultimate justice-promoting objectives and promote the integrity of
a dispute resolution mechanism with critical international implications.
COMMERCIAL DISPuTES (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (last visited Mar. 21,
2006).
95. Recent proposals at ICSID would require arbitrators to sign the following statement: Attached
is a statement of (a) my past and present professional, business and other relationships (if any) with the parties
and (b) any other circumstance that might cause my reliability for independent judgment to be questioned
by a party. I acknowledge that by signing this declaration I assume a continuing obligation promptly to notify
the Secretary-General of the Centre of any such relationship or circumstance that subsequently arises during
this proceeding.
Working Paper, supra note 5. Expanding the disclosure requirements for arbitrators has become more
important with the large number of new cases being registered by the Centre and the increased scope for
possible conflicts of interest.
96. See generally Charles H. Brower H, Structure Legitimacy and NAFTA 's Investment Chapter,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (2000); Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1584-85; Franck,
FAIRNEss, supra note 33, at 33-34; Franck, POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 33.
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WHAT IS WAR? TERRORISM AS WAR AFTER 9/11
Jane Gilliland Dalton*
This paper addresses the topic of terrorism as war after September 11 th,
2001. Historically, "war" has generally been considered to be a state of
hostilities between nations characterized by the use of military force. A
declaration of war provided the formal and official announcement that a state
of hostilities existed between two nations-although a state of hostilities
characterized by the use of armed force could exist without a formal
declaration.
In the post-United Nations Charter world, however, what matters is not
whether one nation has declared "war" on another, but rather whether a nation
has been the victim of an armed attack such that it is entitled to respond with
armed force in self-defense. The United Nations Charter, by its terms, does not
require that the armed attack emanate from another nation state. Article 51
provides solely that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security."' As will be discussed
below, on September 11 th, 2001 the United States was the victim of a horrific
armed attack. The United Nations Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the Organization of American States (OAS) all
recognized that the United States was entitled to use force in self-defense in
response to that attack. To provide a more comprehensive analysis of the legal
issues involved, however, it is necessary to begin substantially prior to
September 11 th, 2001.
Under the traditional nation-state system, a state of hostilities could exist
between two countries merely upon a declaration of war by one of them,
whether or not armed engagements had actually begun. Consistent with that
practice, one could argue that a state of hostilities existed between the United
States and al Qaeda as early as 1992, when al Qaeda leadership issued a
"fatwa" for jihad against United States forces located in Islamic territory.2 In
* Jane Gilliland Dalton is the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the United
States Naval War College, Newport, R.I. The views expressed herein are those of Professor Dalton and are
not necessarily those of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense. This article
is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
2. NATIONALCOMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNrrED STATES, FINAL REPORT: THE
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August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued another fatwa declaring war on the
United States. Certainly by 1998, when Osama bin Laden issued his public
Declaration of Jihad against Saudi Arabia and the United States, calling for the
murder of "any American, anywhere on earth" as the "individual duty for every
Muslim, ' 3 American leadership would have had grounds to believe that the
country was at "war," based solely on those issued pronouncements.
Particularly when analyzing the 1998 fatwa, one is struck by how truly
monumental is the vision and expansive the goals it espouses. Osama bin
Laden called on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies, civilian and
military, in order to liberate the al Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque in Mecca.
The al Aqsa Mosque is located on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Despite the
unprecedented withdrawal of Israel from Gaza in the fall of 2005, it is
inconceivable that Israel would peacefully give up the Temple Mount without
a struggle. Thus, bin Laden must have in mind an armed struggle if he intends
to accomplish the objectives of the 1998 fatwa. In fact, the strategic scope of
that fatwa has been compared with the strategic scope of the Russian
revolutionaries or Mao Tse Tung's guerrilla warfare campaigns.4 Accordingly,
it would not have been unrealistic for the United States to acknowledge that war
in the literal sense had in fact been declared on the country based solely on the
statements by Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership, beginning in 1992.
This author believes, however, that when dealing with a non-state actor
more than mere declarations of war are required for a state to be authorized to
respond with military force under the law of armed conflict (as opposed to
dealing with the threat under domestic law enforcement authorities).
Accordingly, one must look not only at the words of the al Qaeda network, but
at its actions as well. Those actions since 1993 leave no doubt that, not only
has war been declared on the United States by words, but the country has been
the victim of an on-going series of attacks that have cost thousands of American
and foreign national lives.
In 1993, Afghan-trained Arab militants attacked the World Trade Center
in New York, killing six and injuring 1000 people. In addition, al Qaeda has
attacked American embassies (Tanzania and Kenya in 1998), warships (USS
THE SULLIVANS and USS COLE in 2000); financial centers (the World
Trade Center in 2001), military headquarters (the Pentagon in 2001), and has
attempted to decapitate the government (by the failed attacks on the White
House and the Capitol in 2001).' Almost 3000 people from over fifty nations
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 59 (2005) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].
3. Id. at 47.
4. Stephen Gale, Terrorism 2005: Overcoming the Failure of Imagination, THE FOREIGN POLICY
INSTITUTE, Aug. 16, 2005.
5. Id.
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died in the attacks of September 1 th-more than were killed in the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor on seven December 1941. There is some evidence al
Qaeda was involved in or inspired the attacks on the Saudi National Guard
facility in Riyadh in 1995, killing five Americans, and in the attack on Khobar
Towers in 1996 that killed nineteen Americans and wounded 372.6 Al Qaeda
is a multi-national enterprise with operations in sixty countries.7 In light of this
continuing series of attacks, the letter seized in Iraq from Ayman al-Zawahiri
to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, reiterates the strategic nature of the terrorists'
campaign and reminds the world that this armed conflict is continuous and on-
going.8
Misconstruing the scale of terrorism is dangerous and has cost the United
States dearly. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that "an unfortunate
consequence" of the superb criminal investigative and prosecutorial efforts in
the aftermath of the first World Trade Center bombing, "was that it created an
impression that the law enforcement system was well-equipped to cope with
terrorism." 9
One of the major debates in the post-United Nations Charter world has
been what constitutes an "armed attack"-because under the United Nations
Charter, the question is not whether war has been declared, but whether the
nation has been subject to an armed attack that entitles a response with armed
force in self-defense. In some situations, the answer to that question has not
been clear-cut-as was the case with the Caroline incident during the
Mackenzie Rebellion in Canada in 1839. The diplomatic exchange surrounding
that incident, though it preceded the United Nations Charter, is often cited as
the classic description of an appropriate application of anticipatory self-defense,
in a situation that was not completely clear-cut at the time it occurred.' o
6. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.
7. Jeffrey De Laurentis, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Civil and
Political Rights, Including the Questions of: Disappearances and Summary Executions, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/G/80, Apr. 22, 2003, at 4 [hereinafter Civil and Political Rights].
8. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl and Thorn Shanker, Al Qaeda Tells Ally In Iraq To Strive For Global
Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,2005; Susan B. Glasser and Walter Pincus, Seized Letter Outlines Al Qaeda Goals
in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2005, p. 13.
9. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See also Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, at 3 ("Al
Qaida and related terrorist networks are at war against the United States. They have trained, equipped, and
supported armed forces and have planned and executed attacks around the world against the United States
on a scale that far exceeds criminal activity.")
10. To prevent American sympathizers from using the steamboat Caroline to transport men and
materiel to the Canadian insurgents, British forces boarded the vessel, set it afire, and sent it over Niagara
Falls, killing and injuring several American citizens in the process. When the United States protested the
violation of its sovereignty, the British Government invoked the right of self-defense. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster, in a series of diplomatic notes during 1841-1842, maintained that for the claim of self-
defense to be valid, Great Britain was required to show "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming,
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But if the United States was unsure prior to September 1 Ith, 2001 whether
it had been the victim of an armed attack, there was absolutely no doubt after
that date. NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the
Organization of American States invoked the equivalent provision, Article 3(1),
of the Rio Treaty, providing that an armed attack against one or more of the
parties shall be considered an attack against them all." United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1368 invoked the inherent right of self-defense. 2 And
President Bush decided that it was time to break with the practice of treating
terrorism as exclusively a criminal offense, and that the United States would
respond with its armed forces and with every instrument of United States
national power.'3 Recall that President Clinton also took military action against
al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and a chemical facility in Sudan in
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, &
SELF-DEFENSE 218-19 (2003). Though the Caroline incident stands for the proposition that the right of
anticipatory self-defense has long been recognized as an inherent right, the particular articulation of the
standard (instant, overwhelming, no choice, no moment) has been criticized as too restrictive. Id.
11. NATO invoked Article 5 on September 12, 2001 but only provisionally, pending verification
that the attacks had been directed from abroad. U.S. Ambassador Frank Taylor briefed the North Atlantic
Council on October 2 on the results of investigations into the attacks. As a result of that information, the
Council determined that the attacks had been carried out by the world-wide terrorist network of al Qaeda,
headed by Osama bin Laden and protected by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. NA TO Update: Invocation
of Article 5 Confirmed-Oct. 2, 2001, available at www.nato.intldocu/updatel200l; Convocation of the
Twenty-Third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/SerG, CP/RES. 796(1293/01),
Sept. 19,2001; Convocation of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
to Serve as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
OEA/Ser G, CP/RES. 797 (1293/01), Sept. 19, 2001.
12. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/508/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). It could be argued that the
resolution's recognition of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" proves that the Security
Council recognizes the war on terrorism as an international armed conflict. This author does not find that
analysis dispositive.
13. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, Remarks to the Policy Union, University
of Chicago (Apr. 14, 2004), available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040414-0261.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2006) ("The President's most basic decision after 9/11 was how to think about the attack.
Keep in mind that for years Americans were hit by terrorists. There were hijackings, murders and bombings.
In the 1990s, Americans died and were injured in the first World Trade Center bombing, the bombing of
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the destruction of our East Africa embassies and the bombing of the USS
Cole in Yemen. The U.S. Government's response in those cases was to use the FBI to investigate. Our
government was looking for individuals to arrest, extradite and prosecute in criminal courts. President Bush
broke with that practice--and with that frame of mind-when he decided that 9/11 meant that we are at war.
He decided that the US would respond not with the FBI and U.S. attorneys, but with our armed forces and
every instrument of U.S. national power.").
1998,"4 though he did not launch an all-out war against terrorism as did
President Bush.
Traditionally, international law was concerned primarily with relations
between states. 5 A review of the history of conflict during the twentieth
century, however, reveals that states, the entities that create international law,
have adopted a decidedly more flexible stance. Some rules governing inter-
national armed conflicts have been extended to non-international conflicts-as
in Additional Protocol H to the Geneva Conventions. 16 And it has become more
and more difficult to distinguish international armed conflicts, internal armed
conflicts and acts of violence committed by private individuals or groups. 17 It
is those latter acts of violence that are generally considered to be subject to
national laws or specific treaties governing the specified conduct, like
terrorism. But that distinction is based on the assumption that the acts of
violence are, as Article 2(2) of Additional Protocol H provides: "situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence and other acts of a similar nature."' 8 Since September 11th, 2001,
there have been further brutal terrorist attacks in Bali (twice), Madrid, London,
and Jordan. It is quite clear that the conflict with al Qaeda is not an internal
disturbance, nor is it isolated or sporadic. As the Department of State advised
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, "To conclude otherwise is
14. On August 21, 1998, President Clinton informed Congressional leaders that he had ordered
attacks on facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan connected with Osama bin Laden. The attacks were launched
in exercise of the inherent right of self-defense as a "necessary and proportionate response to the imminent
threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities," after receiving "convincing
information from a variety of reliable sources" that the bin Laden organization was responsible for the August
7, 1998 attacks on United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, Tanzania that killed over
250 people. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan, Aug. 21, 1998, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES-WILLIAM J. CLINTON, BOOK I 1464 (2000).
15. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927, P.C.I.J. (Set. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7)
("International law governs relations between independent states.")
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), and Protocol;24005;24005 Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I &;24040;24040
11, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (Protocol 1), 1442 (Protocol I) (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol L1].
17. See, e.g., International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. rT-
94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995, 1 97.
18. Additional Protocol IL supra note 16, art. 2(2). For more information on the development of
international law as it relates to non-international armed conflict, see L.C. GREEN, THECONTEMPORARY LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT 54-57 (2000); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 18, U 96-127.
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to permit an armed group with strategic designs to wage war unlawfully against
a sovereign state while precluding that state from defending itself.' 9
One of the concerns raised by some about the use of the "war" construct
is that it purportedly permits killing suspected terrorists without warning and
detaining suspected terrorists without end. That characterization is only half
correct. Certainly the law of armed conflict does not require that notice be
given to an enemy combatant before he is attacked. Concerning detention,
however, detention is lawful only until the end of hostilities, not until the end
of all time. The war on terrorism is no different than any other war in that its
end cannot be predicted with any certainty. It is unlikely that the prisoners of
war in detention on both sides in 1942, 1943 and 1944-when things were
looking dark for the Allies - had any hopes of being repatriated by 1945, as
ultimately occurred.
Department of State Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger, I1, recently spoke
to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy.2" He
emphasized there that the nation is in a war in every sense, citing the statements
of one of the July 2005 London bombers-that "we are at war and I am a
soldier in that war.' 2 ' The one very critical distinction is that al Qaeda is not
a nation-state and the terrorists do not form the military forces of a nation-state
that is a party to the Geneva Conventions. But that distinction makes all the
difference. In accordance with common Article 2, the Geneva Conventions
apply to armed conflicts which arise between two or more parties to the
Conventions and to the occupation of the territory of a party to the Conventions.
Further, non-party powers engaged in an armed conflict may agree to accept
and apply the provisions of the Conventions.22  Assuming al Qaeda is a
competent "power" to agree to accept and apply the Conventions, it has not
19. Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, at 4. See also Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat?
Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 32-33 (".. . the
worldwide conflict between Al-Qaeda and the United States... would seem to fit the far-reaching definition
of armed conflict given by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia... provided that the word
'protracted' includes a conflict that is both spatially dispersed and temporally discontinuous...").
20. U.S. Dept. of State Legal Advisor, John B. Bellinger, Ill, Remarks to the International Institute
of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy (Sept. 9, 2005) (on file with author).
21. London Bomber Video Aired on T.V., BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/uk/4206708.stm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
22. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86 [hereinafter Geneva 11]; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter
Geneva 111]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [hereinafter Geneva IV] [collectively Common Article 2 to the
Geneva Conventions].
done so. Because of this expectation of reciprocal obligations and benefits, the
Conventions create an incentive to states parties to follow the rules. Providing
the benefits of the Conventions to those who violate every tenet of the law of
armed conflict simply undermines the Conventions and provides a disincentive
to abide by them.
Further, it is an affront to the men and women of the armed forces of all
nations who do comply with the laws of war to treat unlawful combatants as if
they are covered by the Geneva Conventions, particularly when such
combatants are grossly in violation of the laws of war and the principles of
international law that underlie those laws and customs.
This approach is consistent with long-standing practice dating centuries
before the Geneva Conventions came into effect. Both ancient Greece and
Rome actually followed basic rules and principles of war. But tellingly, those
rules and principles were applicable only to "civilized sovereign states properly
organized, and enjoying a regular constitution... governed with a view to the
general good, by a properly constructed system of law.... Hence barbarians,
savage tribes, bands of robbers and pirates and the like were debarred from the
benefits and relaxations established by international law and custom . . .
particularly with respect to the laws of war. 23
Likewise, in the Middle Ages, international law scholars opined that "the
laws of war are not observed toward one who does not observe them."'24 During
the American Civil War, the Code written by Dr. Francis Lieber and
promulgated by President Lincoln as General Orders 100 contained the
following provision:
Men... who commit hostilities ... without commission, without
being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without
sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting
returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assump-
tion of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the
character and appearance of soldiers-such men... are not entitled
to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as
highway robbers or pirates.25
23. Leslie Green, What Is-Why Is There-the Law of War? in NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW STUDIES VOL. 71, 141, 149-150 (1998) (quoting 2 PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 195,207-12,221-23 (1911).
24. Id., at 155 (quoting GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI lib. I, cap. I[, VI, XXIII, at 142-4, 159, 272
(1612) (Carnegie trans., 1933).
25. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Prepared by Francis
Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, 24 April 1863), art. 82,
reprinted in THELAWSOF ARMED CONFLICTS 3, 13 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Instructions for the Government of Armies].
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As to the concept of "detention without end," the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg made clear that since the Eighteenth Century captivity
during time of war "is neither revenge nor punishment, but rather is solely
protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war
from further participation in the war.
26
As John Bellinger so aptly asked the San Remo audience, "What would
you have us do? Let them go?" The fact is that the United States has detained
and screened over 83,000 individuals in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The
vast majority are freed shortly after initial questioning.27 There remain about
14,500 still in custody, primarily in Iraq, consistent with the Fourth Geneva
Convention provisions concerning security detainees.28 Less than 700
individuals have been transferred to and detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The government has already released 245 Guantanamo detainees to twelve
countries-and, unfortunately, the government has been wrong about ten
percent of the time.29 It hardly seems to be in the interests of humanity at large
to release individuals who intend to return immediately to the fight and kill
more innocent men, women and children.
It has also been asserted that the detainees are held "incommunicado."
That statement is simply incorrect. Over 14,000 pieces of mail were processed
for the detainees in mid-2005. The International Committee of the Red Cross
has access to the detainees, over 1000 journalists have visited, over 100
Congressional staff members and over forty members of Congress have
observed the Guantanamo operations3 ° Further, there are two processes in
place to review every detainee's case to determine if there is a continued need
to detain him.3'
26. Green, supra note 23, at 167 (quoting The Nuremberg Judgment, 1945, HMSO, Cmd. 6964,
65, 48 (1946)).
27. U.S. Has Held 83,000 In War On Terror, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 17, 2005.
28. Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 5, 27, 41-43.
29. Bellinger, supra note 20. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Asst. Sec'y of Defense
(Public Affairs), News Transcript-Defense Department Special Briefing on Administrative Review Boards
for Detainees at Guantanomo Bay, Cuba, July 8, 2005, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005 (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). Official Department of Defense
sources report that the Department has detained and screened over 70,000 individuals. Id. Only a very small
percentage, about 700 total, were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id. About 234 of those have been
released. Id. There is evidence that perhaps a dozen or so have returned to the battlefield and continue to
wage terrorism against the United States. Id.
30. Bellinger, supra note 20.
31. The Department of Defense has established two processes to review the case of each detainee.
As of September, 2005, all detainees had been reviewed by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to determine
whether they continue to meet the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant. Over 160 detainees had
been reviewed by an Administrative Review Board, which determines whether the detainee continues to pose
One also hears the argument that the detainees should be given access to
the United States federal court system. Yet it defies logic to give to these
detainees-whose goal is to kill innocent men, women and children in
contravention of all the most basic values of human civilization-greater rights
than are afforded by the law of armed conflict to legitimate combatants who
become enemy prisoners of war. Even some critics recognize that would be "a
perverse legal result.
32
The United States has long been the leader in humane treatment of
detainees, reaching back to the aforementioned Lieber Code,33 which became
the forerunner of the Hague Conventions on Land Warfare. Though they are
not entitled to prisoner of war, or greater, benefits, the detainees held by United
States armed forces are being treated humanely and "to the extent appropriate
and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the
principles of the Geneva conventions. 34 Despite the shrill cries of torture and
abuse, the detainees are afforded, in practice, in this author's opinion,
essentially the basic protections found in common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions (though the official position of the United States government does
not invite comparisons to common Article 3). They are given three meals a day
that meet Muslim dietary laws, state-of-the-art medical care, the opportunity to
worship, clothing, shoes, shelter, soap and toilet articles and much more.35
Alleged abuses or mistreatment of detainees are investigated and appropriate
action is taken against the offenders.36
Certainly in the aftermath of September 11 th, in the Pentagon and the
White House and the Department of State, there were debates whether the "War
a threat to the United States or its allies. Each detainee's case is to be reviewed annually by an Administrative
Review Board. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA,
http://www.defenselink.milnews/detainees.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) (providing additional
information on processes).
32. Berman, supra note 19, at 57 ("It would seem to be a perverse legal result if those who engaged
in combat without complying with the relevant international rules were entitled to criminal trials, with their
requirements of proof of individual acts, the presumption of innocence, and so on-before being detained
for mere participation in hostilities, while their more scrupulous fellow combatants were consigned to POW
camps without such requirements.").
33. Instructions for the Government of Armies, supra note 25.
34. THE WHITE HOUSE, FAcT SHEET-STATUS OF DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO (Feb. 7, 2002,)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2002/20020207 (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
35. Id.
36. As of February 2006, over 25 officers and enlisted personnel had been held accountable for the
abuses at Abu Ghraib. One individual was sentenced to ten years in prison, another to eight years and another
to three. In all, more than 100 individuals have been held accountable for alleged detainee abuse through
court-martials, non-judicial punishments, reprimands and/or separation from the service. U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, U.S. HAS PROSECUTED ABUSES SHOWN IN NEWLY PUBLISHED PHOTOS, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2006/Feb/17-831358.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
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on Terror" was the most appropriate way to label this particular armed conflict.
One concern by those who recommended a different label was, no doubt, that
use of the word "war" implies the military has the major, primary role. That is
certainly one aspect of the war on terror that is misunderstood-it requires not
just a military response, but a response by all facets of the United States and
coalition governments-diplomatic, economic, law enforcement as well as
military. This requirement for interagency and multinational cooperation in this
war is a major theme of several significant policy documents that have been
promulgated since September 11 th, 2001-The National Security Strategy,37 the
National Defense Strategy,38 the National Military Strategy,39 and the National
Strategy for Maritime Security.'
Domestically, the concept of a "war" on terror raises additional issues.
There is no clear agreement between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Homeland Security on where to draw the line between homeland
defense (the responsibility of the Department of Defense) and homeland
security (the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security).
Additionally, the government is working to define the proper role of the
military in homeland security-will the military always have a supporting role
to civil authorities, or could it conceivably take a lead role in major incidents
that overwhelm the capabilities of the civilian first-responders?
Admiral Timothy J. Keating, the Commander of United States Northern
Command, has prepared war plans to guard against and respond to terrorist
attacks in the United States, including multiple simultaneous attacks. Admiral
Keating says the Department of Defense is "best positioned" of the eight
Federal agencies that could be involved, to take the lead. Though touted as the
"first ever" such war plans, that represent a "historic shift" for the Pentagon,4 1
as recently as June 2005 the Pentagon's official position was that domestic
security is primarily a law enforcement function.42
37. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
38. U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2005), available at http://www.defenselink.nil/news/Mar2OO5/d20050318nds1 .pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2006).
39. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA-A STRATEGY FOR TODAY; A VISION FOR TOMORROW (2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2OO5/d2OO503l8nms.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
40. U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY & U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
MARTIME SECURITY (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2006).
41. Bradley Graham, War Plans Drafted to Counter Terror Attacks in U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 8,
2005, p. A01.
42. Id. ("he Pentagon's new homeland defense strategy, issued in June, emphasized in boldface
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff clearly agrees. The day
after the report was released on Northern Command's war plans, Secretary
Chertoff noted that his office, not the Pentagon, would be in charge if the
military is deployed inside the United States to respond to a terrorist attack.
"The Department of Homeland Security has the responsibility under the
President's directives to coordinate the entirety of the response to a terrorist act
here in the United States," Chertoff said.43
This recent reporting simply reflects the very complex issues that are
related to terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The issues don't turn simply on
how the struggle is characterized. Just because the military has the people, the
equipment, the plan or even the authority does not mean that the military is
necessarily the first choice responder. Domestically, it is not. Overseas, it
depends on the situation. In both cases, though, a cooperative inter-agency
approach to the issues is required-law enforcement, economic, diplomatic-
also seeking support from coalition partners and allies around the world.
Considering the United States "at war" is one approach that assists in
keeping the proper perspective on the scope of the problem and ensuring
options that are available and may be the most appropriate in a given situation
are not unnecessarily precluded. In every sense of the word, including under
the United Nations Charter, the United States was attacked by a vicious, global,
networked, organization committed to its ultimate destruction. Criminal law
tools have failed to eliminate the threat. The President is entitled, more
importantly, he has a duty, to respond with all instruments of United States
national power, including the armed forces. To do otherwise could jeopardize
the national security of the United States.
type that 'domestic security is primarily a civilian law enforcement function.' Still, it noted the possibility
that ground troops might be sent into action on U.S. soil to counter security threats and deal with major
emergencies.").
43. Nicole Gaouette, ChertoffDiffers With The Military, L.A. TIM4ES, Aug. 9, 2005.
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The starting point of human rights law is the right of the individual,
including the right not to be arbitrarily killed. The international law
of armed conflict, which is very much older in its origins than human
rights law, starts from totally different premises. The soldier has the
right to kill another soldier.'
Frangoise Hampson's observation is a good place to begin a discussion of
the "war on terror" proclaimed by President George H. Bush within hours of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. She presents starkly the importance of accurately
classifying situations as war or peace. First, as she notes, human lives depend
on the distinction, but so do liberty, property, and the integrity of the natural
environment. This brief article reviews the reasons why the Bush
Administration declared war after September 11. It considers whether that
declaration and related policies are consistent with international law as to the
meaning of war. The conclusion here is that they are not. The President's "war
on terror" does not meet the legal definition of war. Moreover, to the extent
there is ambiguity, the United States should err on the side pursuing terrorists
within peacetime criminal law, not the law of war. Not only does the criminal
law better protect important human rights and other interests, it avoids elevating
terrorists to the status of combatants in a war with the world's only superpower.
* Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A., Highest Honors
(History), Northwestern University, 1980; M.Sc. (International Relations), London School of Economics,
1981; LL.B., First Class Honors, Cambridge University, 1982; J.D., Columbia University, 1985. This article
is a revised version of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1. Franqoise Hampson, Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law: Two Coins or
Two Sides of the Same Coin?, I BULLETIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS 46,50 (1991), quoted in Nathaniel Berman,
Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 42 COLM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1, 3 (2004).
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE "WAR ON TERROR"
Within hours of the September 11 attacks President Bush declared that the
United States was at war.2 Shortly, thereafter, he said the "war" "will not end
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated."3
Many of us in international law, even those of us who work on the
international legal regulation of the use of force, were slow to take in that the
President meant literally that the United States would act as though it were in
an armed conflict in every part of the globe wherever a terrorist might be found.
This was not the "war on drugs" or "war on poverty", this was "World War mH."
On November 13, 2001, the Administration gave its first public indication
that, indeed, it did consider the U.S. to be in an actual war. Executive Order,
Detention, Treatment, & Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism states that terrorist suspects will be tried before military tribunals and
subjected to military detention, irrespective of whether they are captured in an
armed conflict or not.4 Asked in October 2002 when the Afghan war detainees
at Guantanamo Bay would be released, lawyers for the Administration
answered not until every terrorist in the world has been found, killed or
captured.
About a week later, the world learned how serious the Administration
really was about treating the entire world as a war zone. On November 3, 2002,
agents of the CIA, using an unmanned Predator drone, launched a Hellfire
missile at a vehicle in remote Yemen, killing six men. Yemen recognized no
armed conflict on its territory at the time of the strike, nor was the United States
at war with Yemen. National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice explained,
however, that "We are in a new kind of war. And we've made very clear that
it is important that this new kind of war be fought on different battlefields."5
The Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense for International
Affairs said in the global war on terrorism the U.S. could target Al Qaeda
suspects and kill them without warning wherever they are found. He indicated
2. See George W. Bush, President's September 11, 2001 Address to the Nation on the Terrorist
Attacks, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1301 (Sept. 17, 2001).
3. See George W. Bush, President's September 20, 2001 Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1348 (Sept. 24, 2001).
4. Military Order of Nov. 13,2001, Detention, Treatment, & Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
5. Interview: Tony Snow and Condoleeza Rice (Fox NEWS SUNDAY, Nov. 11, 2002), available
at http://www.foxnews.comlprinter-friendly-story/0,3566,69783,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
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that that included targeting persons on the streets of a peaceful city like
Hamburg, Germany.6
It is clear that the Administration following September 11 wanted the
wartime privileges of killing without warning, detention without trial, and trials
under wartime rather than peacetime rules. It has exercised all of these rights
quite separately from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.7
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A war or armed conflict, however, has two important components: It
consists of two or more organized armed groups engaged in protracted and
intense armed hostilities. In Prosecutor v. Tadid before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal defined "armed
conflict" as existing "whenever there is a resort to armed force between States
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a state."8  The Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions also incorporate concepts of intensity and
organized fighting for a situation to be an "armed conflict." Additional
Protocol 11 applies only to conflicts "more than situations of internal
disturbances and tensions such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of
violence." Even "many isolated incidents, such as border clashes and naval
incidents, are not treated as armed conflicts. It may well be, therefore, that only
when fighting reaches a level of intensity which exceeds that of such isolated
clashes will it be treated as an armed conflict to which the rules of international
humanitarian law apply."9
Nathaniel Berman suggests, however, that a worldwide struggle with Al
Qaeda could meet the definition of armed conflict as long as "protracted" is
deemed to include "a conflict that is both spatially dispersed and temporally
discontinuous, waxing and waning by fits and starts for over ten years-and
provided that such a discontinuous conflict is not disqualified as an armed
6. ANTHONY DWORKIN, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, LAW AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
TERRORISM: THE VIEW FROM THE PENTAGON (Dec. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.crimesofwar.orglprintlonnews/pentagon-print.html (Feb. 10, 2006).
7. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the Administration's conduct of its global war
on terror. Suffice it to say that serious charges have been leveled that the Administration has not complied
with the law of war.
8. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. 171T-94--, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
9. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in The HANDBOOK OF
HUMANrrARiAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICr 39,42 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). "International humanitarian law"
or IHL" are the more common terms used for the law that applies to the conduct of hostilities and
occupation.
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conflict by describing it as 'sporadic."" 0 Outside the real wars of Afghanistan
and Iraq, al Qaeda' s actions and our responses have been too sporadic and low-
intensity to qualify as armed conflict.
Some try to argue that a war began on September 11 because the attacks
were an "act of war," or those attacks plus others by Al Qaeda during the
previous ten years. Wars, however, do not begin with an attack. They begin
with a counter-attack. States may have the right to engage in a war of self-
defense following an attack. If they chose not to do so, there is no war. War,
as discussed above requires exchange, intensity and duration.
Kenya, the United Kingdom, Indonesia and Spain have all been attacked
by al Qaeda. They have all responded, but not with a military counter-attack.
They have turned to their law enforcement agencies. None of these countries
declared they were in a war. As the United Kingdom stated when it became a
party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions: ...
'armed conflict' of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which
is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of
terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.""
In addition to the legal definition of war, governments have had strong
policy reasons for avoiding calling terrorism "war." Governments typically
prefer not to acknowledge that a terrorist group can challenge the state at the
level of "war" rather than mere criminality. War connotes a loss of control.
Crime, on the other hand, can remain under control. Every society has crime,
while few are engaged in war and those few are perceived to have failed in
some important sense. Nor do governments normally wish to extend the
privileges of humanitarian law to armed groups. They prefer to apply national
criminal law to their enemies and even to their own armed forces when fighting
enemies within the state. Calling opponents "combatants" and declaring the
struggle against them "war" elevates their status above that of mere criminals.
According to Greenwood,
[i]n the language of international law there is no basis for speaking of
a war on Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group, for such a group
cannot be a belligerent, it is merely a band of criminals, and to treat
it as anything else risks distorting the law while giving that group a
status which to some implies a degree of legitimacy. 12
10. Berman, supra note 1, at 32-33.
11. Reservation by the United Kingdom to art. 1, 14 & art. 96, 1 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(cited in Marco Sassbli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 LAw & INEQ. 195
(2004)).
12. Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism and International Law, 56 CuRR. LEG. PROBS. 505,
529 (2004); see also, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War
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When President Bush declared war on al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, he
elevated Osama bin Laden to his own status, commander-in-chief, in a war with
the world's only superpower.
It was a strategic blunder to have enhanced the status of terrorists through
declaring a war on them. Apparently this was belatedly recognized in the
Pentagon and an attempt was made in the summer of 2005 to back away from
the policy. Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Myers began using the phrase "global struggle against violent extremism" (G-
SAVE) instead of global war on terrorism (GWOT). President Bush, however,
rejected the change, saying the U.S. was in a war." Without a war, there could
be no wartime privileges to kill, detain without trial, and try without peacetime
due process.
Ill. CONCLUSION
International law has a definition of war and it refers to places where
intense, protracted, organized inter-group fighting occurs. It does not refer to
places merely where terrorist suspects are found. Nevertheless, the definition
may not be clear enough or comprehensive enough given the lack of
international protest against the Bush Administration, especially following the
Yemen strike. There appears to be some tolerance for a return to the old days
of formalism when a government's declaration of war was all it took for
international law to recognize a dejure war. Yet, in war human beings and the
natural world lose important protections. Therefore, it is time to restate and
strengthen a narrow definition of war. War should be considered an aberration.
It should only be recognized when compelled by the facts: facts of real fighting
and situations of emergency where normal peacetime law and protections
cannot operate. Doubtful situations should be treated under the law of peace.
The human right to life, to a speedy trial, to peacetime due process, and the duty
to protect the environment should be respected unless the state is compelled by
intense and protracted armed hostilities from doing so.
on Terrorism, 43 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (2005).
13. Ronald Brownstein & Mark Mazzetti, Dissonance on Messagefor Bush, Pentagon, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2005. In early 2006, Pentagon officials from "GWOT" to the "Long War." See, e.g., Vicky O'Hara,
U.S. Government Plans for "The Long War," NPR ONLINE, Feb. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.npr.orgltemplateslstory/story.php?storyld=522771 1 (last visited Feb. 23,2006); Patrick Walters,
It's the New Cold War, and It May Go On Even Longer, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 11, 2006, at 19.
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My role in this symposium is to analyze the concept of "war" as it has
evolved in the American legal system. The idea that the "Global War on
Terrorism" (GWOT) is a war in the historic sense has been effectively used to
mobilize support for the administration's actions in the struggle against
terrorism, including electronic surveillance, protracted detentions, coercive
interrogations, military commissions and the like. How a policy issue is
"framed" has a great deal of bearing on its acceptance by insiders and by the
public.' We note how the political support for the abolition of a certain tax
gained power when it was re-characterized as "death tax" rather than an "estate
tax" or an "unearned receipts tax." In much the same way, framing GWOT as
a war has changed the political dynamics.
I. THE EMOTIVE MEANING OF "WAR"
War has a powerful emotional content. It draws upon a long and complex
history. Those of us who are of a certain age still think of a war according to
standards set in 1941 to 1945. Those of us who were not old enough to be in
the services still vibrated with the sacrifices of those who were. They were
linked to us by ties of family and friendship, a far cry from the small
professional military we have known for the last three decades.
Sacrifices were imposed upon all of us. When we set out to fight in Iraq
I asked my colleagues whether I was right in thinking that this was the first
"war" accompanied by a major tax cut. The response was that I had gotten it
half right, that at the start of previous wars there had been a tax increase,
namely an excess profits tax. Teenagers were mobilized to pick fruit in the
absence of drafted farmers. Civilians manned observation posts to track aircraft
that might just possibly be Condor bombers on Hitlerite missions. We were
* Bemis Professor of International Law, Harvard Law School, Emeritus, 2005; L.L.B., Harvard
Law School, 1951; A.B., Harvard College, 1948. This article is a revised version of oral remarks presented
at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1. GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE
DEBATE-THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004).
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pressed to buy war bonds to prevent inflation. Our sugar, gas, meat and so forth
were rationed. Cigarettes and coffee were scarce on the home front.
Less impressive wars followed-Korea and Vietnam. The armed forces
were still connected to the rest of America by ties of kinship that made civilians
follow events with close attention; it was remarkable how the tensions over the
war in Vietnam dropped away when changes in draft procedures immunized so
many young Americans from liability to service. GWOT came upon us
differently. The fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq has been carried on by profes-
sionals quite removed from most individuals. The war seemed a small overseas
incident that we could watch as a spectator sport. The movie "Fahrenheit 911"
showed the amazement and disdain displayed by Congressional personnel when
offered recruiting literature. Instead of being asked to sacrifice we were urged
to spend and to travel so as to use the money spared for us by the tax cuts.
From a psychological point of view GWOT does not qualify as a war in the
traditional sense, even though some Americans are in peril overseas.
II. THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF WAR
We turn now to the legal concept of war. One starts with the Constitution
that in Article I gives to Congress the power to declare war. This can be argued
to be an exclusive grant of the power to start wars. That would parallel the
argument my colleague Professor Laurence Tribe has made that the
constitutional grant of the treaty power to the President and Senate is the
exclusive mode of making international agreements.2 But the exclusiveness of
the power to declare war was jettisoned early in our history. In 1800 in Bas v
Tingy, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the maritime combat with
France amounted to a war so that rules relating to vessels retaken from "the
enemy" would apply.3 Congress had not declared war. Nonetheless, Justice
Washington found that "hostilities may subsist between two nations more
confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons and things
and this is more properly termed imperfect war... It is a war between the two
nations... ."' Justice Paterson in his opinion said "[a]n imperfect war, or a war,
as to certain objects, and to a certain extent, exists between the two nations..
• ."' These early judicial reactions can be said to establish the original intent of
the constitution as to the meaning of "war." In the following two centuries
there have been only a few "perfect" wars-the Mexican war, the Spanish war
and the two world wars. There has been a long list of imperfect wars, most
2. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995).
3. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37 (1800).
4. Id. at 40.
5. Id. at 45.
conspicuously the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts. It is significant that the
Cold War was never treated as a war, even an imperfect one, except during
those two flare ups. It was only an "emergency," one that lasted as a matter of
law from 1950 to 1976.6
The opinions in Bas v. Tingy establishing the "imperfect war" concept
speak of it as a war "between nations." It is that boundary line through which
the GWOT notion breaks. It is true that were brief periods when combat
activities in Afghanistan and Iraq involved fighting with another nation. Both
actions changed in quality when we recognized new governments in Kabul and
Baghdad and began friendly relations with them. But GWOT began earlier and
it has not ended. It is claimed that GWOT nonetheless comes within the scope
of the idea of war. That claim has been widely accepted in public discourse and
in some opinions of the courts, in ways that show that the momentousness of
this boundary-crossing has not been appreciated.7
It is important to remember the consequences of extending war beyond
state-to-state combat. GWOT has no definite beginning. Did it start with the
9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon? Did it start with the
first attack on the World Trade Center? Or with the Khobar Towers attack in
Saudi Arabia? Or even earlier, in the attack on marines in Lebanon? And when
will it end? With the capture of bin Laden? Or of his last adherent? With a
year of no terrorist attacks from any source? What if there are terrorist acts not
executed inside the United States or aimed at it? The Civil War was deemed to
have ended when the regular Confederate armies in the field gave up the fight,
even though those terrorists who called themselves the Ku Klux Klan continued
to kill union soldiers, blacks and white unionists.8
GWOT has no theatre of operations or any other spatial dimensions. Padilla
can be picked up as a "combatant" (another war-linked term) in Chicago or
presumably anywhere else in the United States. With no limits of time or space
GWOT is quite precisely equivalent to the state of affairs George Orwell
warned us about in 1949 in his classic Nineteen Eighty Four: A Novel. There
the people acquiesce in the regime of Big Brother because of the persistence of
intermittent combat that makes them tolerate thought control and other
intrusions on their private life.
6. The emergency that began in 1950 was terminated by the National Emergencies Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
7. A striking example is the application of wartime concepts to the bombing of a chemical factory
in the Sudan that was thought to be an al-Qaeda operation. E1-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United
States, 378 F. 2d 1346, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Some skepticism of the idea that fighting in Afghanistan,
originally a state to state combat, can go on indefinitely being a "war" is expressed in Hamdi. v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 521-22 (2004).
8. See, e.g., The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871).
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H. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR
What are the legal consequences of there being a war? There are quite a
number of them since both the constitution and the statutes confer powers
during wartime that are not available otherwise. Some of those rules seem to
hinge on the presence of a perfect war. For example, there were statutes
authorizing the seizure of industrial property involved in labor disputes that
were available to President Roosevelt during World War II that were regarded
as not available to President Truman during the Korean War. This was one of
the issues in the Steel Seizure case.9 As Justice Frankfurter noted in his opinion,
"In this case, reliance on the powers that flow from declared war has been
commendably disclaimed by the Solicitor General."' There is a statute dating
to 1917 but still on the books that makes it a crime during time of war to send
written messages into or out of the United States except through the postal
service. II This rule is designed to ease the task of censoring such messages. If
it were in force today as a consequence of GWOT there would be many felons
among the readers of this symposium. It would seem clear that such a statute
would be held unconstitutional except in time of war and probably only during
a perfect war. In the classic anti-censorship case, Near v. Minnesota, the Court
was careful to distinguish cases arising "[w]hen a nation is at war."' 12 In
wartime the publication of the sailing dates of troop transports can clearly be
subject to prior restraint. The Court of Military Appeals has said that only in
time of declared war can Congress extend court martial jurisdiction to persons
accompanying the armed forces overseas. 3 The power to order trials by
military commissions would seem to be linked to the presence of a war.14 There
is an important statute relating to enemy aliens which grants powers only in
time of declared war. 5
Certainly GWOT rises to the level of a national emergency and the
presence of an emergency gives the government and the president a great deal
of power. This includes the imposition of sanctions on trading with foreign
9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1950).
10. Id. at 613.
11. 50 U.S.C. App. § 3(c) (2000).
12. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
13. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 163 (1970).
14. The Supreme Court never decided whether military commissions were lawful after the Civil War
had ended because of procedural problems. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). The leading
historian of the Court in that period believes that it would have invalidated the legislation authorizing
commission. See Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, in 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 509 (Paul A. Freund, ed., 1971).
15. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
countries and currency controls. But those powers are not as sweeping as those
available when there is a war in a legal sense.
Acceptance of the idea that GWOT is a war in the full constitutional and
statutory sense is a major threat to civil liberties and democratic institutions.
That is particularly true since the administration and its lawyers are making
sweeping claims about the extent of presidential powers during war.'6 Over the
years, probably decades, in which GWOT will continue, citizens of the United
States may find themselves in a long Orwellian epoch. There are powerful
reasons for rejecting this concept and the consequences that follow from it.
16. Probably the most extravagant of these claims are to be found in JOHN Yoo, THE POWER OF
WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
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U.N. REFORM AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE: INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Ambassador Andrew Jacovides*
It is customary during anniversaries to devote some attention to
introspection and stock taking. Looking back at my own writings on the subject
of U.N. reform (during the fortieth, the fiftieth and now the sixtieth anniversary
in 1985, 1995 and this year), I confirmed my long held conviction that the
United Nations is indispensable and its Charter, in its basic provisions, has
stood the test of time.
All Member States are legally bound by their signature to the United
Nations Charter. If its principles and rules are often disregarded in practice,
this is not the fault of the organization but of those Member States who fail to
honour their solemn obligations. The Charter is based on sound foundations
and has proven sufficiently flexible to allow, through progressive interpretation,
substantial adjustments to meet emerging needs: peacekeeping and the
limitations to domestic jurisdiction or sovereignty, especially in the protection
of human rights, come readily to mind. While there is considerable room for
improvement, restructuring and regeneration, the emphasis should not be on
tinkering with the Charter but on organizational reforms. Even more
importantly, there must be emphasis on implementing, effectively and
consistently, its purposes and principles and more specifically the resolutions
of its principal organs such as the Security Council and the General
Assembly-a sore point, I might add, as a Cypriot who has seen numerous U.N.
resolutions on Cyprus remain unimplemented. Obviously, there is considerable
room for improvement in the Organization itself and in the Secretariat. Much
can be done to eliminate cronyism and deadwood and prevent the erosion of the
concept of the international civil servant who owes primary allegiance to the
Organization. I refrain from going into specifics for this would go far beyond
today's topic and the time available.
Last year and especially this year, on the occasion of the sixtieth
anniversary of the U.N., considerable activity has taken place at the United
Nations itself, at the U.S. Association for the U.N. (USUN), at learned societies
such as the American Society of International Law (ASIL) and such
* Former 3-term elected member of the UN International Law Commission (1981-1996) and
delegate of Cyprus to the Sixth (Legal) Committee (1960-2003). This article is a revised reproduction of oral
remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
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academic/political/diplomatic institutions as the Institute for the Study of
Diplomacy (ISD) of Georgetown University, under the generic rubric of "UN
Reform." A major study was also commissioned by the U.S. Congress on
"American Interests and U.N. Reform" (issued on June 2, 2005 under the names
of Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell) which makes several sound proposals.'
A major contribution was made by a High-Level Panel of sixteen
distinguished panelists-some more distinguished than others-from different
countries proposing 101 recommendations on U.N. reform, including defining
international terrorism, regulating the use of force, restructuring the Security
Council, abolishing the Trusteeship Council, revamping human rights, etc.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in turn, came out with his carefully
considered report "In Larger Freedom" on March 21, 2005, in a significant
effort to effectively respond to the call for adjusting the United Nations to the
21 st century needs, the more so in the wake of the debate on the legality of the
Iraq war and the "Oil-for-Food" and other controversies currently burdening the
Organization.2
Following considerable diplomatic activity in the past few months and
facing the prospect of collapse because of competing interests and divergent
views, especially on the highly controversial issue of the expansion of the
Security Council, what could be rescued out of these major reform proposals
was what was described as "The 2005 World Summit Outcome" (significantly
not called a "Declaration"), adopted on September 15, 2005 by the High Level
Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly.3 Even though falling far short of the
earlier targets, it was a considerable achievement under the circumstances and
a major effort is under way, spearheaded by President Eliasson, for it to serve
as a stepping stone to meaningful reform in the areas it covers. This document
was also described as "modest" (and, here, may I remind you of Sir Winston
Churchill's saying of his political opponent, "Mr. Attlee is a very modest
person-he has so much to be modest about!" Incidentally, Mr. Attlee was also
described by Churchill as "a sheep in sheep's clothing"!). However, when it
comes to references to international law and the rule of law the Outcome
1. See generally UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, AMERICAN INTERESTS & U.N. REFORM:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS (2005), available at
http://www.usip.org/un/report/usip-un-report.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
2. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General-In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights For All, U.N. Doc. A159/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005, available at
http://daccessdds.un.orgtdoc/UNDOC/GEN/N5/27078/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Mar.
8, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
3. U.N. General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: Draft Resolution Referred to the High-
Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly by the General Assembly at its Fifty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/60/L.1, available at http://www.unis.unvienna.orglpdf/A60L.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006)
[hereinafter Outcome].
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document is not so modest, with a multitude of such references in several parts
of the text:
[W]e emphasize the obligations of States to settle their disputes in
accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, including, when
appropriate, by the use of the International Court of Justice. All
States should act in accordance with the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Amongst States in accordance with the Charter.4
This is an important reminder that the contents of General Assembly
Resolution 2625 XXV (1970)-in the adoption of which I played a very modest
role-are still valid and relevant in 2005 as they were thirty-five years ago.'
More specifically and relevantly regarding today's topic, in Paragraph 134
of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, under the rubric "Rule of Law," it is
stated that
Recognizing the need for universal adherence to and implementation
of the rule of law at both the national and the international levels, we
... Recognize the important role of the International Court of Justice,
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, in adjudicating
disputes among States, and the value of its work, call upon States that
have not yet done so to consider accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court in accordance with its Statute and consider means of
strengthening the Court's work, including by supporting the
Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of
Disputes through the International Court of Justice on a voluntary
basis.
When compared to the paper adopted, after much activity and debate but
also much fanfare, by the High-Level Panel which, inexplicably and somewhat
paradoxically, had nothing to say about the International Court of Justice while
dealing with all five of the other principal organs of the United Nations
(Security Council, General Assembly, Economic & Social Council, Trusteeship
Council, Secretariat), this text is substantial.
However, when compared to the equivalent paragraph 139 of the Secretary
General's Report "In Larger Freedom" of March 21, 2005 (inserted after
considerable efforts by the Court itself, U.N. Secretariat and others concerned
4. Id. 173.
5. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/ResI2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970), available at
http://domino.un.org/pdfs/ARES2625XXV.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
6. Outcome, supra note 3, 134.
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by the evident lacuna in the High-Level Panel's text .... ) it is less far reaching.
Paragraph 139 of the Secretary General's report reads as follows:
The International Court of Justice lies at the centre of the international
system for adjudicating disputes among States. In recent years, the
Court's docket has grown significantly and a number of disputes have
been settled but resources remain scarce. There is a need to consider
means to strengthen the work of the Court. I urge those States that
have not yet done so to consider recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court-generally, if possible or, failing that, at
least in specific situations. I also urge all States to bear in mind, and
make use of, the Court's advisory powers. Measures should also be
taken, with the cooperation of litigating States, to improve the Court's
working methods and reduce the length of its proceedings.7
When comparing the two texts, it should be noted that the World Summit
Outcome document specifically makes reference to the Secretary-General's
Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the
International Court of Justice (a positive element generally and, I imagine,
particularly welcome by the distinguished lawyers who habitually practice
before the I.C.J., sometimes irreverently referred to as "the usual suspects"!).
But, in other respects, it is less precise and specific than the equivalent
paragraph 139 of the Secretary-General's report. Most notably, there is no
reference to the urging by the Secretary-General of "all parties to bear in mind,
and make greater use of, the Court's advisory powers." 8
I recall that in a well thought out statement before the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly, on November 5, 2004, the President of the I.C.J,
Judge Shi (following earlier suggestions to the same effect by, for instance,
Judge Sehwebel when President of the I.C.J) made some significant suggestions
on the underutilization by States of the ICJ advisory jurisdiction and its
potential for expansion. He stated that: ".... the advisory procedure provides
the Court with a very real way of participating and contributing to the overall
objectives of the United Nations. In addition to offering legal guidance to the
requesting bodies, it can play a role in international dispute resolution."9 He
also stated that: "the advisory procedure of the Court can also play an 'indirect'
7. In larger Freedom, supra note 2, 1 139.
8. Id.
9. H.E. Judge Shi Jiuyong (President to the International Court of Justice), Speech to the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Nov. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident-Shi-Speeches-SixthCommittee
20041105.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
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part in preventing disputes and conflicts from developing, by clarifying the
legal parameters within which a problem may be resolved."
Clarifying authoritatively by the I.C.J. of the legal aspects of pending
international political disputes can go a long way towards lastingly resolving
such disputes in a way consistent with the applicable rules of international law.
For instance, in my earlier official capacity-and in the absence of a practical
possibility for resorting to contentious proceedings-I have for many years
advocated resort to the International Court of Justice, through a decision of the
General Assembly or of the Security Council, for an Advisory Opinion
clarifying the applicable rules of international law on several aspects of the
Cyprus situation, such as the unilateral forcible intervention under Art. IV of
the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; the illegality of the 1983 UDI; the illegality of
the establishment of settlers under the 1949 4th Geneva Convention and the
1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court; the applicable rules of State
responsibility as, for instance, were applied on Iraq-Kuwait under S.C. Res.
687; violations of human rights etc. If this had been done, the contents of the
recent U.N. (Annan V) plan would, I believe, have been drastically different
and, quite possibly, it might not have been rejected, thereby becoming defunct
and causing a backsliding of the process for a just solution to this long pending
but solvable international problem.
I strongly feel that, in a comprehensive plan for a reformed and more
effective United Nations, there exists ample room for such proposals for the
fuller utilization of the International Court of Justice in general and of its
advisory jurisdiction in particular. The recent Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, July 9, 2004, furnishes a concrete such example.'
In the same lecture Judge Shi, in a commendable attempt to stimulate
debate among policymakers, cited a number of other possibilities. One is to
broaden the field of application of the Court's advisory jurisdiction to
intergovernmental organizations, perhaps through appropriate resolutions of the
General Assembly or the Security Council. Another is to empower the
Secretary-General on his own initiative to request advisory opinions, as already
proposed by Mr. Boutros-Ghali in 1992 in his Agenda for Peace and by Mr.
Kofi Annan in 2001." The issue was also raised in 1998 in the Charter
10. Advisory Opinion No. 131, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwp-advisory-opinion/imwp-advisory-opinion_20040709.htmlast visited
Mar. 8, 2006).
11. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General n the Work of the
Organization-Prevention of Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. AI55/985-S/2001/574, available at
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/b5bffcd5b64923958S5256caa006efab6?OpenDocument (last visited Mar.
8, 2006).
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Committee Report (U.N. Doc. A/53/33). A third possibility is to authorize
national supreme courts as well as international courts and tribunals to request
advisory opinions on certain difficult or disputed questions of international law
so as to allow for uniform interpretation for such rules and principles.
One other aspect I would very briefly comment on is the Court's
composition. We have all witnessed the great interest and acrimony over the
expansion of the Security Council in order to meet the realities of power in the
21st century, an exercise the outcome of which is far from certain, and, yet, the
Security Council was already expanded from eleven to fifteen members in the
early sixties. By contrast, (under Art. 3 of its statute) the I.C.J. consists of
fifteen judges in 2005 when the United Nations has 191 Member States, the
same number as it had in 1945 with fifty-one Member States. During the same
period other main organs of the U.N. have been expanded in order to meet
emerging needs of representation. The ECOSOC expanded from eighteen to
fifty-four, the Security Council (as I just said) from eleven to fifteen and now
possibly to twenty-four, and the Secretary-General has acquired one Deputy and
possibly another. The Law of the Sea Tribunal (set up in 1996 under the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, currently some 148 States Parties) consists of
twenty-one Judges. The International Law Commission was twice expanded
from eighteen to twenty-five to the present thirty-four.
I recall that in the U.N. Charter Committee session of 1993, the issue was
raised as something worth thinking about though not by a way of a specific
proposal.
It would seem appropriate to also do the same in the context of U.N.
reform, although I readily concede that, realistically, there is no support for any
such initiative, in the I.C.J itself or politically among Member States and that
different considerations apply to the Court's composition than in the
composition of other bodies. But is this not something to reflect upon and,
perhaps, after proper reflection, to reject it if it is not so warranted and its
minuses outweigh its pluses? It is noteworthy, that in a footnote to his article
in the July 2005 American Journal of International Law (at page 637) on
Security Council Reform, Professor Yehuda Blum writes: "while the question
of the Court's enlargement has not been raised by the [High-Level] panel (or
subsequently), in the long term the Security Council enlargement may
conceivably trigger demands for the Court's expansion as well."' 2
This concludes my contribution on "U.N. Reform and the I.C.J." It is my
hope and expectation that, under the firm and able guidance of the General
Assembly President, Jan Eliasson, sufficient progress will be made, with the
World Summit Outcome 2005 document as a starting point, to meet at least
12. Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposalsfor U.N. Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'LL. 632,649 n.45
(2005).
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some of the expectations of the international community for U.N. reform in
general and more particularly of the International Court of Justice and on the
rule of law, nationally and internationally.
IS INTERNATIONAL LAW A THREAT TO
DEMOCRACY: FRAMING THE QUESTION
Andrew Strauss*
I'm Andrew Strauss and welcome to our panel: "Is International Law a
Threat to Democracy?" We are lucky this afternoon to have with us a very
esteemed and ideologically diverse panel. First I'd like to introduce them and
then give some context to the discussion that will follow.
Our first speaker will be Jeremy Rabkin. He is a professor of government
at Cornell University, and a very prolific author of both popular and academic
works. He is on the Board of Directors of the Center for Individual Rights, the
Board of Academic Advisors of the Harvard Journal of Public Policy and the
Board of Academic Advisors of the American Enterprise Institute. He is also
on the Executive Committee of the International Law Section of the Federalist
Society.
Our next speaker will be Carol Gould. Among our prolific panelists
Professor Gould has written many articles in social and political philosophy,
philosophy of law, feminist theory and applied ethics. She directs the Center
for Global Ethics at George Mason University. She edits the Journal of Social
Philosophy and is the Vice-President and President Elect of the American
Section of the International Society for Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy.
She will be followed by Peter Spiro. Professor Spiro is the Dean and
Virginia Rusk Professor of International Law at the University of Georgia. He
is a former Supreme Court law clerk to Justice Souter. He has also served as
director for democracy on the staff of the National Security Council, as an
attorney in the State Department's Legal Adviser's office and as a resident
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Our final speaker, Richard Falk, is the Albert G. Milbank Professor
Emeritus of International Law at Princeton and currently Visiting Distinguished
Professor of Global and International Studies at the University of California,
Santa Barbara. Richard Falk has been extremely prolific as a scholar and
during his extraordinary career has been at the helm of movements as diverse
as championing the rights of indigenous people to promoting the successful
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; A.B., Princeton University; J.D., New
York University School of Law. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the
International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
from October 20 to 22, 2005.
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campaign that led the International Court of Justice to rule on the legality of
nuclear weapons. Professor Falk serves as Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation's Board of Directors, as honorary Vice President of the American
Society of International Law, and as a member of the editorial board of The
Nation.
Our topic this afternoon is whether the growth of the international legal
system threatens democracy and, if so, what can be done about it. Our speakers
are all public figures and are generally perceived as coming from very different
places on the ideological spectrum. But all have in common a significant
preoccupation in their writings with the extent to which international law is
consistent with democracy.
And, I would add that all of them would see themselves as being promoters
of democratic values. All in their writings profess support for pluralism, human
rights (at least as limited to civil and political rights) and democratic
approaches to decision-making. Where there does appear to be significant
disagreement is over the extent to which international law is, or can become, a
force consistent with democracy. More specifically, from their writings it
would appear our panelists disagree over whether, on the one hand, our
democratic future can be secured by the democratic evolution and
empowerment of the global system. Or whether, on the other hand, democratic
values can be best secured through the maintenance of an international system
which ensures that sovereign states do not lose their prerogative to act as they
choose.
Jeremy Rabkin in his recently published book, Law Without Nations? Why
Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States,1 argues that international
law threatens democracy in at least two ways. First, it runs the risk of replacing
clear, enforceable sovereign authority with ill-defined, unenforceable
international authority. This potential for a new medievalism, Rabkin argues,
could cause a breakdown of the constitutional systems upon which basic rights
are secured.2 Second, he suggests that "increasing disorder.., might not be the
greatest danger of this trend,"3 but the greater danger might lie in the
authoritarian potential for people to begin to follow an international system that
is not backed by a democratic constitutional structure.4
Carol Gould in her Cambridge University Press book published last year,
Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights5 does not necessarily disagree, at
1. JEREMY RABKIN, LAw WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITIrONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES
SOVEREIGN STATES (2005).
2. Id. at 45-70
3. Id. at 69.
4. Id. at 69-70.
5. CAROL GOULD, GLOBALIZING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2004).
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least to the extent to which she identifies certain ways in which the
international system is inconsistent with the promotion of democratic values.6
Gould, unlike Rabkin, however, does not wish to make a case against the
empowerment of the international system. Rather, she focuses her efforts on
exploring the extent to which there are contradictions between the growth of
international law and democracy and human rights.7 It will be interesting to see
whether there is any possibility that she and Jeremy Rabkin can find common
ground on democratic reforms of the international system that might allow for
its increasing growth.
Peter Spiro has contributed to this discussion with a quite distinct third
perspective. In articles such as his 2002, "Accounting for NGOs" in The
Chicago Journal of International Law' he sees the international system, if
enhanced by increasingly empowered NGOs, as becoming more democratic.
And, in articles like his 2003 Stanford Law Review piece "Treaties,
International Law and Constitutional Rights,"9 he argues that human rights can,
at least some times, be best protected when treaty based rights are regarded as
supreme to the Constitution. This is in clear contrast to Jeremy Rabkin, who
he refers to critically as one of the "New Sovereigntists" in his well-known
Foreign Affairs article by the same title.' ° If Spiro and Rabin disagree
fundamentally about whether international law is a bulwark for, rather than
threat to basic democratic rights, what is it about their differing understanding
of the interrelationship between the international and the domestic systems that
causes them to disagree so? And, does Carol Gould, with her concerns about
international law's democratic problems find herself more in line with Spiro or
Rabkin?
Finally, Richard Falk shares concerns with our other speakers about the
international system's democratic deficiencies. But his diagnosis of the
problem includes the threat to global democracy that can come from powerful
sovereign states including, perhaps especially, the world's only super power.
And, in works such as his 1999 book, "Predatory Globalization"" he adds to
our discussion a concern with the implications for global democracy of the
neoliberal global economic system. Finally, Richard Falk and I have in Foreign
6. See, e.g., id. at 190-96.
7. Id.
8. Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161 (2002).
9. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1999
(2003).
10. Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists-American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000.
11. RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION (1999)
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Affairs 2 and elsewhere 3 added another element to the discussion, and that is
whether the concerns about the international systems democratic deficit can be,
at least to some extent, ameliorated by the creation of a popularly elected global
parliament modeled on the European Parliament. What impact do Richard
Falk's contributions have on the thinking of our other panelists?
Well, all of this is certainly enough to keep us occupied for the next hour
and twenty minutes. To encourage maximum interaction I will ask each
panelist to speak first for ten minutes and then to respond to the other panelist
with a shorter five minute presentation. With the remainder of the time we will
bring you, the audience, into the discussion.
One caution before we begin, as I have said, we have an ideologically
diverse panel, and I would ask us all to try to avoid the dysfunctional family at
Thanksgiving dinner scenario where we act out our predefined role in our
political family by pushing the same predictable buttons designed to elicit the
same predictable responses. Our public discourse has gotten rather
uninteresting with liberals and conservatives professing the same scripted
outrage at each other night after night on cable television. Our time here will
be more creatively spent if we can see whether on a topic that has not been
much discussed in forums such as this, it is possible to move the ball forward
by finding common ground, or in case of our inability to do that, to approach
our endeavor in the spirit of inquiry as to why it is we disagree.
12. Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001.
13. See, e.g., Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000); Richard Falk and
Andrew Strauss, Toward A Global Parliament, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 2003.
ON THE UNEASY RELATION BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEMOCRACY
Carol C. Gould
The question we are asked to address is as follows: "Is international law
a threat to democracy?" As a political philosopher, my inclination is to suggest
that the answer requires clarifying at the outset the sense in which we are using
each of the main terms here. Thus, whether international law is or is not a
threat to democracy depends on which aspect of international law is our focus
and whether we are restricting our discussion to international law as it is or as
it might come to be further developed. In like fashion, our judgment on this
issue would vary with how "thin" a notion of democracy we are working with
and in particular, whether we limit our conception to the very partial
democracies characteristic of many "advanced liberal democracies." It
addition, the answer will depend in part on whether we properly distinguish
democracy from sovereignty and whether we are willing to extend our
conception to include transnational democratic arrangements.
International law has been roundly criticized by certain United States
theorists who seek to defend older ideas of state sovereignty, for example,
Jeremy Rabkin.1 Such critiques from the standpoint of sovereignty are
somewhat surprising, however, since international law in its modern forms is
rooted in relations among sovereign nation-states, whether defined by treaties
or by customary rules and practices. But the critics' objection can be seen as
more consistent when we appreciate that their aim is often not to defend
sovereignty per se but rather American sovereignty. Thus when they criticize
the International Criminal Court, for example, or even the various Human
Rights conventions, what such critics are most concerned with is the impact of
these institutions or agreements on the United States. To the degree that this
is the case, they have been characterized as defending what has been called
American exceptionalism to international law.
Alternatively, a claim to the illegitimacy of such law may arise from a
more universalistic and less narrow perspective that locates the problem not
with sovereignty but in a deficit in regard to democracy itself. This standpoint
* Professor of Philosophy and Government; Director, Center for Global Ethics at George Mason
University. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend
2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from Oct. 20 to 22, 2005.
1. See, e.g., Jeremy Rabkin, Human Rights Agenda versus National Sovereignty, in FREEDOM IN
THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES (2000).
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(perhaps involved in the recent French rejection of the European Union
Constitution) objects to the idea that political and legal elites should be able to
draft international laws and agreements that are not fully based on national
democratic decision making. Here, what comes into play is the recognition that
the institutions of global governance, whether the EU or NAFTA or even more
fully multilateral organizations like the WTO or the UN itself, do not have a
sufficient grounding in the democratic decisions of the people affected by their
laws, regulations, or policies. A complication here is introduced by the fact that
the people affected are often situated at some distance and may live in other
nation-states. So this version of the critique may emphasize either the lack of
accountability of these transnational institutions to national democratic decision
making or more fundamentally may stress that the decisions are taken by elites,
unaccountable to the people affected, wherever these people may be located.
Yet another avenue of criticism of international law turns the first
objection on its head and argues that international law may be illegitimate in
certain aspects precisely insofar as it is still based on sovereign nation-states.
This critique has several dimensions: It may point to the fact that such states are
most often not very democratic inasmuch as they have reduced democracy to
periodic elections, themselves sometimes usurped by the power of big money;
or else it may be observed that states include ones that are not democratic at all,
even in this thin, liberal mode. On these grounds it could be concluded that
international law is illegitimate to the degree that it is made by, or seeks to
protect, sovereign nondemocratic states of those sorts. Even apart from this
critique, it is widely agreed that nation-states are no longer as exclusively
dominant as before (including in international law) because of the importance
of cross-border and transnational relations established through globalization,
whether economic, technological, social, cultural, and political. The salience
of these new transnational relationships also contributes to the lack of
effectiveness of some aspects of international law itself. In this sense, it can be
argued that to the degree that international law is tied to state sovereignty, it can
hamper the development of new forms of transnational democracy. Further,
because of its source in nation-states and their interests, international law
currently lacks the means of dealing with crucial issues of global justice that are
posed by the strengthening of economic globalization, led by transnational
corporations, with their important economic and ecological effects.
In order to analyze these complex issues here, it may be helpful to begin
by briefly comparing two different cases (or sorts of cases) of international law.
The first set consists of various decisions under NAFTA regarding toxic waste
dumping. In one, a NAFTA tribunal ruled that the Canadian government owed
up to fifty million dollars in compensation to an Ohio toxic waste disposal
company (S. D. Myers, Inc.). Since Canada bans the export of PCBs, this
company was able to claim that it was denied the right to import hazardous PCB
Gould
waste from Canada. Canada argued that to permit such export would require
it to violate the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, a UN treaty to which it is a Party.2 A
related case was the NAFrA dispute tribunal's finding (arrived at in secret) in
favor of Metalclad Corp., which had sought compensation for not being able to
open a hazardous waste landfill in Mexico near the border because of protests
from the surrounding community members.3 Although both of these cases raise
issues of the overriding of state sovereignty, they speak more strongly to the
capacity of such rulings to overcome regulations that protect health and other
human security factors, with consequences for people's human rights. They
also demonstrate a lack of democratic accountability of these tribunals to the
people affected by their decisions, not only within a given nation-state but
across borders. Instead, the multilateral organizations involved seem to
function here almost exclusively to advance corporate interests, apparently at
the expense of human rights.
We can contrast with these cases the important developments in
international law designed to hold wrongdoers accountable for crimes against
humanity and for war crimes, in the UN tribunals and now the International
Criminal Court. Of great significance too are other efforts to strengthen and
give teeth to protection of human rights across borders and to provide appeals
for the protection of these rights even against the decisions of nation-states in
regard to their own citizens.4 This is most evident in the European
jurisprudence regarding human rights and the two European Courts that serve
to protect these rights regionally. A weaker but not insignificant version of this
is also found in the Interamerican Court of Human Rights. Nonetheless, this
jurisprudence has not gone very far in interpreting the economic and social
rights, or in assuring not only the protection of human rights but also enhancing
people's opportunities to fulfill them. Of course, it is clear that much of this
effort would belong more within the domain of democratic decision-making by
people and legislatures. So, it remains to consider how this sort of democratic
provision of the opportunities for rights fulfillment can be made more effective
and how to conceive the relation of democratic participation to international
law more generally.
2. Press Release, Basel Action Network (BAN), NAFTA Flouts Global Toxic Waste Dumping
Treaty (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/NAFrA-Flouts-Dumping-Treaty.htm
(Feb. 10, 2006).
3. Veena Dubal et al., Why are some Trade Agreements Greener Than Others?, 16 EARTH ISLAND
J. 44 (2002).
4. DAVID HELD, GLOBAL COVENANT: THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE TO THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 119-36 (2004).
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While I can only begin to address the difficult conceptual and practical
issues involved here, I will make a few suggestions, starting from the account
I give of the relation of human rights and democracy in my recent book
Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. Since human rights specify the
basic conditions that everyone needs for their freedom and dignity, we can say
that although these rights are subject to somewhat varying cultural and social
interpretations, they ought to have priority within international law. In addition,
they can rightly constrain democratic decisions that violate them in the same
way that a national constitution, and especially a bill of rights, can serve to
protect important rights of minorities if majorities seek to violate them. 6 For
human rights to be effective in this way, they need further institutionalization
or even constitutionalization at regional levels, and regional courts of human
rights would appear as a positive development in this perspective. One can
speculate that if the EU constitution had remained with a specification and
further institutionalization of rights, it could have gained wider assent.
Needless to say, care must be taken not to overly narrow the scope of national
or local democratic decision through such rights.
But the relation between democracy and human rights is more complex
than this. Thus I argue that impact on the basic human rights of people at a
distance serves as a criterion for giving these people some input into the
decisions of international organizations.7 Without proposing that everyone
ought to have input into every decision that affects them, which would be
impossible, we can say that wider transnational participation and representation
are required given the intensive interrelations and significant human rights
impacts that follow on contemporary forms of globalization. Clearly, this
implies opening up the decisions of organizations like the WTO not only by
making them more transparent, but by enabling participation in them (including
in the epistemic communities so important to their functioning) on the part of
representatives of people affected by their policies. In the absence of new
modes of such participation and representation, NGOs may serve in the near
term to represent those seriously affected. But the NGOs would themselves
have to be sure to operate by principles of democratic accountability to their
members, which some, though not all already do. I also propose that the
transnational organizations (including global corporations as well) should be
required to prepare what I would call "human rights assessments," to consider
and respond to the impact of their rules, policies, and activities on the
opportunities for human rights fulfillment by those affected.
5. CAROL C. GOULD, GLOBALIZING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2004).
6. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999,
1999-2028 (2003).
7. GOULD, supra note 5, at 201-16.
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Beyond this, we can say more generally that international law should
regard itself as the handmaiden of democracy, where by democracy we mean
democratic associations at all levels. This suggests that rules and laws need to
be structured with the principle of subsidiary in view, so that decision-making
can occur at the lowest level relevant, and should also show deference to the
diversity of democratic forms of participation and representation at all levels.
It is likewise important to leave room for some diversity in the cultural and
social interpretations of norms.8 Inclusion of a wider sphere of interpreters,
somewhat similar to what is happening in the sphere of human rights law,
would be important, as would be opportunities for public deliberation about
these norms and laws.
Other forms of transnational representation are also imaginable beyond
simply opening up existing forums to NGOs. There are proposals like those of
Philippe Schmitter for reciprocal representation in legislatures or Michael
Saward's promotion of cross-border referenda or forums.9 Preferably within
the context of regional human rights protections, closer connections between
national legislatures would be possible (including joint legislation by
subcommittees within them), as would the development of democratic decision-
making within new cross-border communities. More generally, the introduction
of such democratic modes of decision making in transnational communities,
whether economic, ecological, or simply communicative, as through the
Internet, should be encouraged and facilitated by law (but only if regulations
and laws are in fact necessary).
Proposals for a more representative global democratic assembly (Held'1 )
or a global parliament (Falk and Strauss') are useful additions to a system
currently limited to representatives of states. But these very large scale
institutions would have a hard time being fully representative on my view, and
would need to avoid replicating the lack of real democratic participation so
evident at national levels. They cannot replace the work of expanding
democratic modes within the variety of associations at lower levels,
increasingly of a transnational sort, and including not only political associations
but economic and social ones as well. 12 Such an expansion of democracy (in
8. See also Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the
Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25 (2003).
9. GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: KEY DEBATES 39-43 (Barry Holden Ed. 2000).
10. HELD, supra note 4, at 110-11.
11. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy
and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 191-220 (2000).
12. See, BALAKRISHNANRAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); CAROL C. GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY:
FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION IN POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 31-90; 247-61 (1988).
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both procedural and more substantive senses) in this wide range of institutional
contexts provides the greatest hope, in my view, for eventually instituting what
has been called international law from below.
POLITICAL CONFLICT AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN VENEZUELA
Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez Herrera*
Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to speak on this important
subject.
First off, let me start by saying that contrary to popular belief, the freedom
of expression and the press are alive and well in Venezuela. The country's
private media-forty-one television stations, more than 400 radio broadcasters,
eight national newspapers, and 200 regional and local newspapers-vibrantly
discuss and report on the issues of the day free from government interference.
Human Rights Watch wrote the following of the Venezuelan media in 2003:
There are few obvious limits on free expression in Venezuela. The
country's print and audiovisual media operate without restrictions.
Most are strongly opposed to President Chdvez and express their
criticism in unequivocal and often strident terms. No journalists are
in prison for exercising their profession, and there have been few
criminal prosecutions or successful civil suits against journalists in
recent years.'
While President Chdvez may not agree with what the media has to say, he
does not question their right to say it, much less use government resources to
punish them for saying it. We do, though, worry about how far a narrowly
controlled media can go in acting against a democratic government.
The case of the media in Venezuela is of particular interest to this
discussion. In few other instances has the media played such an overt political
role, replacing an opposition defeated at the ballot box and paving the way for
what was a brief coup against a democratically elected president. In that
* Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez Herrera earned a degree in Political Science from the School of
Political Studies at Universidad Central de Venezuela; Masters degree in Development Studies from the
University of Sussex in England. Ambassador Herrera is a professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela,
School of Political and Administrative Studies and the Venezueulan representative for the Energy Council
of the United States of America. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the
International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
from October 20-22, 2005.
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN VENEZUELA
2 (2003), available athttp'/www.hrw.org/reports/2003/venezuelalvenezO5O3.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
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instance, privately held Venezuelan newspapers and television stations
knowingly encouraged anti-democratic actions, manipulated information and
events to further their cause, and refused to cover the country's return to
constitutional order. While a far cry from the radio stations that helped provoke
the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, the actions of the Venezuelan media raises
serious questions as to how the power of the press is used, especially in
countries experiencing political turmoil and where the ownership of the media
is highly concentrated in few hands.
Permit me, now to pose another question: What is the proper role of the
state when it is faced with a media whose power is roughly equal to that of the
state, and when that power is used actively to destabilize a democratically
elected government?
Venezuela's experience in this regard is instructive. Large corporate
groups or families own the country's primary newspapers and television
stations, which allow them substantial power in shaping public perception of
events. Marta Colomina, a professor of communications at Catholic University
Andrds Bello and former journalist with a critical opinion on the government
of President Chivez, once said:
Media owners are very aware of their power, and they know how to
use it. In the United States or Europe, there are big corporate media
groups that see themselves as serving the public interest. In
Venezuela, media are in the hands of small groups of owners who
tend to serve their own interests.2
These interests quickly aligned against the government of President
Chdvez in the aftermath of his election in 1998, breaking down the walls that
often separate opinion and commentary from facts and reporting. Andres
Cahiizalez, the head of the Institute for Press and Society in Venezuela, has said
the following of this situation: "But here you had the convergence in the media
of two things: grave journalistic errors-to the extreme of silencing
information on the most important news events-and taking political positions
to the extreme of advocating non-democratic, insurrectional path.",
3
The reality is that this political posturing by the private media led to the coup
against President Chdvez that has come to be known as the world's first "golpe
mediatico," a media coup. Newspapers and television stations encouraged
anxious crowds to march on the presidential palace, where, as they noted, the
2. JON VANDEN HEUVEL & EVERETrE E. DENNIS, CHANGING PATrERNS: LATIN AMERICA'S VrrAL
MEDIA 75 (1995) (quoting Marta Colomina).
3. John Dinges, Soul Search, 4 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (2005) (quoting Andres
Canizalez).
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"final battle" would occur. When unidentified snipers opened fire on
opposition and pro-government protestors, television stations presented images
that gave the impression that government supporters had done the shooting.
After President Chivez was illegally detained and removed from office, the
private media celebrated, with the newspaper El Universal going as far to
loudly proclaim, "Se Acabr!"-"It's Over!" As President Chdvez was
returned to office amidst widespread protests against the emerging dictatorship,
newspapers and television stations remained absolutely silent-news of the
return to constitutional order was only disseminated by CNN, word of mouth
and online journalists
Soon after the coup, The Economist stated the following of the media's
role:
In a desperate bid to hold on to power, the government's media allies
conspired to suppress all news of its difficulties. A regime that had
seized power while waving the flag of press freedom spent its thirty-
six hours in office doing its best to keep the truth from the public."
This media activism goes beyond the coup. For sixty-four days over late
2002 and early 2003, the private media openly supported a general strike that
shut down the country's vital oil industry and cost the nation almost $14 billion
in lost economic activity. They have accused President Chivez of plotting
assassinations and bombings, sponsoring foreign terrorist organizations and
leading anti-democratic movements across the hemisphere, and commanding
an army of clandestine guerilla groups and slum militias. The lack of evidence
rarely detracts from the publication of many of these fabrications, though the
government is often forced to defend against them
As I asked before, "What is a democratically elected state to do when
faced with an assault by a powerful private media?"
Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, both of
which Venezuela is party to, recognize that speech that promotes hatred,
encourages violence, or threatens public order and morals can be regulated by
the state. While Venezuela forbids prior censorship, it does recognize the
importance of being able to regulate speech that, as happened in Venezuela,
may alter the constitutional order or threaten social peace. The bar on this
regulation is set extremely high, and is subject to judicial review.
The actions of the private media in Venezuela test the limits of freedom
of expression and the ethical responsibilities of the press. As was the case with
the radio stations that helped provoke Rwanda' s shocking genocide, the media
4. Coup and Counter-coup, THE ECONOMIST-GLOBAL AGENDA, Apr. 16, 2002.
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in Venezuela has proved that words can have a direct and substantial impact on
democratic institutions and public order. How far do we allow the media to go
in promoting hatred, encouraging violence, or organizing against the
constitutional order? How can we ensure that the media remains responsible,
becomes more democratic, and is removed from the control of the few vested
economic interests? Does Venezuela's experience provide any guidance? Does
Rwanda's? Does the United States', when people like Reverend Pat Robertson
appear on television and call for President Chdvez's assassination?
I leave you with these questions.
Thank you very much.
HATE SPEECH UNDER THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Eduardo Bertoni*
Good morning and thank you for inviting me to participate in this
conference.
Today I would like to address a very important and novel topic in the
Americas-the issue of hate speech. I will first discuss hate speech in general
as it is treated by the American Convention on Human Rights. I will then turn
to some of the lessons that we can take from other legal systems on the topic of
hate speech, given that the Inter-American system has yet to speak in depth on
this issue.
Hate speech can be defined by both its intent and its target. With respect
to intent, hate speech is speech designed to intimidate, oppress or incite hatred
or violence. This speech must also be targeted directly against a person or
group based on characteristics like race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual
orientation, disability or other group characteristic.
Historically, hate speech knows no boundaries of time or place. It has
been used by officials in Nazi Germany, by the Ku Klux Klan in the United
States, and by a full range of actors in Bosnia during the 1990s and during the
1994 Rwandan genocide. But when it is used, hate speech has a common
thread: it is used to harass, persecute and justify the deprivation of human
rights. At its most extreme, hate speech can even be used to rationalize murder,
as the world saw just a few years ago in Rwanda.
In the wake of the German Holocaust, and with the rise of the Internet and
other media that can spread hate speech almost instantaneously, many
governments and intergovernmental bodies have tried to limit the harmful
effects of hate speech. But these efforts naturally collide with the treaties,
constitutions and domestic laws that guarantee the right to freedom of
expression.
In this hemisphere, the American Convention on Human Rights provides
for a broad measure of freedom of expression. Article 13 of the Convention
guarantees the right to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
* Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Inter American Commission on Human Rights,
Organization of American States. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the
International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
from October 20 to 22, 2005.
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kinds" through any medium. Article 13 then protects this freedom by banning
prior censorship and indirect restrictions on speech and by allowing for
subsequent imposition of liability under an extremely limited set of exceptions.
Still, Article 13's broad mantle of freedom of expression is not absolute. Like
many international and regional agreements, the American Convention declares
hate speech to be outside the protections of Article 13 and it requires States
parties to outlaw this form of expression. Paragraph 5 of Article 13 provides
the following:
Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to
any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any
grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national
origin shall be considered offenses punishable by law.2
Hate speech has also been the topic of joint discussions among the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and his counterparts from the United
Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The three rapporteurs, who often meet to discuss freedom of speech issues,
have said that expression inciting or promoting "racial hatred, discrimination,
violence and intolerance" is harmful and they noted that crimes against
humanity are often accompanied or preceded by these forms of expression. The
rapporteurs then stated that laws governing hate speech-given that they
interfere with freedom of expression-should do two things. First, they should
be provided by law. Second, they should "serve a legitimate aim as set out by
international law and be necessary to achieve that aim." Finally, the joint
statement laid out the minimum guidelines for regulations on hate speech.
These guidelines say the following:
1) no one should be penalized for statements which are true;
2) no one should be penalized for the dissemination of hate speech
unless it has been shown that they did so with the intention of inciting
discrimination, hostility or violence;
3) the right of journalists to decide how best to communicate
information and ideas to the public should be respected, particularly
when they are reporting on racism and intolerance;
4) no one should be subject to prior censorship; and
1. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights].
2. Id.
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5) any imposition of sanctions by courts should be in strict
conformity with the principle of proportionality.3
Even though hate speech has been defined in the American Convention,
the Inter-American Court and the Inter-American Commission have yet to
interpret this area of the Convention in depth. It is useful, therefore, to look to
the case law of the United Nations, European Court of Human Rights and other
tribunals. These systems can help to illuminate the interpretation of this right
in the Inter-American system.
Under international law beyond the Inter-American system, freedom of
expression enjoys broad protection, but like in the Americas, it is not an
absolute right. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or
ICCPR, says that freedom of expression "carries with it special duties and
responsibilities."4 These duties and responsibilities are defined to include what
is necessary to respect others' rights or reputation or to protect national
security, morals or public order. The ICCPR also restricts freedom of
expression by prohibiting war propaganda and the advocacy of national, racial
or religious hatred. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has provided further
guidance on the issue of hate speech under the ICCPR in a number of cases,
which I will discuss later.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms also provides for restrictions on freedom of expression.
This Convention says that its freedoms may be subject to the formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as proscribed by law that are necessary,
among other aims, to protect the reputation or rights of others. The European
Convention therefore does not expressly address speech of national, religious
or racial hatred. But the European Court has considered the issue in a series of
cases.
The jurisprudence of the European Union (EU) and the United Nations
(UN), including the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and
the former Yugoslavia, suggest a number of principles on incitement to
discrimination and violence. These principles can serve as guideposts in
determining how far hate speech can be restricted under the American
Convention.
3. Review of Reports, Studies and Other Documentation for the Preparatory Committee and the
World Conference, Contribution of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A.CONF.189/PC.2/24 (Mar. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsfdf/0/d640345f55da5dcl256a5300383afc/$FLE/GOI 1206
L.doc (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
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One of the key principles found in legal systems outside the Americas is
purpose. The ICTR, for example, has found that if the purpose of the speech
is bona fide, it does not constitute incitement. Bona fide purposes can include
the search for historical truth or the dissemination of news and information. To
determine purpose, tribunals have looked to the actual language of the speech
at issue. In one case, the UN Human Rights Committee found that the use of
the words "magic gas chamber" in relation to Nazi Germany suggested the
motivation was racism, not the search for historical truth and thus it was not
protected speech. The European Court has also touched on this area in the
realm of national security. In several cases involving Turkey, the European
Court drew a line between language explaining terrorist activities and language
that promotes terrorist activities.
A second principle of international tribunals is the context of the speech.
The European Court found, for example, that a Turkish mayor's comments
about massacres were hate speech because they were made at a time when
massacres were taking place, and thus were likely to "exacerbate an already
explosive situation."5 The European Court has also looked at whether the
speech is occurring in the realm of political expression or criticism of the
government, since both of these areas enjoy greater protection. By contrast, the
European Court has said that national security issues have a wider "margin of
appreciation" for authorities to restrict freedom of expression.
A third principle that can be taken from international jurisprudence is
causation. International jurisprudence has not traditionally required a direct
link between the expression at issue and the demonstration of a direct effect.
The European Court has found that even if the expression at issue did not cause
particular violence, it could still be considered hate speech. ICTR has
suggested that the question is not the effect, but what the likely impact might
be, because causation may be relatively indirect.
With these three principles in mind, I would like to emphasize a couple of
final points about the use of jurisprudence from outside the Americas in
defining hate speech under the American Convention.
First, it should be noted that there is a discrepancy between the English
and Spanish versions of Article 13(5). In English, the text notes that hate
speech "shall be considered as offenses punishable by law."6 This suggests that
hate speech can only be regulated through subsequent imposition of liability.
In Spanish, meanwhile, the text uses the word "prohibir," meaning that hate
speech is to be prohibited by law, and this suggests that censorship of hate
speech might be possible. A resolution of this issue requires looking to
international law sources for the means of interpretation, and here, the Vienna
5. Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H. R. 2533 (1997).
6. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2.
Bertoni
Convention says that the full text of the article can be used to shed light on the
meaning. If the full text of Article 13 is considered, it seems clear that
paragraph 5 is governed by paragraph 2 and its imposition of subsequent
liability. This view has been further supported by the Inter-American Court,
which has said that censorship is only allowed for the purposes stated in
paragraph 4. Hate speech, therefore, should be regulated like the other areas of
expression in paragraph 2-through subsequent liability. The Inter-American
Court has said that subsequent liability must fulfill four requirements.
1) there must be previously established grounds for liability;
2) there must be express and precise definition of these grounds by
law;
3) third, the ends must be legitimate; and
4) fourth, there has to be a showing that the grounds of liability are
"necessary to ensure" the aforementioned ends.7
Another point I would like to emphasize is that the jurisprudence of the
UN and the EU should not be applied in a way that chips away at the
Convention's core freedoms. In particular, the Inter-American Court has said
that if both the American Convention and another international treaty are
applicable, "the rule most favorable to the individual must prevail."8
Finally, I would like to highlight that Article 13(5) of the American
Convention diverges from the ICCPR on a key point. The text of Article 13(5)
discusses hate speech in relation to incitement of "lawless violence" or "any
other similar action."9 This suggests that the American Convention requires
violence in order for speech to be hateful. The ICCPR and the European
Convention, meanwhile, do not have any such requirement. The ICCPR
outlaws speech inciting "discrimination, hostility or violence," which suggests
it covers a broader range of speech.' ° The European Convention likewise
allows for conditions and restrictions "necessary in a democratic society"" and
then lists a number of ends justifying these limits such as national security and
public safety. It can be concluded then that while the UN or EU jurisprudence
on hate speech can serve as guidance, not every example found by these
systems to be hate speech would qualify as hate speech under Article 13(5) of
7. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism
(Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 (1985), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/serieapdfingseriea_05-ing.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
8. Id.
9. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2.
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, at art.20.
11. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221.
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the American Convention. We must therefore be careful to apply the lessons
of international tribunals only within the narrow limits allowed in this
hemisphere.
In closing, I would like to emphasize again that the Inter-American
Commission and the Inter-American Court have not yet considered the topic of
hate speech, as they have done in the areas of criminal defamation and
censorship. For this reason, the Office of the Special Rapporteur undertook an
extensive study of this topic in other legal systems, and I have summarized
some of this report's conclusions today. For more details on the treatment of
hate speech in other judicial systems, I invite you to consult the 2004 Annual
Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
Thank you very much for your attention. I welcome your questions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most states within the United States do not consider international law in
their legislative process. The Constitution specifically prohibits states from
concluding treaties.' In fact, this power is expressly given to the President.2
Law students reflect upon Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920),
which suggests the treaty power is defined by those with the power and trumps
states' rights.
Such an expansive reading would be antithetical to our system of checks
and balances. It would give the federal government too much power to reach
into areas that have traditionally belonged to states, such as court procedures.
It also ignores states have the Constitutional power to conclude agreements with
* Member, Brown & Welsh, P.C. of Meriden, CT (www.BrownWelsh.com); Chair, Connecticut
Bar Association's Section of International Law. This article is a revised version of oral remarks presented
at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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foreign powers (with the consent of Congress).3 International delegations often
must be implemented locally in numerous ways. As a result of this assumption,
states have not properly considered their obligations to implement treaties (and
there is often more than one way to implement a treaty).
Connecticut has been markedly different from other states. Connecticut
considers the United States' treaty obligations when it enacts legislation.
Legislation which violates the United States' treaty obligations is not only void,
but it may subject the United States to reparations claims by other countries.
While some state legislators may consider the possibility their enactment may
be void, they don't consider the possibility their actions may subject the United
States to a claim for reparations.
On the positive side, Connecticut has enacted a number of statutes which
codify and implement Connecticut's international law obligations. They have
generally been codified in Title 50A in the Connecticut General Statutes.
HI. CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES: TITLE 50A
A. Uniform International Wills Act'
The Uniform International Wills Act (a part of the Uniform Probate Code)
regulates the formalities necessary for executing a valid will. It does not
regulate the effect of a will, nor how a will is interpreted. The formalities
necessary to execute a valid will have traditionally been regulated by states for
hundreds of years.
The act is based upon the National Conference Commissions on Uniform
State Law's interpretation of what is necessary to implement the 1973
UNIDROIT Convention on the Form of an International Will. While the United
States Senate has given its advice and consent for the United States to become
a party, the instrument of ratification (signed by President Reagan) has not yet
been deposited. The instrument of ratification is unlikely to be deposited until
the United States Congress enacts the federal implementing legislation which
would cover the citizens overseas, members of the military and so forth.
In the meantime, the following states have enacted the necessary
implementing legislation: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. This was done even though
the United States is not a party to the convention.
It should be noted Connecticut's legislation did not provide for a will
registry.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§50a-1-10 (2004).
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B. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration5
Arbitration is the most effective way for resolving international
commercial disputes because the United States is not a party to any
international convention on the enforcement ofjudgments. While each country
is generally convinced of the wisdom of its own laws, there is a need for
predictability across countries in enforcing commercial obligations and to avoid
a "race to the courthouse."
The Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC § 1, et seq.) is a rather "bare bones"
piece of legislation. Much of its detail comes from decades of judicial
interpretation. While Americans may be able to find and apply the judicial
interpretations, foreign nationals are concerned because the details are not
codified. Interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act on important points can
differ from circuit to circuit.
Connecticut responded to this by enacting the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act does not
pre-empt this enactment because it mainly supplements the Federal Arbitration
Act. In addition, the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted under the
Constitution's commerce clause. Disputes being arbitrated in the United States
which involve trade solely between other countries do not fall within the
commerce clause, meaning Connecticut has the exclusive legislature
competence to regulate in this area.
The experience in other countries under the Model Law can be used to aid
in its interpretation.
C. Uniform Transboundary Pollution
The American Bar Association and the Canadian Bar Association adopted
a report in 1979 prepared by a joint committee entitled "The Settlement of
International Disputes Between Canada and the United States of America."
Pollution was a major area of concern. Pollution damage pollution does not
respect national boundaries. The primary legal problems are caused by the fact
the polluter is usually outside the jurisdiction where the damages occurs.
Actions for damages under common law concerning land could be brought
only where the land was situated. This means a person whose Connecticut land
suffers pollution damage could sue only in Connecticut. If the polluter was
outside of Connecticut, the Connecticut plaintiff had to rely on the Connecticut
"long arm" statute to obtain jurisdiction over the polluter.
The long arm statute does not provide jurisdiction if the pollution is an
isolated event and the polluter has no other contacts with Connecticut. Under
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§50a-100-137.
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such circumstances, the due process clause of the United States Constitution
may prohibit Connecticut from exercising jurisdiction. If the polluter's home
jurisdiction is common-law based, it may refuse to hear the case because the
land is in Connecticut and the damage was suffered in Connecticut. This means
the victim has no effective forum, which is not a result lawyers should support.
Canadian courts are not required to give full faith and credit to the actions of
Connecticut courts. There is a very good chance that a Connecticut judgment
based on this provision of the long-arm statute would not be honored by
Canadian courts. A Canadian court might require the action to be re-litigated
or refuse to hear the case at all.
A person owning land damaged by pollution may be unable to find any of
the polluter's assets where the land is located. Under present law, any
judgment the injured party obtains in his home state may be unenforceable in
the polluter's state because of jurisdictional problems. The polluter's home
courts might not entertain an action because the harm was not done to land
situated within their state. The end result is that a polluter may act with
impunity and not suffer the consequences of his actions. This result defies
common sense and moral justice. This Act was designed to eliminate this
"Catch 22."
The Act allows a suit to be brought in a reciprocating jurisdiction where
the pollution originates. A "reciprocating jurisdiction" is one that has enacted
the Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act or "provides
substantially equivalent access to its courts and administrative agencies. '"6
Connecticut courts must use their own rules under the Act, excluding choice of
law rules, to determine what constitutes pollution, whether there is a sovereign
immunity defense and most other points.
D. Model Law on Conflicts on Jurisdiction7
This Model Law was drafted by the American Bar Association and is used
to determine which suit should protect when multiple suits are filed on the same
topic.
E. Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act8
Whenever damages occur in a foreign transaction, the damages occur in
a foreign currency. United States courts would not normally issue judgments
denominated in a foreign currency because they didn't have the power.
6. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-351b(b)(1).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§50a-200-03.
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§50a-50-66.
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This subjected plaintiff to unnecessary currency fluctuations. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act to address this problem, which as been
adopted in twenty three states.9 A Connecticut court may now issue ajudgment
denominated in a foreign currency (except for local costs, which are always
denominated and incurred in United States dollars).
To eliminate the currency risk, the conversion is done on the day before
the date the Marshal obtains the funds. This means the plaintiff is more likely
to be made whole.
F. Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act 1
This Uniform Act was also drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It has been enacted in a number of
states. Connecticut did not elect to reciprocity before it will enforce a foreign
judgment.
G. Registration of International Arbitration Awards
The United States has an obligation under the 1899 Hague Convention, the
1907 Hague Convention and 1965 International Settlement of Investment
Disputes to enforce decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and ICSID
arbitration panels. This appears to be a fairly discrete and self-executing
obligation.
However, there are practical problems. The prevailing party submits an
award to the local marshal. What will the marshal do? Probably nothing. The
marshal will insist on an execution signed by a judicial authority the marshal
recognizes.
So the prevailing party goes to a local court and tries to submit the award
to obtain an execution. The court clerk has never seen such a thing and has no
procedures for handling such an award. The legislation gives the prevailing
party a procedure for enforcing the award.
Connecticut will enforce both interim measures of protection and final
award. Federal legislation for ISCID awards does not allow the enforcement
of interior measures of protection.
9. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Connecticut adopted the draft of
the act just before it was finalized. Other states have adopted the final act.
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§50a-30-39.
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H. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Connecticut recognizes its obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations to allow foreign nationals to contact their consul. While
this convention leaves it up to the foreign national to determine if he was to
contact his consul, certain bilateral conventions require notification even over
the foreign national's objection.
Connecticut implemented the United States' obligations by a judicial
department policy. Foreign governments are notified by fax when their
nationals are being detained. The fax is preserved to show notification was
actually given. Defendants are notified of this right in open court when they are
read their rights.
L Foreign Legal Consultants
The Connecticut General Assembly legislatively empowered to the
Judicial Department to regulate foreign legal consultants. The Judicial
Department responded by enacting a comprehensive scheme to allow foreign
lawyers to practice foreign (but not Connecticut) law within Connecticut.
J. Overseas Service of Process2
Although the United States became a party to the Hague Convention of
Service of Process Abroad on February 10, 1969, there was no coordination of
the Convention with court rules. Connecticut has taken that step.
K. Taking Evidence Abroad 3
Although the United States became a party to the Hague Convention on
taking evidence abroad on October 7, 1972, there was no coordination of the
Convention with court rules. Connecticut has taken that step.
L. Practicing Law by Foreign Lawyers During Arbitrations14
After enacting the UNC1TRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, it was only reasonable to expect international arbitrations to occur
in Connecticut. As foreign parties begin to arbitrate, they will want to use their
customary counsel.
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-80a; CONN. PRACTICE BOOK §§2-17-21 (2006), available at
www.jud.state.ct.us/Publications/PracticeBook/PB 1 .pdf.
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-59d; CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 11-8.
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-197b; CONN. PRACTICE BOOK §13-21.
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-163a; CONN. PRACTIcE BOOK §10-3(b).
Lowry
Hong Kong first raised the issue of whether representing a party in an
international arbitration constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
Recognizing this restrictive interpretation would have international arbitration
more than it helped the local bar, Hong Kong ultimately decided representing
a party in an international arbitration does not constitute the practice of law.
The issue had never been raised in Connecticut before. Nevertheless,
Connecticut agreed with Hong Kong's analysis. This decision was codified in
the unauthorized practice of law statute. If an arbitration is an international
commercial arbitration under the UNCITRAL Model Law, anyone (not just a
qualified lawyer) may represent a party.
M. Determining Foreign Law15
Foreign law is generally a question of fact to be determined by a judge
instead of a jury. This doctrine was codified in the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Uniform Law for the determination of
foreign law.
Connecticut's old statute required the foreign jurisdiction to deposit a
certified copy of their laws. This was obviously not being done. The laws of
many jurisdictions are available from a variety of commercial publishers.
Under these circumstances, the parties should be able to rely on commercially
available material instead of bringing in a foreign legal expert to testify.
m11. CONCLUSION
The federal states within the United States have a real and significant role
in implementing international law within their boundaries. It is a responsibility
that should neither be taken lightly nor shirked.
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-163a; CONN. PRACTICE BOOK §10-3.
20061
COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ENFORCEMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR
NONCOMPLIANCE
Dr. Christopher A. Ford*
I. THE COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS .................... 583
U. NONCOMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ....................... 586
A. Finding the Balance ................................. 587
B. Counter-WMD Intervention ........................... 588
C. Diplomacy and Counter-Proliferation ................... 589
III. CONCLUSION .......................................... 591
Good morning.
The question posed for this panel, about the relationship between weapons
of mass destruction (hereinafter "WMD") related noncompliance findings and
what you have tactfully described as exceptional actions by states acting
together or acting unilaterally, is a provocative and important one. In order to
help enrich your deliberations, I would like to offer some observations upon
these matters from the perspective of an official whose job it is at the State
Department to do compliance assessments. To begin with, I'd like to say a few
words to outline what we mean when we talk about a noncompliance finding.
I. THE COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS
I serve as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and as Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Compliance Policy in something called the Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation at the U.S. Department of State
(hereinafter "VCr'). VCI is a very young bureau, having been established by
statute only in 1999,' but it is in some ways the direct descendent of the
* Dr. Ford is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation, U.S. Department of State. This article is a revised reproduction of oral
remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1. Pub. Law No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-486), § 11 12(c)(1) (creating Assistant Secretary of
State for Verification and Compliance to have "principal responsibility [for] the overall supervision
(including oversight of policy and resources) within the U.S. Department of State on all matters relating to
verification and compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements
or conmiitments"). The new Assistant Secretary, the statute specified, was to "participate in all interagency
groups or organizations within the executive branch of Government that assess, analyze, or review United
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Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support Bureau (hereinafter "IVF')
of the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (hereinafter "ACDA").
Among our responsibilities is taking the lead role within the U.S. Government
in arriving at compliance findings for arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament agreements and commitments. This includes, most prominently,
drafting the President's congressionally-mandated annual report to Congress
that identifies instances of noncompliance with such agreements and
commitments, and outlines compliance concerns related thereto. The most
recent report-the longest and most detailed ever, running to a total of over 700
pages in three versions published at different levels of classification-was just
issued in August. You can find the unclassified version on our Bureau's
website.2
States planned or ongoing policies, programs, or actions that have a direct bearing on verification or
compliance matters, including interagency intelligence committees concerned with the development or
exploitation of measurement or signals intelligence or other national technical means of verification." Id. §
1112(c)(2)(A). The Assistant Secretary was also to be "the principal policy community representative to the
intelligence community on verification and compliance matters." Id. § 11 12(c)(3). Congress had disagreed
with the State Department's reorganization plan-which had proposed to divide the verification staff
functions of the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) between a "Special Advisor" to the
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and a Deputy Assistant Secretary within the
then-Arms Control Bureau-and opted instead to give "the verification and compliance aspects of arms
control agreements... a voice at the most senior level of the Administration" by creating a purpose-specific
Assistant Secretary. Id. "A true commitment to vigorous enforcement of arms control and nonproliferation
agreements and sanctions," said the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "cannot be maintained by
submerging compliance analysis within other bureaus." S. REP. No. 106-43, at 28 (1999); see also Jesse
Helms & Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Letter to William J. Clinton, at 1 (Feb. 24, 1999) (expressing concern that
"under your plan, the function of verification and compliance or arms control treaties would not be carried
out by a separate bureau"). The leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had also expressed
similar concerns. See Richard C. Shelby & J. Robert Kerrey, Letter to Madeleine K. Albright, at 2 (Sept. 15,
1997) (urging creation of separate "Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance to maintain
the integrity of the verification and compliance process, and to protect the credibility within the Senate of the
Department's assessments in this area").
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF VERIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION,
ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WrrH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/c 15720.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2006). The report is drafted by the Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation but by law is a Presidential report. See 22 U.S.C. § 2593a(a)(4) (requiring President to
submit "a detailed assessment of the adherence of other nations to obligations undertaken on all arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments, including the Missile Technology Control
Regime, to which the United States is a participating state, including information on actions taken by each
nation with regard to the size, structure, and disposition of its military forces in order to comply with arms
control, nonproliferation, or disarmament agreements or commitments" including "a specific identification,
to the maximum extent practicable in unclassified form, of each and every question that exists with respect
to compliance by other countries with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements with the
United States"). The President has delegated authority to the Secretary of State to sign the report and submit
it to Congress on his behalf. See Delegation of Certain Congressional Reporting Functions, Exec. Order No.
Anyway, we do compliance assessments for a living, and I'd like to talk
a little bit about what goes into them. In our diplomatic engagement with other
governments on compliance-related matters, it has become apparent that many
do not understand the complexity and rigor of the U.S. compliance assessment
process. They sometimes seem to assume that we reach compliance findings
as mere issues of policy preference-as if we just sit around a table and
someone declares that "I don't like that country, so they must be guilty of
noncompliance with something." In fact, I fear that is how some governments
probably make such decisions. But we certainly don't.
The U.S. process, as shown in the preparation of the annual Noncom-
pliance Report, is a long and complex one that involves the entire interagency
community and detailed clearance procedures in which officials sometimes
argue at length over subtle nuances of phrasing and, yes, even punctuation. The
text of the report is cleared by all relevant parts of the policy community-
including the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy and the National
Security Council staff-as well as by the U.S. Intelligence Community. This
elaborate and often difficult process is quite appropriate; the report is, by law,
the President's report and it represents the findings of the U.S Government as
a whole, not just one or more components of it.
Conceptually, the process begins with trying to ensure that we have a clear
understanding of the obligations in question. These obligations can come in
many forms, ranging from formal treaties such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (hereinafter "NPT"), to informal, voluntary arrangements among a group
of countries such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (hereinafter
"MTCR"), to United Nations resolutions such as UNSCR 1540, which commits
nations to undertake efforts to stem the proliferation of WMD.
It is often imagined that compliance analysts spend most of their time
arguing over facts and over interpretations of intelligence information, but
interestingly, it is often the meaning of the underlying obligation that causes
intense discussion and debate. This highlights the point that compliance
analysis is different from intelligence analysis. To be sure, compliance analysis
depends upon intelligence, which must be assessed and understood. But
compliance analysis also involves legal analysis, because one needs to be able
to explain what a country is required to do before one can judge whether that
country has done it. Ultimately, all this requires a policy judgment as to
whether the facts constitute a violation when held up against a promise or an
obligation.
It's also worth noting that for compliance assessment purposes, some of
the things over which intelligence analysts spend their time arguing are not
13313,68 Fed. Reg. 46073 (July 31,2003), at § 1 (a)(15), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/orders (last
visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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always of primary importance. There may be different views, for instance,
about when a certain country will have come into possession of a workable
nuclear weapon, or how many weapons they currently have. Those are vital
questions for the Intelligence Community, and for policymakers whose job it
is to reduce or counter the national security threats represented by such
capabilities. For a compliance analyst, however, the key may often simply be
whether the country in question is trying to develop nuclear weapons at all,
which, for NPT non-nuclear weapons states, is the key to identifying a potential
Article II violation.3
II. NONCOMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
So that's the compliance assessment process. But for today's purposes,
the most interesting discussions will likely be about the implications of
noncompliance. And this is indeed where some of the most important
challenges lie in our world of verification and compliance.
Dr. Fred Ickl, who went on to become head of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, wrote an article in 1961 for Foreign Affairs magazine
which made a very important point that holds true today. The title of his article
was After Detection ... What?,4 and this title nicely summaries his point.
Verification capabilities are clearly crucial in the arms control, nonprolifera-
tion, and disarmament world. One needs to be able to detect violations in time
to be able to do something about them. But that's the rub. Detection alone is
of little value. Detection serves its purpose only by providing a foundation for,
and warning timely enough to permit, effective action in compliance
enforcement. There is no way around the need for taking action to counter the
threat posed by a violation, return the violator to compliance, and deter others
from following in his footsteps.
This is a lesson unfortunately underscored by recent events. Even though
the world has long since learned of Iran's flagrant noncompliance with its
nuclear safeguards obligations and with Article II of the NPT, the international
community is still having a difficult time making such noncompliance costly
and unattractive-either to Tehran or to any country that might contemplate
following Iran's path in the future. The international community is also
3. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IL Apr. 22, 1970, 729 U.N.T.S.
161 ("Each non-nuclear weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes... not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.") [hereinafter Non-Prolifeiation Treaty].
See also NOTIFICATION TO INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) OF TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAR. 5, 1970 ENTRY INTO FORCE, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Otherstinfcirel40.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
4. Fred Charles Ickl6, After Detection-What?, 39:2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 208-20, Jan. 1961.
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struggling to agree upon how to provide a "what" in response to North Korea's
even more obvious violations of the NPT. Dr. Ickld was, I believe, right to
suggest that it can often be even harder to mount an effective response than it
is to detect violations in the first place.
But what sort of response is appropriate, and when is it permitted?
A. Finding the Balance
You will probably find our Bureau second to none in advocating firm
responses to compliance problems. After all, it is important that all violations
-- or at least all deliberate ones, anyway--elicit some compliance pressure
aimed at making noncompliance expensive, difficult, annoying, or dangerous.
The proliferators of today have learned lessons from how the international
community has handled noncompliance in the past, and it seems clear that
tomorrow's would-be proliferators will learn from the choices we make in
responding to today's proliferation challenges. Not taking violations seriously,
wherever they occur-thereby sending the message that compliance is not
important, or is negotiable-can have grave consequences in undermining our
ability to stand firm when it matters most. As a result, we believe it important
for the U.S. to be a stickler for compliance rigor, and to engage in vigorous
efforts to ensure compliance enforcement-a role, incidentally, which we feel
to be the responsibility of all members of the international community, jointly
and severally.
But it is also clear that not all failings are equally dangerous. South Korea,
for instance, engaged in a few undeclared uranium enrichment and plutonium-
separation experiments inconsistent with its obligations under its nuclear
safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(hereinafter "IAEA"). In stark contrast, Iran carried on a twenty-year
clandestine program to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle capable of producing,
and clearly intended to produce, fissile material usable in nuclear weapons.
Clearly, Iran's activities are far more threatening to international peace and
security.
Both cases represented compliance difficulties, but the dangers they
present-and the responses these different efforts should therefore elicit-vary
enormously. South Korea quickly cleaned up its act when the IAEA brought
the problem to its attention, so no response beyond mere chastisement was
5. I do not address here the problem of a state that fails to comply with an obligation on account
of error, incompetence, or forces beyond its control. In some such cases (e.g., those of simple error), mere
detection of noncompliance may, alone, lead to redress. In others, remedying noncompliance may present
capacity-building challenges (e.g., it may take time and money to fix things). These problems, however, are
different from the challenges presented by a willful violation-with which both Dr. Ickld and I are principally
concerned.
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needed. Iran, however, seems intent upon retaining the fuel-cycle capabilities
it secretly acquired as part of its nuclear weapons effort, while North Korea
actually brags about achieving a weapons capability. Both Iran and North
Korea appear to need a good deal more compliance pressure than mere
admonishment.
Another interesting comparison is the case of Libya. The Libyans clearly
violated Article II of the NPT by engaging in a program to manufacture nuclear
weapons-which they aimed to do with the help of gas centrifuges for uranium
enrichment, and even nuclear weapons designs, acquired from the A.Q. Khan
proliferation network. Their program included undeclared possession of
uranium hexafluoride centrifuge feedstock in noncompliance with their
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and therefore in
noncompliance with Article II of the NPT.6 As a nuclear weapons develop-
ment program, this effort constituted a very serious noncompliance problem
indeed. But the context in which we learned the full details of these problems,
however, was one in which it was clear that Libya was on the road to reforming
its proliferating ways and eliminating its WMD programs.
So while noncompliance is always bad and should always elicit com-
pliance pressure in response, context is critical. Decisions about appropriate
responses to noncompliance can raise very complex and difficult questions, and
they require all sorts of policy, and sometimes legal determinations. There is
no substitute for good judgment and policy sense, and it may not be possible to
set down precise recipes ahead of time for which responses will be appropriate
in any particular case.
B. Counter-WMD Intervention
In extreme cases, particularly given the nature of the potential threats that
can be posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by a rogue
state-particularly one with ties to international terrorism-the repertoire of
potential responses to proliferation noncompliance may include military action.
Of course, any decision to take this course of action would require careful
6. See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 3, art. III ("Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to
the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillments of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be
followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used
in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall
be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of
such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.")
analysis of legal authorities and policy considerations, and would ultimately be
made at the highest levels of our government.
We are often asked when such action would be consistent with the United
Nations Charter and other principles of international law. It is impossible to
state a general rule here because, in the end, each use of force must look for its
legitimacy in the facts and circumstances that the state believes have made it
necessary, and each such use of force should be judged, not against abstract
concepts, but on the particular events that gave rise to it. In the case of Iraq, for
instance, the U.S. had ample authority under pertinent Security Council
resolutions to use force to compel compliance with WMD obligations in the
face of material breaches of Iraqi obligations under relevant resolutions of the
Security Council, including conditions that had been essential to the
establishment of the ceasefire in 1991. This is not to say, however, that
Security Council action is a sine qua non for the use of force in such cases, as
the doctrine of self-defense may be available to justify use of force in cases
where the Council has not acted. Each case must be judged on the particular
facts. This is why so many attempts to define bright-line rules describing the
circumstances in which the use of force is justified have come to naught.
C. Diplomacy and Counter-Proliferation
I would like to emphasize, however, that if we spend all our time debating
hypothetical scenarios of military intervention we will likely miss some very
important points about what can be done-and in fact is being done-to fight
WMD proliferation and prevent things from ever having to come to such a pass.
After all, it is now clear that skillful diplomacy can help create opportunities for
compliance enforcement far short of military intervention. Let me offer you
some examples:
1) This Administration's Proliferation Security Initiative
(hereinafter "PSI") and Dangerous Materials Initiative
(hereinafter "DMI"), for instance, are innovative approaches to
some of these problems that rely upon coordinated applications
of existing legal authorities to increase the costs and risks to
proliferators and smugglers of dangerous material around the
globe. We are working with like-minded friends and allies,
using well-established rules regarding ascertaining the true
nationality of vessels on the high seas or conducting medical,
safety, and customs inspections in ports of call, and securing
ship-boarding agreements with major flag states such as Panama
and Liberia. The U.S. is, by such means, making it much harder
for countries such as Libya to receive black market centrifuges,
for countries such as North Korea to ship missiles, illegal drugs,
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or counterfeit currency around the world, and for other rogue
states to acquire chemical weapon precursor materials or
ballistic missile components.
2) The U.S. is also now working with the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(hereinafter "NSG") to halt the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies while we endeavor to ensure reliable
alternative nuclear fuel supplies for countries that forswear such
proliferation-risky capabilities. Incidentally, just this past week
[October 17-18, 2005], in accordance with its recently revised
guidelines, the NSG also held an extraordinary plenary meeting
to consider the Iran issue in light of the IAEA Board of
Governors' resolution declaring Iran in noncompliance with its
safeguards obligations (and noting that this requires a U.N.
Security Council report).7 I'm pleased to note that at the NSG
plenary, the European Union announced that it would make no
transfers of NSG trigger list items to Iran and would exercise
special vigilance with regard to non-listed items that could
nonetheless be useful in enrichment and reprocessing.
3) The U.S. also uses a range of bilateral economic and diplomatic
pressures to fight WMD-related proliferation. These pressures
include sanctions laws passed by the U.S. Congress, many of
which are explicitly linked to specific international nonproli-
feration norms such as the NSG guidelines or the MTCR.
Through such mechanisms, we have made it harder and more
costly for would-be proliferators to do the wrong thing by
making it clear that one cannot be both a WMD proliferator and
a full trading partner of the world's largest economy.
4) Finally, the example of our successful efforts, first to negotiate,
and then to assist in the implementation of and ultimately to
verify Libya's elimination of its WMD programs, is also a very
important illustration of the innovative approaches being taken
to handle proliferation challenges. While we worked closely in
Libya with both the IAEA and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereinafter "OPCW"), it is
important to note that most of our work in country was done on
a cooperative trilateral basis between the U.S., our British allies,
and our Libyan partners. Once Libya had made its strategic
commitment to renounce WMD, for example, it was possible to
work with the Libyans to eliminate their nuclear weapons
program--not merely to place seals on it and monitor it
7. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (2005), available at
http//www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
pursuant to IAEA safeguards. As far as we're concerned,
dismantlement and removal beats mere monitoring any day.
Thanks to patient diplomatic efforts and a keen U.S. focus upon stopping
WMD proliferation during 2004---coming on the heels of years of international
pressure on Libya in connection with terrorism, human rights, and regional
security problems-this Administration was able to achieve a tremendous
success in WMD rollback on a voluntary and cooperative basis.
I hope these examples make clear that there exist a great many tools for
policymakers whose job it is to cope with the threats posed by noncompliance
with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and
commitments. The military variety of compliance enforcement constitutes only
one tool in the toolbox. A finding of noncompliance should always produce
compliance enforcement response, but it does not, and should not, automatically
produce any particular response. Which tools will best suit the circumstances
at hand is something that we need to consider anew for each problem that
arises, as we tackle the policy challenges of fashioning remedies that address
the wrong, and that best serve U.S. national security interests and the interests
of international peace and security.
Ill. CONCLUSION
I hope that my discussion of the compliance assessment process and the
challenges of After Detection ... What? will help you better understand the
sometimes somewhat arcane world of compliance enforcement. So while I am
sorry that I offer today no bright line rules and clear recipes, I am not sure that
such things exist. Nonetheless, I hope I have been able to impress upon you
both the seriousness and the complexity of these challenges, and I look forward
to hearing some very interesting discussions today.
Thank you.
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Christopher Ford just spoke about compliance assessment and compliance
enforcement, which are two concepts very inter-related and essential to non-
proliferation. I will too focus my presentation today on compliance, but more
specifically on its linkage with verification, another important element in non-
proliferation. The Concise Oxford Dictionary describes compliance as the
"action in accordance with request, command, etc."' Compliance with non-
proliferation obligations could then be understood as either a result of a threat
of retaliation by others, or deriving from a voluntary decision to enter into such
obligations.
The first type of compliance was most recently experienced in 1991 when
the Security Council imposed stringent disarmament obligations on Iraq,
threatening "grave consequences" in case of non-compliance (and "grave
consequences" in the diplomatic lingo means "military attacks"). The
inspections, therefore, implemented in Iraq from 1991 to 1998 and from
November 2002 to March 2003, were extremely intrusive and unrestricted.
* Mr. Gustavo R. Zlauvinen assumed his duties as Representative of the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations and Director of the IAEA Office in New
York, NY on September 4, 2001. During his career in the diplomatic service, Mr. Zlauvinen has served as
Deputy Delegate of Argentina to a number of disarmament, nuclear energy and arms control meetings, inter
alia, the Disarmament Conference, the NPT Review process, the IAEA Board of Governors and General
Conference, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the 1994 Conference on the adoption of the
Nuclear Safety Convention, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Outer Space. From 1993 to 1996, he was Rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage. He also participated in the negotiations that led to the placement of the nuclear
programmes of Argentina and Brazil under full-scope IAEA safeguards, and the ratification of the NPI" by
both countries. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law
Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20
to 22, 2005.
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They inspected any place, any time, anywhere in Iraq, and they had access to
any Iraqi official or scientists deemed relevant for verification purposes.
But most of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
obligations entered into by countries fall in the second category: voluntary
agreements by which governments decide to accept certain restrictions under
the expectation to benefit from joining those regimes.
In both cases, the third parties (the Security Council in the case of Iraq; the
other states parties to the treaties in the case of voluntary agreements) see it as
fundamental to ascertain whether the other governments are fulfilling their
obligations. One important and common tool to ascertain compliance is
through a "verification regime." Thus, verification is the action to prove either
compliance or non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements. The whole
purpose of verification is to build confidence. In cases where proliferation
concerns exist, states are demanded to be more open and transparent. Even if
such measures go beyond a state's legal obligations, they pay valuable
dividends in restoring the confidence of the international community.
Verification also serves as deterrence due to the risk of detection of
proscribed activities. For example, we now know that in July 1991 the Iraqi
regime decided to destroy, unilaterally and in secret, its clandestine missile
force to avoid being caught cheating by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM).
Verification is not a rewarding activity-it goes unnoticed until something
goes wrong. Verification is also not a perfect system, as its results depend on
many technical, legal and most importantly, political factors. Moreover,
verification is but one part of the non-proliferation regime. For the regime as
a whole to function effectively, we must ensure not only effective verification
but also effective export controls, effective physical protection of nuclear
material and effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of non-compliance.
It is imperative that these components are well integrated.
The effectiveness of a verification system depends on four elements:
a) Adequate legal authority;
b) Timely access to information;
c) Timely access to locations and people for interviews; and
d) Availability of state-of-the-art verification technology and the
right to use it.
There are many versions of verification as there are many arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. The most common type of
verification is the so-called "permissive regime," such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency's (LAEA) or Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapon's (OPCW), as it is based on a voluntary acceptance by the
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governments to be verified by external bodies. This type of verification in
general has a limited legal scope, which reduces the actual inspection activities
to certain types of materials and locations clearly defined by the agreements.
Consequently, the assurances provided by this kind of verification are also
limited. Still, they have proved to be an important tool for the international
community. Without them, each individual state party to a multilateral
disarmament or non-proliferation agreement would have to make its own
assessment about the other parties' compliance with their obligations.
Over the past years, the IAEA has clearly made progress on some fronts
in the verification area, but perhaps regressed on others. The IAEA's
resumption of inspections in Iraq in 2002, the termination of inspections in
North Korea, our investigation of clandestine nuclear programmes in Libya and
Iran, the discovery of illicit nuclear procurement networks and the lack of
agreement at the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference have put the spotlight on an unprecedented array of challenges to
the non-proliferation and arms control regime.
The IAEA's verification system has shown great resourcefulness and
resiliency in dealing with many of these challenges. We have rapidly initiated
intensive verification efforts in a number of countries and investigated the illicit
procurement network. We have strengthened the verification system through
enhanced use of satellite imagery, environmental sampling and a variety of new
technologies-well as through the development of enhanced information
analysis techniques, the introduction of integrated safeguards, and the transition
towards a more qualitative, information based system. And perhaps most
importantly, in dealing with these verification challenges, we have maintained
our objectivity and independence, and thereby strengthened our credibility. In
short, the past few years have continued to underscore the central importance
of the IAEA' s role in combating proliferation.
Let me now address two specific non-proliferation challenges and the
verification activities conducted by the IAEA.
I. NORTH KOREA
Since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to fully implement its NPT
safeguards agreement with North Korea. After an extended period of non-
compliance with that agreement, in December 2002 North Korea asked IAEA
inspectors to leave the country and a few weeks later declared its withdrawal
from the NPT. Since that time, the IAEA has not been permitted to perform any
verification activities in North Korea, and therefore, cannot provide any level
of assurance about North Korea's nuclear activities.
The IAEA remains ready to work with all parties towards a comprehensive
settlement that would both address the security needs of North Korea and
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provide assurance to the international community that all nuclear activities in
that country are exclusively for peaceful purposes. The agreement reached in
Beijing at the six-party talks-after two years of complex negotiations--on the
principles that should govern a comprehensive settlement, is a significant step
forward. It is particularly welcome that North Korea has expressed its
commitment "to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs
and [to return], at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards." 2
This past September the TAEA Board of Governors expressed the view that
a successfully negotiated settlement of this longstanding issue of maintaining
the essential verification role of the IAEA would be a significant
accomplishment for international peace and security.
II. IRAN
For the past two and a half years, the IAEA has been investigating the
nature and extent of Iran's nuclear program, with a view to assuring ourselves
that all past activities have been declared to the IAEA, and that all nuclear
material and activities in the country are under safeguards. Iran has failed in a
number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear
material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where
such material had been processed and stored.
Since October 2003, however, Iran has made good progress in correcting
its past breaches and the IAEA has been able to verify certain aspects of Iran's
nuclear program. As a result, some aspects of that program-such as those
related to uranium conversion, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and heavy
water-are now being followed up as routine safeguards implementation
matters.
Since last November, our verification efforts have focused primarily on
two aspects of Iran's centrifuge enrichment activities. Regarding the first
aspect, the origin of uranium particle contamination found at various locations
in Iran, we have made good progress, with the active cooperation of Pakistan.
Regarding the second aspect, clarifying the chronology of Iran's centrifuge
activities, we still have a number of unanswered questions and we have made
repeated requests to Iran for additional information and access.
As our latest report in September made clear, Iran continues to fulfill its
obligations under the safeguards agreement and additional protocol by
providing timely access to nuclear material, facilities and other locations. This,
2. Christopher R. Hill, Asst. Sec. for East Asian& Pac. Aff. (U.S. Dept. of State), Statement before
the House International Relations Committee (Oct. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rmV2005/54430.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
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however, is a special verification case that requires additional transparency
measures as a prerequisite for the IAEA to be able to reconstruct the history and
nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities, and to compensate for the
confidence deficit created. By promptly responding to these IAEA requests,
Iran would well serve both its interests and those of the international
community. The more thoroughly we are able to clarify all of Iran's past
nuclear activities, the more we will be in a position to understand and confih'm
the nature of the program.
As a confidence building measure, the Board has also, in a number of
resolutions beginning in December 2003, urged Iran to maintain a voluntary
suspension of all its enrichment related and reprocessing activities and has
asked the IAEA to continue to monitor Iran's application of this suspension.
Since August 8, Iran has been conducting conversion activities at the Isfahan
Uranium Conversion Facility under IAEA verification. Other aspects of Iran's
suspension remain intact.
The IAEA Board of Governors has continued to devote considerable
attention to the implementation of Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. Last
month the Board adopted a resolution that, inter alia, found Iran to be in
noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and urged Iran to implement the
transparency measures necessary for the IAEA to be able to clarify outstanding
issues. The IAEA will continue to call on Iran to do its utmost to work with the
IAEA and the international community, to provide assurance that its nuclear
program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
III. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
Countries with nuclear industries have set up elaborate accounting and
protection measures to ensure strong national oversight of their nuclear
material. The IAEA inspects regularly to verify the accuracy of what countries
report. Export controls restrict the transfer of sensitive technologies that could
be misused for nuclear-weapons production.
However, controlling access to nuclear-weapons technology has grown
increasingly difficult. The technical barriers to designing weapons and to
mastering the processing steps have eroded with time. Much of the hardware
in question is "dual-use;" for example, it is hard to justify restrictions on
exporting "hot cell" technology that could be used for plutonium separation
when the same equipment is vital for producing radioisotopes used in modern
medicine. Changes in political fortunes or economic downturns have at times
found nuclear scientists without jobs and reportedly willing to offer their
knowledge and services elsewhere. And with the passage of time, the sheer
diversity of technology has made it harder to control both procurement and
sales. In pre-1991 Iraq, for example, scientists were simultaneously pursuing
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no fewer than six different technologies to enrich uranium for eventual weapons
use, shopping for essential equipment and specialized materials in more than
ten countries.
Uranium enrichment is sophisticated and expensive, but it is not
proscribed under the NPT. Most designs for civilian nuclear-power reactors
require fuel that has been "low-enriched," and many research reactors operate
with "high-enriched" uranium. It is not uncommon, therefore, for non-nuclear-
weapon states with developed nuclear infrastructures to seek enrichment
capabilities and to possess sizeable amounts of uranium that could, if desired,
be enriched to weapons-grade.
While high-enriched uranium is easier to use in nuclear weapons, most
advanced nuclear arsenals favor plutonium, which can be tailored for use in
smaller, lighter weapons more suited for missile warheads. Plutonium is a by-
product of nuclear-reactor operation and separation technology ("reproces-
sing"), also not proscribed under the NPT, can be applied to extract the
plutonium from spent fuel for re-use in electricity production.
Under the current NPT regime, therefore, there is nothing illicit in a non-
nuclear-weapon state having enrichment or reprocessing technology, or
possessing weapon-grade nuclear material. And certain types of bomb-making
expertise, unfortunately, are readily available in the open literature. Should a
state with a fully developed fuel-cycle capability decide, for whatever reason,
to break away from its non-proliferation commitments, most experts believe it
could produce a nuclear weapon within a matter of months.
In 1970, it was assumed that relatively few countries knew how to acquire
nuclear weapons. Now, with thirty five to forty countries in the know by some
estimates, the margin of security under the current non-proliferation regime is
becoming too slim for comfort. We need a new approach.
Several proposals have been floated in the past two years, including one
by President Bush, to restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
facilities and technologies. However, countries with the potential to develop
such technologies, in particular developing countries, are opposed to any further
restriction. It is in that context that the Director General has presented his
proposal for a Multinational Approach to the nuclear fuel cycle.
In 2004, the Director General established a group of senior experts to
explore options for multilateral control of fuel cycle facilities. In February
2005, the expert group issued its report, and the Director General has been
encouraged by the range of supporting initiatives that have followed. The
uranium industry and the World Nuclear Association have set up a working
group to explore the concept of fuel assurances. The United States has been
developing a proposal on providing "reliable access to nuclear fuel," working
with principal suppliers, for states that agree to forego independent enrichment
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and reprocessing facilities. And the Nuclear Threat Initiative is working on a
strategy that would help the IAEA set up an actual fuel bank.
In addition, with spent nuclear fuel stored in temporary sites in more than
fifty countries, many without the proper geology for underground disposal,
multilateral approaches to spent fuel management and disposal could be a
solution for the future. In July in Moscow, at an international conference
organized by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (ROSATOM) in cooperation
with the IAEA, considerable discussion took place on possibilities related to
multilateral fuel storage and disposal, as well as fuel leasing or even full service
nuclear leasing.
We should be clear that there is no incompatibility between tightening
controls over the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding the use of peaceful nuclear
technologies. In fact, by reducing the risks of proliferation we could pave the
way for more widespread use of peaceful nuclear applications.
IV. NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated
technologies has taken on heightened significance in recent years. The IAEA
has been active in the field of nuclear security for many years, but the events
of September 2001 propelled the rapid and dramatic re-evaluation of the risks
of terrorism in all its forms-whether related to the security of urban centers,
oil refineries, air and rail travel, or activities involving nuclear and radiological
material. Terrorist attacks since that time have continued to keep these
concerns in the forefront of our collective consciousness. It has become
obvious that our work to strengthen nuclear security is both vital and urgent and
that we must not wait for a "watershed" nuclear security event to provide the
needed security upgrades.
Effective and credible approaches to nuclear security are essential not only
for detecting and responding to illicit trafficking, but also for the protection of
nuclear power plants, research reactors and the array of nuclear and other
radioactive materials that support these and other nuclear applications. To
optimize the effectiveness of these efforts, it is important to prioritize-to focus
on those facilities and activities where the risk is greatest-and to maintain a
balance between security needs and the many benefits of peaceful applications
of nuclear technology.
International cooperation has become the hallmark of these security
efforts. While nuclear security is and should remain a national responsibility,
some countries still lack the programmes and the resources to respond properly
to the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. For these countries,
international cooperation is essential to help them strengthen their national
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capacities. International cooperation is also essential to our efforts to build
regional and global networks for combating transnational threats.
In that context, the IAEA has established a nuclear security plan to help
states to improve their national capacities to guard against thefts of nuclear and
other radioactive material and to protect related facilities against malicious acts.
Important progress has been achieved in the last few years in increasing the
governments' awareness of the potential risk of nuclear terrorism. But much
remains to be implemented. International cooperation in this fight is essential,
as the system is as strong as its weakest link. Loose controls in one country
could mean safe passage or ground for a terrorist organization to acquire, plan
and launch a nuclear or radiological attack to another country. And the
consequences to the population and the environment in such an attack would
not only be suffered by the country under attack, but also by its neighbors.
After all, we are all on the same side in this fight.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING ARMED
CONFLICT
Jordan J. Paust*
Customary international law is universal in its reach.' It is not subject to
control by a few actors in the international legal process,2 and it binds all
participants in international and non-international armed conflicts to the extent
that it is applicable to such conflicts.'
For example, insurgents operating during an armed conflict not of an
international character who are nationals of a state that has not ratified the 1949
Geneva Conventions (a rare state, such as Taiwan) are bound by relevant
customary humanitarian law reflected, for example, in common Article 3 of the
Conventions.4 Thus, they are subject to prosecution for violations of common
Article 3's prohibitions-technically, not as violations of treaty law as such, but
as violations of the customary law reflected in common Article 3. Further, it
is widely recognized that common Article 3 reflects customary international
law,5 as a new study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
demonstrates.6
That treaties can later reflect customary law and bind nonsignatory
nationals was recognized, for example, by the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg7 with respect to German nationals despite the refusal of Germany
to ratify the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV8 prior to the outbreak of World
* Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston Law Center. This article
is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2005, held at the House
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2005.
1. See, e.g., JORDANJ. PAUST, INTERNATIONALLAw AS LAW OFTHEUNITED STATES 4,7-8,22-26
n.14, 420-23, 443-46 (2d ed., 2003).
2. See, e.g., id., at 5, 22-26 n.14.
3. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 813-14, 816-18, 820-22 (2005).
4. See, e.g., id. at 816.
5. Id. at 816-17 n.19.
6. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 299, 306-19 (2005).
7. See International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946,
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947) [hereinafter Military Tribunal].
8. Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277.
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War U1. Moreover, a general participation clause that limited the treaty's reach
to conflicts between signatory states became irrelevant once the rules mirrored
in the treaty became customary international law,9 which is universal in its
reach. The same reach can occur regarding other customary laws of war despite
attempted limitations concerning treaties through use of unilateral reservations
or understandings, since the effect of such treaty-based limitations are obviated
once the rights, duties and protections become customary international law.'"
Further, it did not matter that Germany objected, was a major participant in
war-making, and was otherwise a specially affected state. Customary
international law is based in general and dynamic patterns of opinio juris and
practice," but when a customary norm comes into existence it is universally
applicable.
With respect to Geneva law, it is important to note that common Article
1 of the Conventions, which reflects customary law, requires that signatories
and their nationals "respect and.., ensure respect" for the Conventions "in all
circumstances."' 2 Thus, customary and treaty-based Geneva obligations flow
erga omnes-that is, not merely to enemies, but also to all other signatories
and, as customary obligatio erga omnes, to all of humankind and without
putative excuses based on alleged necessity, reciprocity, or reprisals. 3
Customary international law also provides relevant rights for all
participants in international or non-international armed conflicts whether or not
they are nationals of a state, nation, or belligerent that has ratified a treaty
reflecting the same rights. With respect to treaty-based rights, it is worth
emphasizing that the nationals of a state that has ratified the 1949 Geneva
Conventions are bound by and have numerous express and implied rights under
such treaties.' 4 It does not matter that such nationals are also members of an
entity that is not a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent-such as a private
security corporation operating in Iraq, a lawyers' bar association, or al Qaeda.'5
Nationals of signatories to the Geneva Conventions, such as Saudi and Afghan
nationals, have duties and rights under Geneva law applicable to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Customary international law, which is universal in its reach, also provides
states various competencies mirrored, for example, in Hague and Geneva law,
9. Military Tribunal, supra note 7; see also Paust, supra note 3, at 819 n.28.
10. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 822-23.
11. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 3-7.
12. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Civilian Convention].
13. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 814-16.
14. See, e.g., id. at 814, 816-20, 829 n.62.
15. Id. at 829.
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whether or not persons under control or enemies in battle are nationals of
signatories to such treaties. Thus, for example, the customary competence to
detain certain persons under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security
of a state when reasonably necessary for security purposes that is reflected in
Articles 5, 42-43, and 78 of the Geneva Civilian Convention 6 can be exercised
also with respect to nonsignatory nationals. Detention of non-prisoners of war,
of course, is subject to required review of the propriety of detention. 7
Customary state competencies to detain prisoners of war 8 that are reflected in
the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention 9 also apply with respect to
nonsignatory nationals.
Customary international law also provides a necessary background as an
interpretive aid. As recognized internationally in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties2 and domestically by various decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, customary international law is a relevant and
necessary background for interpretive purposes, resolving ambiguities, and
filling in gaps.2 ' Such a role of customary law is all the more important with
respect to normsjus cogens or peremptory norms that preempt other norms with
respect to rights and duties.22 An example is the customary and jus cogens
prohibition of torture as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, 23 such
as the stripping of persons naked for interrogation purposes, the use of dogs for
interrogation and even terror purposes, and hooding for interrogation
purposes--each of which is a patently illegal tactic that was authorized and
ordered in memos by Secretary Rumsfeld and others as part of a common plan
for use in Guantanamo and even in Iraq. 24 These were clearly illegal tactics
under customary laws of war and nonderogable human rights law, and their
authorization and use can lead to criminal and civil responsibility for
16. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power To Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 503, 512-14 (2003).
17. See, e.g., id. at 507-10 (judicial review under human rights law), 514 (review under the Geneva
Civilian Convention).
18. See, e.g., id. at 510-12; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,520 (2004).
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug., 12 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
21. Id. art. 31(3)(c); See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 12-13,370,388 n.64, 435-37 (concerning
such a use of customary international law in U.S.).
22. See PAUST, supra note 1, at 48 n.57, 164-65 n.127, 370-71, 376-77.
23. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 821-22.
24. See, e.g., id. at 834-36, 838-50.
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perpetrators, conspirators, complicitors, and those guilty of the separate offense
of dereliction of duty.25
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski has stated in an August 3, 2005
interview with Professor Marjorie Cohn that she saw a Rumsfeld authorization
on a pole outside at Abu Ghraib: "It was a memorandum signed by Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld, authorizing a short list, maybe 6 or 8 techniques: use of
dogs; stress positions; loud music; deprivation of food," and so forth, adding
"[a]nd then a handwritten message over to the side that appeared to be the same
handwriting as the signature . . . said 'Make sure this happens' with two
exclamation points. '"26 On Frontline on October 18, 2005, she also stated that
Major General Miller came to Iraq to GTMOize interrogation tactics.27
Another example of the use of custom involves the incorporation of
customary human rights to due process into common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. This occurs expressly through the phrase "all the judicial
guarantees recognized by civilized nations. 28  Today, these include the
minimum human rights to due process reflected in Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,29 which in turn are
mirrored in the Rules or Statutes of the ICTY,30 the ICTR,31 and the ICC32- but
which are seriously lacking in present rules for the military commissions at
Guantanamo.33
Customary international law can also shift limitations in the Geneva
Conventions or override them. An example is the recognized applicability of
rights and duties set forth in common Article 3, not merely during insurgencies,
but also during belligerencies and wars among nations and/or states such as the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps more appropriately, the rights and duties
reflected in common Article 3 are now a minimum set of customary rights and
25. See, e.g., id. at 852-55, 862 n. 198.
26. Marjorie Cohn, Abu Ghraib General Lambastes Bush Administration, TRUTHOUT:
PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 24, 2005, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/082405Z.shtml (last visited Feb. 15,2006).
27. Frontline Interview with Janis Karpinski, Gulf War Veteran and Army Reservist, (Aug. 5,2005),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/karpinski.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2006).
28. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 16, at 511 n.27, 514.
29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
30. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), arts.
20-21, S.C. Res. 827, Annex (May 25, 1993).
31. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), arts. 19-20,24-25, S.C.
Res. 955, Annex (Nov. 8, 1994).
32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 55, 66-67, 81-83, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 183/9 (July 17, 1998).
33. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 677-90 (2002).
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duties that are also applicable in international armed conflicts.34 Moreover,
customary and universally applicable human rights apply during war and
provide at least the same or similar rights and restraints.35
Another area of customary law is worth highlighting-the immunity of
combatants from prosecution for conduct that is lawful under the customary
laws of war.36 Interrelated is the customary definition of "combatant," which
hinges on membership in the armed forces of a belligerent, nation, or state
during an armed conflict.37 Attempts to change that test can be dangerous for
U.S. and other military personnel.38 Of course, mere insurgents have no
combatant status or combatant immunity under customary law.39
Customary international law can also have effects domestically.4 For
example, when a treaty is not directly incorporable but the customary laws of
war can be, customary laws of war can produce direct effects in a domestic
legal process.4' In the United States, the customary laws of war are binding on
the President and all persons within the Executive branch.42 There have also
been recognitions of the primacy of the laws of war over federal statutes.43
34. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 816-17 n.19.
35. See, e.g., id. at 820-22. Under the U.N. Charter, human rights would also prevail over
inconsistent law of war treaties. See U.N. Charter arts. 55(c), 56, 103. Human rightsjus cogens would also
prevail over more ordinary international law.
36. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 330-33 (2003).
37. Id. at 328-330.
38. See, e.g., id. at 332-35.
39. Id. at 327-29.
40. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 7-16.
41. See, e.g., id. at 10-12, 15,170-73,293-96 n.503,370-71,489,492-94,499-501 n.25,507-08
n.87.
42. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 856, 858-61.
43. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 1, at 106-07.
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